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***FILHO DO PORTO, FILHO DO IMPÉRIO: ANTÓNIO FRANCISCO DA SILVA PORTO (1817-1890) AND THE POLITICS OF MOTIVATION IN PORTUGAL'S FIRST AND SECOND SCRAMBLES FOR AFRICA (1836-1861; 1875-1891)***

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"Hurry up, Hurry up! Here comes a foreigner!"  
Portuguese to friends in Cafeteria line  
Lisbon Airport, seeing the writer, who  
Obviously looked like a foreigner,  
Coming behind them in line. Late 1970s,  
Early 1980s.

A study of the contribution of the life and work of *sertanejo* António Francisco da Silva Porto (1817-1890) of Angola to Portuguese imperialism in Africa affords the opportunity to re-examine the on-going historiographical debate regarding Portugal's motives in the Scramble for Africa. The life and times of a Portuguese settler-trader-merchant-explorer in the interior of central and southern Angola and further east presents evidence which enables inquiring historians to re-examine evidence, ask new and old questions about the factors behind Portugal's involvement in expanding her imperial control, claiming and annexing new African territory. Besides the splendid occasion of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of key events in 1890 and 1891, which brought this Congress together at a time when the world is convulsed with concern about territorial aggression in an international context, there is yet another reason for a reappraisal of the scholarly discussions over Portuguese imperial motives: 1991 marks the silver anniversary of the publication of a book which helped spark the original debate regarding why Portugal was in late 19th century Africa: Richard J. Hammond's *Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: a study in uneconomic imperialism* (Stanford, 1966).

While the two main protagonist-authors of this debate have been Hammond and Gervase Clarence-Smith, it is vital in this re-examination of the motives question to give credit also to other historians between 1959 and 1980, including Duffy, Axelson, Newitt, Robinson and Gallagher and this historian who provided ammunition for both sides but who are rarely included in the

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discussion. Hammond's main thesis<sup>1</sup>, which has been somewhat taken out of context by Clarence-Smith<sup>2</sup>, owes an acknowledged debt to Duffy's<sup>3</sup> pioneering study, and which elicited the criticism at the time of publication of this historian who cited the example of Silva Porto's motives<sup>4</sup>, can be summarised in part as:

[in dealing with motives of the involved European countries in the Scramble for Africa:

"...[if the historian is asked to adduce a single, overriding motive for the "scramble for Africa"] the Veblenian notion of conspicuous consumption, seems nearer the mark than the urgings of Hobsonian, capitalists bent on enlarging export markets in improbable places."<sup>5</sup>

"Portugal, at the time of the nineteenth century scramble for Africa, held title to a few bits of African seaboard and little besides; no industries seeking overseas markets, no middle class seeking overseas fortunes, no capitalists seeking overseas investment, no large military forces seeking overseas employment."<sup>6</sup>

The latter statement and several variations in Hammond's writings provided the *casus belli* in this little war and Clarence-Smith in his major work on the Portuguese Empire<sup>7</sup> found every statement within that quote an easy target. His main thesis on Portugal's motives suggests that Portugal was in economic motives like the run-of-the-mill European imperial power of the day "the driving force behind [Portugal's] imperial expansion [after 1870] was the search for markets, to which I would add a constant preoccupation with the need for foreign exchange, in short a renewed mercantilism. "In Chapter 4 on "The new mercantilism" (1880s to 1910) he refines this thesis when he suggests that it was the onset of a capitalist recession, a crisis in in

<sup>1</sup> Hammond's thesis, fully analysed in his 1966 book, is somewhat over-simplified in his chapter, "Some economic aspects of Portuguese Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries," in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (Eds.), *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960* (Cambridge, 1975), vol. 1V, p. 256.

<sup>2</sup> Clarence-Smith, G. *The third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975. A study in economic imperialism* (Manchester, 1985), pp. VII-VIII; 81-82. See also his article, the first shot in 'the motives war', in effect: The Myth of Uneconomic Imperialism. The Portuguese in Angola, 1836-1926, "J of Southern African Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, 1979, pp. 165-167ff.

<sup>3</sup> James Duffy *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, MA., 1959), see espec. Chapter VIII, "Livingstone and the Portuguese", Chapter VIII, "International Disputes", and pp. 225-226 of Chapter IX, "A new Era" in a work which helped interest a generation of American Africanists in Lusophone Africa in the 1960s and later.

<sup>4</sup> Douglas L. Wheeler, review of Hammond's book, *Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism* (Stanford, 1966), in *Journal of African History*, vol. IX, n°1, 1968, pp. 582-598.

<sup>5</sup> R. J. Hammond, "Economic imperialism, side-lights on a stereo-type," *Journal of Economic History*, XXI, no. 4, 1961, pp. 582-598.

<sup>6</sup> See Hammond chapter (1975) cited in footnote 1.

<sup>7</sup> See note 2, Clarence-Smith's 1985 book cited.

Portugal's economic development, which impelled Portugal into the Scramble for Africa<sup>8</sup>.

A study of the life and times of António da Silva Porto, including an examination of his private diaries and reports, and of the writings of other members of the colonial movement and imperialist ventures, however, provides evidence which supports a revision of the bases of the Hammond vs. Clarence-Smith thesis debate and sheds new light on approaching Portugal's role in the Scramble for Africa. While not attempting, to challenge the economic aspects of Clarence-Smith's valuable contribution to the economic history of Portugal's third empire, this historian focuses on six factors, all rather uneconomic, which helped drive Portugal's effort in the second Scramble for Africa (1875-1891), following her first Scramble for Africa on her own (1836-1861).

1. Intensive Portuguese nationalism before 1870s economic crisis fused with notion of 'Greater Portugal' and new imperialism and colonialism.
2. Belief of imperially-minded elites that African empire gave weak Portugal in Europe what it lacked: status respect and security against aggressors and creditors.
3. Impetus from Portugal's first Scramble for Africa, 1838-1861 in Angola, 1860s in Mozambique, and post-1822 African territorial-trade disputes with Ally, England.
4. Influence of individual foreign travellers, agents, like Livingstone who appear in Portuguese areas, make criticisms.
5. Diplomatic incidents arising from territorial disputes (1846, 1855, 1860, 1870, 1875, 1885, 1890) like foreigners intrusions threaten Portuguese sovereignty and arouse Portuguese to greater activity.
6. Actions, influence of Portuguese individuals, organizations (both public & private) support expansion in Africa.

#### **Biographical Sketch of António Francisco Ferreira da Silva Porto.**

Born on August 24, 1817 in the city of Oporto<sup>9</sup> to a middle class family, his Father Francisco, was an "industrial", Silva Porto had only a rudimentary formal education<sup>10</sup>. Dreaming of making his fortune in Brazil, Silva Porto who added "Porto" to his name after he left his hometown) emigrated to Brazil in

<sup>8</sup> Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>9</sup> Two biographical articles, albeit not comprehensive or up-to-date, are found in António da Silva Porto "*Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira* (Lisbon), vol.28, pp. 884-885; and Jofre Amaral Nogueira, "Silva Porto" in *Dicionário de História de Portugal*, vol.III, p.885.

<sup>10</sup> There is no full, up-to-date biography of Silva Porto in Portuguese and most of the printed works appeared either just after the sertanejo's suicide or during the New State's colonial early years: Luciano, Cordeiro, *Silva Porto publication programs early years: Luciano Cordeiro, Silva Porto (Lisbon, 1891); Gastao de Sousa Dias, Silva Porto e a travessia do continente Africano*(Lisbon, 1938) António Augusto Dias "Pombeiros de Angola, " *Cadernos Coloniais* (Lisbon, 1938), no .35, 62pp; Ralph Delgado, *Ao Sul do Cuanza* (Lisbon, 1944), vol.I.

1829. In Brazil he worked in commerce as a clerk in various businesses in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, but found few prospects of fulfilling his dreams of prosperity and decided to leave Brazil for Angola in 1838. He resided briefly in Luanda but then struck out on his own as an itinerant trader, soon to become a *sertanejo*, into the interior and participated in the long distance trade between the upper Zambezi River and the Angolan coast, especially the route which penetrated the Bie (Vie) plateau and descended to Benguela.

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Much of the remainder of his long, eventful life was spent as a *sertanejo*, or Angolan trader in the interior, who traded European goods, often cloth, gun powder and firearms, and alcohol, for ivory, wax, slaves and, later, rubber<sup>11</sup>. After he established a residence in Bie, which he named "Belmonte" (the original locus of the town named "Silva Porto"<sup>12</sup> by the Government in 1922), in 1845, he spent most of his time on trading expeditions between the Angolan coast and the interior. He acted in an official capacity in some Government appointed colonial post connected with negotiations with African authorities, farmed properties in Benguela, made some trips to Portugal, and wrote letters, diaries, or reports to members of the Government or friends in the colonial organizations in Lisbon and Oporto, in order to expand and consolidate Portugal's sovereignty and rule over the interior of Angola or over Central Africa: in 1848 he was appointed a sort of settlers' representative of the Governor of Benguela in Bie in litigation regarding an African chief; in 1852 he was given the official mission by the governor-general of Angola, in the early "Scramble" phase of the Portuguese in Angola, to take a trading and exploring expedition to the upper Zambezi River; he reached what became Barotseland (Western Zambia), but was prevented from crossing the continent because of illness and uncertain political conditions. Several of his pombeiros, however, reached the coast of Portuguese East Africa in 1853. Characteristically, Silva Porto donated the modest funds the Government of Angola had sent him for the ill-fated expedition, to a Mercy Hospital (charitable) in Oporto<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> The most valuable historical sources on the life and times of Silva Porto in Angola is still largely in manuscript : his diaries which are deposited in archives and libraries in Lisbon and Oporto which are in 13 volumes: *Viagens e apontamentos de um Portuense em África* (found in Biblioteca Municipal Pública do Porto; Biblioteca da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa (Lisbon); and Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon; various reports and letters he wrote from Angola to friends, family and officials in Portugal are deposited also in the Library of the Sociedade de Geografia, Lisboa

<sup>12</sup> "Silva Porto" *Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira*, vol.28, p. 883, "Cidade, sede da prov. dist e conc. do Bie etc.

<sup>13</sup> Excerpts from Silva Porto's unique diaries are collected and edited in a work edited by Gastão de Sousa Dias: Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos de um Portuense em África* (Lisbon, 1942); this work material on Silva Porto's to cross the continent, 1852-53 and reactions to contacts with Livingstone.

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While in Barotseland in 1852-53 at Naliele, Silva Porto met with the Scottish Missionary-explorer, David Livingstone, an event, which changed his life and altered the course of the later European "Scramble for Africa"<sup>14</sup>. Livingstone's choice of route to the Atlantic coast on this first transcontinental journey was to take a north route via Cassange to Luanda and not a central-south route via Silva Porto's establishment in Bie to Benguela, and consequences which followed from it, influenced Silva Porto's attitudes toward Portugal's participation in the Scramble and her relationship with oldest ally, England, Livingstone's choice of an eastern, Zambezi approach to Central Africa, and Portugal's strategy in the *contra-costa* quest years later. Following Silva Porto's providing assistance to Livingstone to reach Luanda and later contacts, as well as Livingstone's dubious claim to be the first European to reach the upper Zambezi and that Silva Porto was a "mestiço" and, in effect, not in the running for the honour of priority in discovery, Silva Porto remained obsessed with the Scottish missionary-explorer's world fame and imperial influence. His voluminous diaries are replete with references to Livingstone and he even noted that he dreamt about Livingstone a decade following their meeting in the wilderness. Just as the explorer Alexandre Serpa Pinto years later was influenced by the example of Henry Morton Stanley's feat of tracing the course of the Congo (Zaire) River to its mouth, so Silva Porto's drive to influence Portugal to invade and annex the Angolan central plateau as a strategic staging area for the acquisition of a band of Central Africa which would connect east Angola and west Mozambique, the *contra-costa* dream at least as old as the 18th century among some Portuguese colonialists, was in part charged by the anger and resentment (and jealousy) felt toward David Livingstone's role in helping to sabotage Portugal's fondest goals in the Scramble.

For about a decade, 1869-1879, Silva Porto retired as a farmer-plantation owner-merchant to properties near Benguela<sup>15</sup>. Following earlier pleas to Luanda and Lisbon in letters, reports and passages from his diaries published in Portuguese newspapers, Silva Porto in 1868 suggested that Portugal secure claims to Central Africa, between Angola and Mozambique, with a national expedition of explorers from Bie to the upper Zambesi to the coast of Mozambique<sup>16</sup>. When such an expedition, led by the Portuguese

<sup>14</sup> Silva Porto's diaries beginning in 1852 and ending in final entries in March 1890 have numerous references to David Livingstone, his deeds and writings.

<sup>15</sup> Silva Porto purchased a "*fazenda*" named "*Bemposta*" near Benguela, Angola on October 30, 1870 for "11 contos de reis fortes" or slightly more, and took possession on January 1, 1871. *Viagens e apontamentos*. vol.VI, pp. 224-225, entries for October 1870, etc.,

<sup>16</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, . vol.V. See espec.pp. 101-192 which are Silva Porto's notes and analysis after reading one of the premier Portuguese works which proposed greater imperial activism for Portugal in Angola and which criticised the 1866 book of David Livingstone (*Narrative*): Dr. José de Lacerda, *Exame das viagens do Doutor Livingstone* (Lisbon, 1867); from the Silva Porto diaries, it appears that the sertenejo began to read Lacerda's book in May 1868; see also, Luciano Cordeiro, *Silva Porto e Livingstone* (Lisbon, 1890) in effect, Silva

military officer-explorers, Capelo, Ivens and Serpa Pinto, reached plateau Angola in 1877-78, Silva Porto provided important assistance; the expedition split into two expeditions and neither was successful in laying claim to Central Africa and only Serpa Pinto succeeded in crossing the continent but found it impossible to reach Portuguese territory from Angola and had to cross through South Africa<sup>17</sup>.

Silva Porto's later years on the Bie plateau were full of personal frustration. While Portugal devoted more resources to the Scramble for Africa in Angola, his beloved Bie was not used as the jumping off point for fulfilling the promise, Serpa Pinto's schemes of the *Mapa cor de Rosa* (1887), utilising Bie as Silva Porto envisioned came to naught<sup>18</sup>; while making a comfortable living he discovered he could not afford to retire in Portugal and was deeply involved in trade disputes with African merchants and chiefs<sup>19</sup>; he was disillusioned by news of the English "ultimatum" of January 11 1890, a fire had destroyed his house some weeks before that, and, despite Portugal's dispatch of an armed expedition to Bie which was to go east into Central Africa in 1890, Silva Porto found that local traditional African authorities remained hostile to such initiatives and that Portugal's writ remained weak on the plateau not only militarily, for most of the Ovimbundu states were not yet conquered, but economically<sup>20</sup>. Ovimbundu caravan leaders were becoming

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Porto's entry in his diary for Sept. 14, 1868, following his reading of Lacerda's controversial book, is the introductory material in Cordeiro's book. It is noteworthy that throughout his diaries Silva Porto refers to Livingstone with a deferential tone and invariably describes the Scottish explorer-missionary as "*O illustre viajante*" [19th century spelling maintained here]

<sup>17</sup> For material on the 1877-78 Portuguese expedition to Angola, see Douglas L. Wheeler, "Stanley [Henry Morton] and the Portuguese Explores," *Anglo-Portuguese News* (Lisbon), Jan. 20, 1962, pp. 1ff; Douglas L. Wheeler, *The Portuguese in Angola 1836-1891: A Study in Expansion and Administration* unpublished PhD. dissertation, History University, 1963), pp. 252-270, from Chapt. VI, "The Way to Berlin, 1877-1885."

<sup>18</sup> For useful general studies on Portugal's participation in the Scramble for Africa, with an emphasis on diplomatic records in Britain and Portugal, see Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble For Africa 1875-1891* (Johannesburg, 1967); Charles E. Nowell, "Portugal and the Partition of Africa," *Journal of Modern History*, XIX (London, 1947), pp. 13-14ff; see also, on South-eastern Africa, M. Jackson, *European Powers and South-East Africa* (London, 1947) and Raymond W. Bixler, "Anglo Portuguese Rivalry for Delagoa Bay," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. VI (1934), pp. 425-440.

<sup>19</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol. II, , entries for October 2-28, 1870, p. 224ff; the old trader traveller vacillated about plans to return to Portugal. In 1870 he noted in one entry that he would return that year or in 1873 after "two more journeys" into the Angolan interior, "*este bello paiz, mas de ingratos povoadores*." In late October came news which helped make up his mind not to return to Portugal then: his 22 year old son, he learned at Catumbella, had died.

<sup>20</sup> . For accounts of Portugal's efforts in 1890 to send expeditions from plateau Angola (Bie) to "pacify" and assert sovereignty in the interior and also connect up with Portuguese expeditions dispatched from Mozambique, see Marquez do Lavradio, *Portugal em Africa. Depois de 1851* (Lisbon, 1937); Alexandre Malheiros, *Crônicas do Bihe* (Lisbon 1903); Gastão de Sousa Dias (Ed.), *Artur de Paiva* (2 vols.) (Lisbon, 1938), vol. I, pp. 180-190; see also my doctoral

mercantile powers apart from the Portuguese. Feeling old, ill and perhaps fearing for his life following an African chief's threats, Silva Porto committed suicide early in the morning of March 30 by means of standing on barrels of gun powder, wrapping himself in a Portuguese flag he had made and which was flown in his Central African expeditions since 1847, and throwing a match. Mortally wounded, he lived until April 3, 1890<sup>21</sup>.

The public response to his spectacular demise and to the memory of his key role in Portugal's expansion into the interior of tropical Central Africa grew upon news of his death and burial in Angola. This intrepid colonial and colonialist, "the Pioneer [white trader-explorer] of Angola,<sup>22</sup>" Portuguese "folk hero"<sup>23</sup>, entered colonial legend during the emotional national reaction to the rebuff of the 1890 Ultimatum. Significantly, his widely known last will and testament donated to Portugal his properties and fortified house at Belmonte, and became the core of the colonial town of Silva Porto (official name, 1922-1975) along the Benguela Railway of later years. Colonialists insisted that the old *sertanejo's* body be exhumed, shipped to Portugal and buried in style in Oporto. His funeral service<sup>24</sup> of April 12, 1891 in Oporto attended by a "Who's Who" of colonialism; including Royalty, was perhaps the most magnificent service for a commoner who did not hold a high post of that era. His last official post was in 1885, when he was appointed Capitão-Mor of Bie.

*Silva Porto, Motives, and the periodization of Portugal's participation in the Scramble for Africa*

*The first Portuguese Scramble and Portugal's first colonial movement (1838-1861)*

A number of scholars, including Clarence-Smith, Pirio, Halpern Pereira and V. Alexandre have documented aspects of the economic history of Portugal's Scramble for Africa, though they have emphasised 1875-1910 and not earlier years. They have evidence of Portuguese business interests' motives in seeking markets and foreign currency supplies in Portugal's expansion efforts in Africa. In a sense, they, have paralleled Hammond's Lisbon-centred, cabinet level vantage point of imperialism in Portugal: economic

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dissertation Douglas L. Wheeler, *The Portuguese in Angola, 1836-1891: A Study in Expansion and Administration* (History Dept., Boston University, 1963) pp.330-360

<sup>21</sup> Sousa Dias, *Artur Paiva*, l p. 166; Gastão Sousa Dias, *Silva Porto (crónicas Angolanas)* (Lisbon, 1948), pp.49-50ff; Luciano Cordeiro Silva Porto (Lisbon, 1891); Frederick S. Arnot, *Garenganze* (London, 1903 ed.).

<sup>22</sup> "Silva Porto" articles *GEP e B.* (Lisbon), vol.28, p. 884.

<sup>23</sup> James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, 1959), p.192.

<sup>24</sup> An interesting journalistic account of the elaborate arrival ceremony in Lisbon and funeral services of Silva Porto in Oporto later, see *The Times* (London), April 13, 1891.

motives for imperialism of economic classes and associations existed, but what has not been satisfactorily answered are questions such as:

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1. To what extent did the "classes" to which the key decision-makers belonged in Lisbon match the "classes" directly committed to imperialism as this School suggests? The decision-makers would be Prime Ministers, cabinet ministers and parliamentary leaders, key civil servants in the Foreign Ministry, Marine and Overseas Ministry, etc. and key business organization leaders, as well as key colonialists in associations such as the Society of Geography of Lisbon?

2. No scholarly study yet has been based on a range of most diplomatic, economic, social and political records and analyses and there is no definitive study so far of Portugal's main motives in the Scramble for Africa: it behoves scholars to ask now: what were the main motives and to what extent did Portugal's differ or resemble those motives of other colonial powers involved?

The first set of questions about which "classes" in Portugal dominated post-1870 imperial efforts for expansion in Angola and Mozambique is a complex assignment and we badly need a historical sociology of the Portuguese colonial movement in all its manifestations after 1836. It is worthwhile stating now that there is evidence that a significant portion of the leading colonial thinkers, diplomatists, decision-makers during 1830-1900 were not only *bourgeoisie* of various types but from what remained of the aristocratic and noble upper classes. Only a few of the outstanding *Africanistas* from this class can be cited here: Marquis of Sá da Bandeira; Aires de Count of São Januário; Viscount of Santarém; Marquis of Ornellas; Lavrado, Major Joaquim Mousinho de Albuquerque; Marquis of Soveral and Viscount Paiva Manso, and others<sup>25</sup>.

As for the second question on studying Portugal's motives in the Scramble, it is important to put such a question into general historical perspective as well as into the framework of the historiography of the Scramble in general. It is too obvious to belabour the point that all imperialism (and colonialism) to some extent are "economic," whether it be Portuguese or of another nationality. Second, in an ideal world Portugal's government as well as private business interest groups would naturally desire new markets and more foreign exchange and to varying extents all the colonial powers had a similar interest. But the history of the Scramble as well as a much more refined historiography of the motives of the Scramble in the European powers

<sup>25</sup> See the bibliography of my doctoral dissertation and an Appendix on biographies Wheeler *The Portuguese in Angola*, pp. 375-400; 410-413; and my unpublished paper for an intermediate Portuguese course, Harvard University, May 22, 1961 "Portugal And The Colonial, Movement." 71pp.

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suggest that the mix of main motives of each power was slightly or greatly different in each case. Germany's motives were thus different than Britain's; Italy's different than Portugal's and France's etc. If I were to compare the mix of main motives of Portugal and other European imperial powers I would suggest that Portugal's motives more closely resembled to some extent those of France (diversion from defeat and territorial loss in Europe at hands of Germany, reinforcement in Europe by means of new resources in Africa, Asia) and Italy (colonial space for poor, excess population, prestige and status with other powers, colonial resources to assist slow economic development). Robinson and Gallagher's 1961 work, *Africa and the Victorians*<sup>26</sup>, noted for placing Britain's economic motives in Africa in realistic perspective and for emphasizing political, strategic, local crisis-driven decision-making and historical commitments, is suggestive for comparison with Portugal's main motives after 1836.

Silva Porto's voluminous writings during the first Portuguese colonial movement (1836-1875) and during what must be recognized as Portugal's "first Scramble" for the coasts and interior of tropical Africa, 1838-1861, together with other unpublished reports by colonial officials in Angola suggest the Portuguese Government had a number of key motives for this imperial effort: 1) to replace the most important colony of the Portuguese empire, Brazil, lost to independence in 1822, with a new African empire beyond the coasts; 2) to replace illegitimate trade in slaves, and eventually, slavery, with legitimate commerce, agriculture and industry. 3) to revive Portugal's coastal colonies of Angola and Mozambique by means of tapping interior African trade with the coast at Congo River's- mouth, as well as at other trade outlets such as Luanda, Benguela, Moçamedes in Angola; and at the Zambezi River in Mozambique; colonial revenues would come from customs duties as well as from trade revenues from African long-distance trade to both coasts with Central Africa; 4) to acquire new resources, including minerals, foods, raw materials in Africa for use in Portugal; 5) to reassert Portugal's role as an European power by reviving the African empire and bringing "civilization" to the inhabitants and to revive an ancient pre-1800 "civilizing mission" which derived from Portugal's first and second empires in Brazil, Africa and Asia, 1415-1822; 6) to reinstate historic claims to the coast and interior of Africa from before 1800, in light of rival powers' new commerce, anti-slave and slavery action of England primarily, and individuals in particular like David Livingstone, the Scottish missionary-explorer. Silva Porto's motives for living in Angola after 1838, when the early stages of the first Portuguese Scramble were in progress, were an interesting mixture of economic, personal-social, and patriotic. He was in Angola to make the commercial living and fortune he failed to establish in Brazil; he was first and foremost a trader in African communities who resided travelled for the same motives in Bie and to the

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<sup>26</sup> K. Robinson and R. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians* (London 1961)

east and north, but his thoughts are dominated by nationalistic and patriotic concerns. There are frequent references to the fear that Portugal will lose its independence in Europe, that Portugal will suffer the fate of a partitioned, conquered Poland, also a weak Catholic power with one or more giant neighbours<sup>27</sup>. Silva Porto desired that Portugal take control of the interior of Angola and link this up with Mozambique in order to strengthen the nation at home in status and prosperity beginning as early as the mid-1840s when he settled at Belmonte, Bie on the plateau as a *sertanejo*. His reports and diaries are full of plans and suggestions that Portugal, beginning in 1852, when he met Livingstone in the upper Zambezi area, send expeditions to secure, claim and annex territory for Portugal. Driven by his feeling of resentment and frustration at the superior education and resources at Livingstone's disposal as well as by anger at what Silva Porto and not a few Portuguese colonialists thought were unfair criticisms and attacks on Portuguese sovereignty, rule and influences in both Angola and Mozambique, in Livingstone's famous, persuasive books and lectures between 1857 and 1873, Silva Porto's personal scramble for the interior of Angola and beyond was driven in part as a rejoinder and response to a increased English interference, interest and action in Africa.

Silva Porto's personal long-distance feud, largely one-sided since Livingstone was most unaware of it, involved dreaming about the Scottish heroic traveller, thinking up Portuguese arguments against Livingstone's criticisms, and even purchasing personal mementos of Livingstone's travels from African traders<sup>28</sup>. While Silva Porto's feelings about Livingstone's travels, fame and writings mellowed following Silva Porto's interesting analysis of Lacerda's scholarly rejoinder to Livingstone's Narrative book (1866) in an important Portuguese work of 1867<sup>29</sup>, and the death of the traveller deep in eastern Africa in 1873, thoughts about the "illustrious traveller" who had first stirred the sleepy Portuguese settlements in north Angola in 1854-55 continued until his- suicide in 1890<sup>30</sup>.

The failure of Portugal's first Scramble for interior Africa of 1836-1861 was due to a number of reasons: first, the Government's scant economic and financial resources in the 1860s prompted a policy of ceasing military

<sup>27</sup> Silva Porto *Viagens e apontamentos* vols V-VIII, various entries, the fate of Poland and Portugal in history.

<sup>28</sup> Silva Porto "*Viagens e apontamentos*" vol. II, entry for June 11, 1862, pp. 305ff, concerns "Dreams" and the epigram he read in a book by one "Conselheiro Bastos" that life is almost all a dream; "Where will Dr. Livingstone [sic] be today about whom I dreamt quite a bit last night? Wherever he may be, we will continue to desire for the, illustrious traveller prosperous health and a thousand adventures."

<sup>29</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol. V, pp. 101-192.

<sup>30</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol. VI, Entry for July 5, 1870, he noted a false report from Central Africa that Livingstone had died; SP read this in the Portuguese newspaper he received in Bie, *Jornal do Comércio* (Feb.9, 10, 1870).

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expeditions to the Angolan interior and coast and the expansion policy which favoured northern coast and northeastern Angola<sup>31</sup>. Secondly, this imperial activity provoked stiff African resistance in several sectors of the northern Angolan coast and interior, caused rebellions over efforts to collect hut taxes, and over-extended Portugal's military resources; several military expeditions from Portugal, including one sent to the interior north of Luanda in 1860, suffered heavy losses in life mainly from tropical disease. Third, England's policy was to oppose Portugal's coastal expansion north of Luanda to the Congo mouth by means of diplomatic and naval threats and action<sup>32</sup>.

Portugal's strategy was to improve Angola's economy by means of replacing the slave-trade, the main revenue source of Angolan commerce, with several other forms of revenue: customs duties on new ports taken in the expansion policy north and south of Luanda (Angola's ports were opened to non-Portuguese trade for the first time in 1844); agriculture in crops new to Angola from Brazil cotton, sugar and coffee; mining (copper mines opened by means of English investment in Bembe -1857-63) and tapping long-distance African trade from central Africa. Portugal's armed forces captured the town of Ambriz, Angola from African slave-traders in 1855, despite English naval opposition and Foreign Office disapproval, but Portugal's drive to take the Congo River mouth, in order to tax European trade by means of customs duties and benefit from African trade from the interior failed.

In 1861, the first scramble in Angola ceased operations.

The results of Portugal's first Scramble for Africa to the early 1860's were profoundly frustrating to various levels of the colonial ruling groups. Leaders in Lisbon had to call a halt to interior expansion in north Portugal due to a lack of finances, costly expeditions such as the disastrous 1860 affair north of Luanda, greater African resistance to intrusion and to increase taxation. While the Portuguese area of Angola under actual administration had nearly doubled between 1838 and 1861, when withdrawal began, the central-south plateaus remained in African hands, a point Silva Porto made frequently in his letters and diary. Again the "north coast" strategy dominated expansion plans and the hinterland was neglected.

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<sup>31</sup> For a detailed analysis of the history of Portugal's first Scramble for Africa, mainly in Angola, which preceded the general European Scramble of post-1875, see my doctoral dissertation, *The Portuguese in Angola, 1836-1891: A Study in Expansion and Administration* (Boston Univ., History Dept., 1963) espec. pp. 139-243 on the-period, 1857-1875.

<sup>32</sup> For the diplomatic, military and trade struggle between Portugal, France and Britain over the coast north of Luanda up to and north of Cabinda, there are several good scholarly works: Roger Anstey, *Britain and the Congo in the 19th century* (Oxford, 1962) and F. Latour Da Veiga Pinto, *Le Portugal Et Le Congo Au XIX Siècle. Étude d'histoire des relations internationales* (Paris, 1972).

The African and English challenge especially in Angola met a weak response, despite fine plans in Lisbon and Luanda. Portugal hoped to find greater room for maneuver in Africa for the semi-Protectorate status she was obliged to endure in the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and in the long African territorial disputes over the Congo River mouth, 1822-1861, a conflict continued until the Berlin Conference, 1884-85. Portugal's strategy concerning the Congo River mouth, including the tolerated capture of Ambriz town, 1855, and the English "ultimatum" of 1860, all based on Palmerston's 1846 policy, deeply angered Portuguese diplomats and leaders. Lord Russell's 1860 statement to Lavradio, Minister in England and an expansionist, were like a provocation to the "Greater Portugal" group:

"The interests of Portugal would be far better consulted by developing the resources of the vast territories which she already possesses in Africa, than by seeking to extend a barren sovereignty over future tracts of country on that Continent, which can only be acquired by violence and bloodshed"<sup>33</sup>

The Congo Mouth strategy helps explain why the drive to the Central African plateau was neglected and delayed and why Portugal's first Scramble was largely pre-capitalist; this strategy was expedient because the potential benefits were closer at hand, close to the centre of Portuguese power at Luanda, and because the potential revenue from the Congo mouth<sup>34</sup> was larger than that of Central African long-distance trade.

There was one more early effort in the private sector in Luanda to claim and annex the Congo mouth; a pigeon-holed 1865 petition from five Portuguese merchants in Luanda to ask France to negotiate a swap of Portuguese Guinea for support in asserting "rights" to the Congo mouth in the on-going diplomatic dispute over the question with England. The Congo mouth goal of Portugal even as a revenue-earner was lost even before England's parliament failed to ratify the Anglo-Portuguese Congo treaty of 1884 and the disappointing results for Portugal of the Berlin West Africa Conference, 1884-85.

<sup>33</sup> Lord Russell to Count Lavradio (Portuguese Minister in London), October 13, 1860, cited in British Parliamentary *Accounts and Papers*, C 3531(1883), XLVIII, p. 63.; see also this citation portion of chapter in Douglas L. Wheeler and R. Pélissier, *Angola* (London and NY, 1971), chapter 3.

<sup>34</sup> Wheeler, *The Portuguese in Angola*, pp. 206-208, citing a curious, in of the first Scramble: *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino* (Lisbon), Pasta 34, no.638, December 30, 1865, Letter to Overseas Ministry signed by five Portuguese Merchants in Luanda "L.J. Affonso, J. Tavares, T.P. Falcão, Pinto and Redrige."

Despite the disappointments of the failure of the 1838-1861 expansion in the north to take the Congo mouth or to establish Portuguese military control and sovereignty on the Bie plateau where he lived, Silva Porto continued to dream of empire on the plateau, of answers to Livingstone's negative writings, and of Portuguese expeditions to achieve the goal of *contra-costa*. Besides his trading business and the establishment of a plantation at Bemposta near Benguela, Silva Porto made efforts to establish Portuguese claims for areas east of Bie to the upper Zambezi River. His trading caravans to what is now Zambia featured his hand-made Portuguese flag at the head column; in 1864 he suggested to the King of the Makololo that one of the King's sons be sent to Portugal for a European education<sup>35</sup>. In 1868 Silva Porto proposed that a Portuguese expedition be sent from Bie to cross Africa to Mozambique and assure Portugal's claim between Angola and Mozambique<sup>36</sup>.

In the meantime, at the metropolitan and colonial levels Portugal's imperially minded leaders forged more plans for interior expansion but concentrated on the eastern side. Imperial signals appeared to be mixed: on the one hand, and end to expansionist policies in Angola was confirmed by policy-makers in Lisbon and Luanda<sup>37</sup>, and in 1869 colonial budget revenues were cut and military action in Mozambique was placed in question. On the other hand, major colonial legislation calling for de-centralisation of colonial authority to Governors from Lisbon was passed in the Organic Act of 1869<sup>38</sup>, major military operations in the Zambezi, even with losses by 1869 were continued<sup>39</sup>, and a Portuguese Governor in Mozambique proposed a plan to send a military expedition from the coast to conquer and annex Manicaland's region<sup>40</sup>, on a plateau where reports of gold discoveries had reached South

<sup>35</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol. 111, 1864, pp. 120ff.

<sup>36</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol. V, 1868, pp.101-102. Silva Porto, whose diaries, letters and reports are replete with modest, even self-deprecating remarks about his lack of education and training for African exploration while add respectful remarks about living-stone, added in a 1868 entry about discoveries in Central Africa (my translation from the Portuguese): "... I believe I am not in error [in] saying that, the priority in the interior of the African continent is mine."

<sup>37</sup> See the opinion / judgement ("Parecer") of the Junta Consultiva, in the *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, Junta consultiva, 1870 Pasta, nº 431 of February 22, 1869 which stated in response to suggestions that Portugal re-occupy the Congo region of Angola that "The Government of Portugal should abstain as much as possible from interfering in internal tribal questions and kingdoms giving us no homage in African territory..."

<sup>38</sup> Douglas L. Wheeler, "Portuguese Colonial Governors in Africa, 1870-1974," in L.H.Gann and Peter Duignan (Eds.), *African Pro-consuls. European Governors In Africa* (New York, 1978), p.417.

<sup>39</sup> See Malyn Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi. Exploration, Land Tenure and Colonial Rule in East Africa* (New York, 1973), chapters 15 and 16

<sup>40</sup> Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Lisbon), Junta Consultiva, Pasta 207» 1869-70, no.395. In 1869 the Governor of Queli- mane, Mozambique proposed to Lisbon the plan of dispatching a

Africa and Lourenço Marques a proposal which was not acted upon but which if it had seen could have changed the course of Mozambique's history.

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In the interim period, Portugal's diplomatic, military and political initiatives, though muted compared to the activism of 1838-1861, continued to emphasize the Zambezi and Congo mouth strategies, to the detriment of expansion onto the plateau. Several domestic developments and international events pressured Portuguese imperial groups and interests to get more active. The Latino Coelho Ministry of Navy and Overseas, 1869-70, despite budget cuts, was active in promoting territorial expansionist projects as it involved parts of the African Empire. In 1870 Lisbon was pleased with U. S. Grant's arbitration award to Portugal of Bolama Island, disputed with France<sup>41</sup>, a diplomatic dispute which lasted over a decade. In 1869 several colonialists in Lisbon, including Luciano Cordeiro, converted from schemes to sell some of Portugal's African colonies to pay off the growing foreign debt, proposed a national expedition to Angola to probe Central Africa<sup>42</sup>.

Internal economic difficulties in Portugal, the beginning of a recession in 1873-75 and a bank panic and crisis in 1876 had an impact on imperial enthusiasms. But it is uncertain how much Portuguese capital, which continued to be invested mainly in Europe and Brazil, was available for highly risky ventures in Africa and few Portuguese chose to emigrate to any part of Africa, much less Portugal's weak territories. Trends in Portuguese emigration are clear: between 1850 and 1910, 90% of Portugal's emigrants went to Brazil, North America or South America. To Africa the number of Portuguese who emigrated (legally and were recorded doing so) was rarely more than several hundred a year and after the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa (1867-1883) some of these preferred South Africa to Mozambique or Angola. Between 1887, when only 493 Portuguese went to

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force of 120 men to occupy a new interior district to the south in what became Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The Governor considered that this region, basically Manicaland and a portion of Shonaland, would soon undergo English encroachment and that it was nominally a Portuguese area. The Junta Consultiva in Lisbon» the Ministry's committee on major policy-making decisions, turned down this plan because of the costly military campaigns Portugal was conducting in the Zambesi valley and since it could spare no resources to "pacify" reputedly powerful tribes.

<sup>41</sup> A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* (2 vols; New York, 1972), II, p.108

<sup>42</sup> As recently as 1868, Luciano Cordeiro was still an ardent, anti-imperial Socialist who had written a pamphlet which advocated the sale of Portugal's colonies in Africa. This was an unexpected background for the forceful colonial publicist-writer who helped found the Society of Geography of Lisbon in 1875 and who in 1884-85 was a member of the Portuguese delegation to the Berlin West Africa Conference. Francisco de Assis de Oliveira Martins, *Oliveira Martins e Os Seus Contemporâneos (1845-1894)* (Lisbon, 1960), p. 154.

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Africa, and 1909, when only 9 went, a "good year" of ca. 1900 emigrants to Africa compared with 35, 000 to Brazil and 10-27, 000 to North America<sup>43</sup>.

Several international developments increased both public and private interest in Portugal in a more active African expansionism. In 1875, after a long diplomatic dispute with England, French Marshal MacMahon's arbitration award went to Portugal not England in a claim for a portion of Delegoa Bay, Mozambique<sup>44</sup>. The same year in Lisbon the most important colonial movement organisation was established, The *Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa*.

In 1876 plans were consolidated for a national expedition to plateau Angola in order to explore the Congo and Zambezi basins, with the assistance of the Luanda sertanejo Silva Porto in Bie and Benguela. This was also same year that Portugal's colonialists and Government reacted in anger when Portugal's geographers were not invited to a Geographical conference in Brussels which resulted in the establishment of the mysterious "International Association for the Exploration and Civilisation of Central Africa, " presided over by Belgium's King Beopold II, soon to carve out a vast private estate in the "Congo Free State", and help undermine Portugal's 30 year old plans for claiming and annexing all of the Congo River mouth.

#### *Silva Porto, Angola and the Scramble for Africa, 1875-1891*

Several international developments during 1874-76 moved the question of Portugal's participation in a general European Scramble from out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and cabinet discussions into the parliament, the streets and the press. In 1874 a number of foreign explorers, mainly German and English, travelled and explored through Portuguese territory in Angola and Mozambique; most important in stirring emotions of national pride, honour and the desire for respect in Europe were the earlier travels of Young in eastern Africa<sup>45</sup>, and V. Lovett Cameron, who crossed Africa from east to

<sup>43</sup> F.E.da Silva, *Emigração Portuguesa* (Lisbon, 1917), p. 192.

For Portuguese emigration to Brazil between 1851 and 1873, see J.P. Oliveira Martins, *Brazil e as Colónias Portuguesas* (Lisbon, 1880), p. 159. It should be noted in this regard also that Portugal's great 19th century historian Alexandre Herculano was aware of the importance of Portuguese emigration to Brazil in his day and that in 1874 he wrote: "A nossa melhor colónia é o Brazil, depois de ser colónia." Cited in Alexandre Herculano, Carta a sociedade Real de Agricultura (Lisbon » 1874) » p. 9.

<sup>44</sup> Raymond Bixler, "Anglo-Portuguese Rivalry for Delagoa Bay, " *Journal of Modern History* (Chicago), vol.VI (Dec.1934), pp.425-440

<sup>45</sup> On Governors-Generals reactions to the perceived threats present in explorations in north and central Angola by well-prepared German explorers, see Arquivo Historico Ultramarino (Lisbon), Pasta 44, Angola, Sept.18, 1874, no.400, Gov. Gen.; Past 46, May 20, 1876, nº.198, Gov. Gen., Pasta 45, nº.353, July 30, 1875; also, my dissertation, *Wheeler, the Portuguese in Angola*, pp. 244 - 247; see also V.L.Cameron's book: (Cont' d) *Across Africa* (London 1885 ed.)

west, passing through the Bie plateau to Benguela. Cameron's<sup>46</sup> speeches, letters to the press and his book in 1876 were highly critical of the weaknesses in Portuguese rule in areas Portugal claimed near both coasts as well as of the misdeeds of traders in between Angola and Mozambique who claimed to be Portuguese subjects. In the midst of the increasingly heated discussion in the Portuguese press, parliament and cabinet offices in Lisbon, number of colonialists, mainly geographers, historians, writers, soldiers and sailors with African service, established the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa in 1875.

**240** An analysis of the reports of the governors-general of Angola to Lisbon beginning in 1874 demonstrates how the appearance of the German explorers Guesfeldt, Falkenstein and von Homeyer in north and central Angolan travels<sup>47</sup>, and Cameron in 1874-75 was another impetus to Portuguese expansion efforts, long delayed or neglected following the cessation of Portugal's first Scramble in Angola, 1838-1861. Because of the generally harsher criticism of Portuguese rule in the areas through which they travelled with great difficulties Young and Cameron received more negative press in Lisbon than the lesser known German explorers. Portuguese officials and colonialists suspected the motives of these but were generally hospitable and assisted their journeys, which they feared were less scientific than political, commercial or imperial in nature. These foreign intruders completed their travels safely, but their hosts in Luanda were once again unable to show their guests that they controlled much beyond the coastal strip of Angola and Mozambique. All transportation facilities were poor (i. e., the explorers had trouble getting porters to carry their food and equipment through trackless wilderness), and African authorities retained political hegemony over the interior plateaus. With foreign expeditions' numbers increasing, governors-general of Angola called for Portugal to mount expeditions to the interior<sup>48</sup>.

To the perceived threat of imperial rivalry with the new foreign explorers activities in Angola and Mozambique, and most of the frontiers of these colonies not formally delimited or recognized by treaties among the powers, was added an intentional or unintentional international 'put-down' Portugal's geographers were not invited to the Brussels conference. In the meantime, there was a new generation of colonial activists in Government and the Fathers of the first colonial movement (1836-1875) were retired or dead. The

<sup>46</sup> Cameron, *Across Africa*, pp.387-388;472; 528-529. Among other comments the Portuguese Government considered to be damaging to their case for territorial claims in the on-going diplomatic dispute with England and other powers, Cameron wrote: "Portugal cannot be cognisant of the atrocities committed by men claiming to be her subjects." (pp. 387-388)

<sup>47</sup> See Wheeler, *The Portuguese in Angola*, pp.247-248.

<sup>48</sup> João de Andrade Corvo, *Estudos sobre as Províncias Ultramarinas* (4 vols, Lisbon, 1883) I, pp. 157; 228 - 241.

Viscount of Sá da Bandeira, long out of office but recently publishing his final book on the Portuguese Empire's needs for reform and revival<sup>49</sup>, died in 1876. Minister of the Navy and Overseas João de Andrade Corvo (1824-1890), in many ways the colonial heir of Sá da Bandeira<sup>50</sup>, became active with new expansionist projects in 1875-77 and fully backed the dispatch of a public works mission to Angola in early 1877 and the launching, after many delays, of the Portuguese expedition of Capelo, Ivens and Serpa Pinto, which left Lisbon for Luanda on July 7, 1877<sup>51</sup>.

Press coverage of this event indicated to several levels of colonial interest group that success in Africa for Portugal translated into political power in Portuguese internal politics and prestige, status and respect in Europe. To Andrade Corvo and his generation of colonial-minded writers and leaders, the question of Portugal's role in what was becoming the general European "Scramble for Africa" was only in part an economic-financial issue. For an elite which deeply resented and even feared its oldest Ally's diplomatic and military power to squelch Portugal's coastal and interior expansion in Africa over arguable questions of free trade, the questions of Portuguese territorial claims, prior discoveries, and sovereignty were political questions of national honour and pride. The growing national consensus about the necessity of asserting greater independence within the Alliance and lessening the binds of what was, in effect, in many diplomatic questions related to Africa, a "Protectorate" mentality, combined to create an important motive for Portugal's role in the Scramble. Expressing the feelings of several classes of colonialists from Lisbon to Luanda to Bie and beyond, from Africa in 1878 explorer Serpa Pinto wrote to Luciano Cordeiro, founder of the SGL, that the building up of the African empire, in effect, was "the only salvation of Portugal"<sup>52</sup>. The next year, a critic of Serpa Pinto who savaged the soldier-explorer's claims of cross-continental travel agreed with the officer who eventually would help provoke Britain to hand Portugal the 1890 ultimatum, that Portugal could not afford to assume the risky business of this new imperialism now<sup>53</sup>:

"In the Council of Nations, Portugal should be principally esteemed a colonial power. Only the colonies can give us in Europe the influence and position which

<sup>49</sup> Marquês de Sá da Bandeira, *O Trabalho Rural Africano e a Administração Colonial* (Lisbon, 1873)

<sup>50</sup> Francisco de Assis de Oliveira Martins, "A Sociedade de Geographia nas Explorações Africanas do Século XIX," *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa* (serie 69, July-August 1951, n<sup>os</sup>. 7-8, pp. 399-404 ff.

<sup>51</sup> *Diário de Notícias* (Lisbon) July 10-11, 1877.

<sup>52</sup> Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa (Lisbon), Manuscrito no.35, Serpa Pinto to Luciano Cordeiro, May 16, 1878, *Cartas de Serpa Pinto ao Secretário perpétuo da Sociedade de Geographia Luciano Cordeiro*.

<sup>53</sup> Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, *As Conferências e o Itinerário do Viajante Serpa Pinto* (Lisbon, 1879), p. 754.

otherwise would be denied us so justifiably because of the narrow boundaries of the metropolis, and its situation in the [Iberian] peninsula."

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Despite Silva Porto's efforts to assist the Central Africa expedition of 1877-78,<sup>54</sup> that venture was only a partial success; Portugal acquired new geographical and political knowledge of the interior, but hinterland sovereignty was not greatly increased. The expedition's professed goals of exploring the Congo and Zambesi River basins were not achieved due to Stanley's prior feat of exploring the Congo, to perilous travelling conditions beyond Angola's settlements, lack of Government support and personal quarrels among the explorers who divided the expedition in two. Serpa Pinto's stubborn insistence on exploring alone, inspired in part by the example of Stanley, was a factor; this intrepid traveller did manage to cross the continent from the west, but was forced to travel through South Africa in the final stages. Capelo and Ivens explored central and Northeast Angola.<sup>55</sup>

Controversy, uncertainty as to the true purpose of the expedition and the Government's on-going concentration on the Congo mouth question, not moving into the interior plateaus, raised the question of why the expedition enjoyed only modest official support in Luanda. Including an official mission related to communications, this 1877-78 effort was Portugal's boldest imperial effort since the Zambesi campaigns. Despite the enthusiasm of the Ministry of Navy and Overseas, the Government was unable to pay all of the venture's costs. A portion of it was paid for by the Lisbon Society of Geography and its membership and some of it by a public subscription fund based in Lisbon<sup>56</sup>. Furthermore, the current Governor-General of Angola in Luanda, Alexandre de Almeida e Albuquerque (term in office: 1876-79) opposed expanding control into the interior due to lack of Portuguese resources to confront hostile African states and to the withering away of what little Portugal had beyond the coast. This pessimistic, unhelpful Governor wrote to Lisbon in October 1877, following the arrival of the expedition to explore (and presumably help to claim) the interior, that he deplored:

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<sup>54</sup> See Alexandre de Serpa Pinto, *How I Crossed Africa* (London 1881) – pp. 184ff (Portuguese edition's title like the English edition's is deliberately taking off from H. M. Stanley's world famous book's title *How I Found Livingstone* (London, 1872). See also Capelo a more modest title, *De Benguella as Terras de lacca* (Lisbon, 1881).

<sup>55</sup> Charles E. Nowell, "Portugal and the Partition of Africa" *Journal of Modern History* (vol. XIX, n<sup>o</sup>. 1, March 1947), pp. 7-8.

<sup>56</sup> F. A. de Oliveira Martins, "A Sociedade de Geographia nas Explorações Africanas," BSGL (Lisbon), pp. 399ff.

...the heavy sums consumed in disastrous wars we have fought, we would do better to develop a certain strip of the coast [of Angola] were we can exercise secure, real influence.<sup>57</sup>

Silva Porto's writings fully reflect his continuing dismay at the failure of Lisbon and Luanda to act decisively in claiming and occupying the territory between coastal Angola and Mozambique until rival European forces moved in from down the Congo River, up the Zambezi, or across to Lake Nyasa and inland<sup>58</sup>. The Capelo-Ivens and Serpa Pinto expeditions were not what he had in mind in his 1868 proposal and, though Serpa Pinto by 1880 had become an advocate of a Bie plateau strategy of expansion into Central Africa, what Silva Porto had advocated for nearly 40 years,<sup>59</sup> even the later expeditions of Capelo and Ivens in the mid-1880s did not secure Portugal's control of the plateau.

Portugal's strategy of participation in the general European scramble for African territory was flawed not only because of "too little, too late, " and of stronger rivals powers like England and King Leopold's organization. It was flawed because the colonial strategists and planners were divided on strategy and because old diplomatic disputes over territorial coastal claims with England diverted efforts from developing effective occupation in the African hinterlands between Angola and Mozambique. Silva Porto and his settler friends<sup>60</sup> along with the celebrated explorers Capelo, Ivens and Serpa Pinto in speeches and writings cried for Portugal to move inland rapidly; "To the Plateau!"<sup>61</sup> one of their books warned in 1881.

Encouraged by the diplomatic victory in 1875 of the MacMahon award in Delagoa Bay, Minister Andrade Corvo and much of the colonial opinion-makers in Lisbon and the important work of the English Lusophile Minister, Morier, staked all they had in settling the Congo Question in the next decade. The diplomatic history of this territorial, colonial dispute has been ably analyzed elsewhere<sup>62</sup>, but suffice it to say here that Portugal expended a lot of its political, diplomatic and moral capital in the first phase of the Scramble

<sup>57</sup> Arquivo Historico Ultramarino (Lisbon), Angola, Pasta 47, Gov.Generals, n<sup>o</sup>. 267, *Relatório*, October 19, 1877.

<sup>58</sup> Nowell, "Portugal and the Partition of Africa", pp. 9-14.

<sup>59</sup> See "Confidential" Letter of Serpa Pinto to Luciano Cordeiro, in Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, Manuscripts, *Cartas de Serpa Pinto ao Secretário Perpétuo da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, 1876-84*, Carta n<sup>o</sup>.54, May 5, 1880.

<sup>60</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, 13 volumes, on deposit in Lisbon and Oporto many such references.


<sup>61</sup> "To the Plateau" [of Africa or Angola] (author's translation) is from Capelo e Ivens, *De Benguella*, vol.II, p. 262.

<sup>62</sup> Roger Anstey, *Britain and the Congo in the 19th century* (Oxford, 1962) is a substantial up well during nearly 30 years of consultation; see also Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa, 1875-1891* (Jobannesburg, 1967) which has a thorough documentation from Portuguese as well as British archives.

on the Congo Question and the goal of claiming, annexing and exploiting the entire Congo River mouth, a goal that originated before the mini-ultimatums to Portugal of Palmerston (1846) and Russell (1860) already discussed. When England's parliament rejected the Anglo-Portuguese Congo treaty in early 1884 and when the Berlin West Africa Conference was called and settled the question during November 1884 and February 1885, Portugal's "coastal, commercial monopoly strategy" fell before the European powers and King Leopold's African Association pressures and demands. The euphoric anticipation of a hopeful Andrade Corvo in his 1883 book<sup>63</sup> quickly vanished as the powers at Berlin rejected Portugal's historic claims and arguments. Portugal received only a portion of the south bank of the Congo River and Cabinda, but it is often forgotten that a last ditch effort of Lisbon to take forcibly one town on the north bank met the first public "Ultimatum" over territorial claims in the Scramble which was delivered by England, her oldest Ally, and France and Germany on February 13, 1885. The Governor of Angola, Ferreira do Amaral, more of an enthusiastic expansionist than his predecessor Albuquerque but also a "North coast" (including Congo River Mouth) man, possibly without orders from Lisbon, ordered Portuguese naval vessels to move into the Congo mouth ports (north bank) of Boma and Banana. French and British men-of-war stood in the way. Portuguese delegates in Berlin at the conference made a last stand and refused the powers' demands, claimed the port of Banana, Cabinda enclave, and the south bank of the Congo River up to Vivi [see Map]<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> Andrade Corvo, *Estudos sobre as provincias ultramarinas*, I, pp.41-42; 57. As he wrote in 1882: "The Treaty of Congo [following successful Anglo-Portuguese negotiations] will be a glory for whoever celebrates it; not one of these ephemeral glories with a short popularity, but one of those glories that will remain in history, never to be erased from the memory of a people." In view of the sad fate of the 1884 treaty and of Corvo's roseate hopes, a writer might ponder: *sic transit gloria mundi!*

<sup>64</sup> An account of Portugal's last minute efforts to claim and capture parts of the Congo River mouth denied her by the Powers is found in Wheeler, *The Portuguese in Angola*, pp.311-318; previously classified "Secret" documents from Portugal's operations north of Ambriz in 1884-85 are in the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Angola, Gov.Gen., Pasta 7,2ª Repartição, nº.359, April 15 1884; see also encl. "Copia de Instruções" dated Feb.13, 1885 for Portugal's agent in the port of Banana, north bank of Congo, which Portugal hoped to commandeer as the Berlin Conference was sitting; see also S.E.Crowe, *The Berlin West African Conference 1884-1885* (London, 1942), pp. 23-24.



The first "Ultimatum" Portugal received, on February 13, 1885, from Britain, Germany and France, stated that either Portugal accepted what the other Powers were willing to offer Cabinda enclave north of the Congo mouth and the south bank to Noqui (the remainder of the Congo Mouth was partitioned between France and Leopold's International Association) or the powers would refuse to recognize Portugal's rights to any part of the disputed area<sup>65</sup>. Forty-eight hours later, Portugal capitulated to the ultimatum and signed the convention. With the General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885, Portugal's fifty-year struggle for coastal expansion north of Ambriz (taken, finally, in 1855, while Ally England was embroiled in the Crimean War!) was over<sup>66</sup>. The Congo Question ("*A Questão do Zaire*") was over, but part of the price of this diplomatic-military colonial effort and the desire for a trade monopoly her administrative and economic system could not manage in rivalry with richer powers and stronger capitalist interests (British merchants) was a failure to bring effective occupation to the vast Central African interior.

Some months after the English parliament rejected the Anglo-Portuguese Congo Treaty but before the Berlin Conference began meeting, the expansionist Governor-General of Angola, Francisco Ferreira do Amaral (term in office: 1882-1885) wrote in a report to Lisbon an analysis which revealed much about both main motives and expansionist strategy of Portugal at that moment in the Scramble:

"One of the reasons why our rule today in the interior [of Angola] is weak is because the *concelhos* of the east were abandoned... because the expense they incurred could not be covered by ordinary means, and we had to choose awaiting the natives [Africans] on the coast rather than proceeding to civilize them in the interior. Following this policy came the foreign explorations and designs [Cameron, Young, Schutt, Guessfeldt, Falkenstein, Von Homeyer and Lux, von Wissmann & Pogge the explorers and the designs of Leopold's agents, including Stanley, and his organization] obliging us to change our tactics, and now it is imperative that we move toward the east and reconquer what we possessed."<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile in the *sertão* of Bié, Silva Porto reported his reactions to the failure of Lisbon to occupy effectively most of the interior of plateau Angola. Depressed over international developments and the dearth of colonial control in central and eastern Angola, the old trader considered again retiring to Portugal for good. Pleading poverty and contempt for how expensive life was getting in the metropole, Silva Porto decided to remain in Angola<sup>68</sup>, however,

<sup>65</sup> See Crowe, *The Berlin West African Conference*, pp.3-29.

<sup>66</sup> See also coverage of Conference and events in Africa by the Lisbon newspaper, *Jornal do Comércio* (Nov. 1884 - Feb. 1885).

<sup>67</sup> Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Lisbon), Angola, Gov.Gen. Pasta 4, nº.335, *Relatório* of Gov. General of Angola to Overseas Minister, April 9, 1884.

<sup>68</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol.

See also vol. XII, entry for August 24, 1887, When he wrote that he still had *saudades*, in effect for Portugal but: "I ask for a little bit of bread; and an in Where I can retire,

and despite his concern about the Africanization of the long-distance Central African caravan trade finance, he opted to stay in his Bié farm of Belmonte. Significantly, he confided to his diary that he had three *Patrias*.

Silva Porto's motive for remaining in Angola, a candid diary entry in 1882 suggests, was not economic but social. He was losing money and piling up debts, and he saw his commercial position endangered by two problems: his having to pay *mucanos* (traditional fines) to African chiefs along the caravan trails, sometimes for alleged witchcraft, and the competition from the first African *sertanejo* with some capital.<sup>69</sup> Enamoured of both the trading life of the plateau and aspects of African life, including the keeping of a large family, Silva Porto decided his social status in interior Angola was worth more than obscurity in Portugal, for his economic status was marginal. As he wrote in his diary<sup>70</sup>.

"In the land of the blind, the one-eyed are king. As poor as I am now, if I retired to Portugal today, I would amount to nothing [zero]; on the other hand, I am who I am around here as long as I possess one piece of trade cloth."

Portugal's expansionist program in the interior of Angola, following the settling of the Congo Question, accelerated in 1885. Already on its way to cross the continent from Angola to Mozambique, was the important, second expedition of Capelo and Ivens, this time much better prepared and equipped. This expedition was more important for scientific knowledge than for assuring Portuguese claims for the *contra-costa* plan. In 1887 the Portuguese parliament studied a map, known later in history as the "rose-colored map" because the area between Angola and Mozambique, what is now Katanga (Zaire), Zambia, much of Zimbabwe and Malawi were colored in pink as Portuguese territory<sup>71</sup>. One expedition assisted the national goal in this regard in expanding the "occupied" or "effectively claimed" area of eastern Angola: Henrique Dias de Carvalho's successful political and scientific expedition during 1884-1887 mapped new areas of Angola and, Carvalho reached east of the Kasai River, Zaire (Congo); signed a treaty with important African Kings and helped support Portugal's territorial claims for

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in the land which is a cradle to me, or in this [Angola] my third Fatherland. I have already said a while ago that I had three Fatherlands - Portugal, Brazil, and Africa." (from Letter to Luciano Cordeiro, of SGL).

<sup>69</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol. XI, Entry of June 25, 1885 notes a caravan reaching Bihe with the "first native Sertanejo with solid capital, in virtue of his position; he could be the first native capitalist of the interior." The man's name was "D. Pedro Antonio Camgombe," and SP observed him in Catumbella after his caravan came from Bie.

<sup>70</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol. IX, p.389, entry for August 4, 1882.

<sup>71</sup> Charles E. Nowell, *The Rose-Coloured Map: Portugal's Attempt to build an African Empire from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean* (Lisbon, 1982),

the region. In effect, Carvalho's expedition resulted in increasing by nearly one-sixth the previous size of what was then Portugal's territory in Angola<sup>72</sup>.

The history of Portugal's claims, frontier treaties with Germany (1886), France (1886) and Britain (1891), following the British Ultimatum of January 11, 1890, the second major Ultimatum Portugal had received in the general Scramble, has been related in detail elsewhere<sup>73</sup>. If Portugal had occupied with military force Manicaland in 1869-70, as a Mozambique official proposed, and if Portugal had formally claimed that region in a diplomatic follow-up with her oldest Ally at the time, Rhodes and the British South Africa Company's beginning thrust into Rhodesia in 1889-1890 might have had a different outcome.

It is difficult to imagine a different outcome for Portugal's expansionist plans in the Shire highlands once the memory of the shade of Livingstone and the Scottish mission and merchant lobbies were aroused.

In any event, even Bié the area Silva Porto considered his adopted home, was not under Portuguese control until long after the old trader, growing blind with various illnesses depressed by the burning of his house and insults and an incipient African rebellion he was helpless to thwart, decided to commit suicide wrapped in his Portuguese trade caravan flag. Whatever the reasons for Portugal's failure to take Central Africa, the fact was that by the time of the 1891 Anglo-Portuguese treaty which settled most of the frontiers between Portugal's southern African colonies and Britain, Portugal controlled a good deal less than one tenth of the area of Angola's 481, 000 +square miles<sup>74</sup>.

As late as December 1900, Protestant missionaries in the Bié area reported that the Bailundu people and their plateau neighbors did not consider themselves to be under Portuguese rule and expected the Europeans to leave the area in the near future<sup>75</sup>. Indeed, it was not until after the costly military campaigns of 1902-1920 that Portugal could claim the Angolan

<sup>72</sup> See Henrique Dias de Carvalho's main account of his 1884-87 journeys in Angola and Zaire (Congo Free state) in his book *Descrição da Viagem A Massumba do Muatianvua* (Lisbon, 1890) and his pioneering account, *Ethnographia e História Tradicional dos Povos da Lunda* (Lisbon 1890)

<sup>73</sup> See Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa* (Johannesburg, 1967).

<sup>74</sup> See Wheeler, *The Portuguese in Angola* (Ph.D. dissert.), pp. 343-346.

<sup>75</sup> Houghton Library, Manuscripts, Papers of the ABCFMC (American Board of Congregational Foreign Missions, vol. 635, W.H. Sanders (Missionary) to Smith from Kamundongo mission, Dec.24, 1900: "... Throughout the country the blacks expect that the Portuguese will withdraw sooner or later, dominion revert to the [African] chiefs." In the midst of the Bailundu war, a rebellion against Portuguese rule in 1902-3, missionaries reported that a major factor in sparking the collective desire "to rise with one mind" was the widespread perception of Africans there "that the government lacked power." Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA., Manuscripts, ABCFMC, vol. 2, W. Sanders in Bailuridu to J. Smith, Boston, August 29, 1902.

plateau to be under *de facto* rule and in remote eastern Angola near the border with the so-called Belgian Congo it was not until the early 1930's that Portuguese officials collected taxes among Africans on a regular basis.

### Conclusion

The politics of motivation of Portugal's participation in the general European Scramble for Africa are an interesting, complex historical problem. While Clarence-Smith's contributions have highlighted effectively the economic aspects of one portion of the Portuguese colonial movement and business groups' motives and activity in post-1870 tropical Africa, the archival records of the Portuguese colonial Ministry and imperial decision-makers, the diplomatic records of the on-going Anglo-Portuguese territorial conflict and disputes, and the writings of Silva Porto, a trader-imperialist in the Angolan *sertão* and beyond, suggest that political, social, strategic and nationalistic motives prevailed over the economic at least until after the June 11, 1891 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty's boundary settlement ended the formal phase of the general Scramble in the case of Portugal.

While there are significant flaws in the thesis of Hammond since it tended to oversimplify even the top ruling group's motives in the Scramble and its evidence is limited in its use of Portuguese Government records and private writings, its emphasis on the political and nationalistic motives as a kind of idealism of national revival would appear to be supported, again at least at the top levels in Lisbon officialdom and even in the bush with settlers of Silva Porto's mindset, by a great deal of evidence. Indeed, 24 years after it was published, Eric Axelson's measured conclusion, while very general, still rings true:

*The Treaty of 11 June 1891 marked the end of an epoch for Portugal. The pioneer European power in Africa, she had regarded the hinterland of her settlements on the coasts of Angola and Moçambique as reserved for penetration by her subjects. Lack of financial resources, of manpower, and of will, had militated against extension of Portuguese dominion. She was incapable of withstanding the inroads and onslaughts of the often-unscrupulous agents of wealthier, more highly industrialized, more vigorous powers. The Treaty of 11 June denied her the high ground and nearly all the gold-producing areas of Mashonaland. Extra tracts about the Upper Zambezi appeared poor compensation. But the powers confirmed Portugal in her possession of what later was found to total 481, 351 square miles in Angola, and 302, 328 in Moçambique; to develop this vast area proved to be an excessively heavy burden, in view of continued financial crises, and the marked reluctance of Portuguese to export either capital or themselves to Africa.<sup>76</sup>*

<sup>76</sup> Eric Axelson, *Portugal And The Scramble For Africa 1875-1891* (Johannesburg, 1967), p.297.

While the profit-driven motives and action of the economic portions of the colonial movement, public and private, are now better known, a definitive study of the politics of Portugal's motivation and action in the general European Scramble requires more evidence and a broader analysis and vision. This paper has emphasized how the timing, motivation and nature of Portugal's participation in the general Scramble after 1875 were related less to the metropolitan economic difficulties and interests of business groups than to the fact that Portugal had invested significantly in its own prior Scramble of 1838-1861, mainly in Angola but partly in Mozambique after 1868, and that Portugal's official action in expansionist efforts was by necessity and history driven by the on-going Anglo-Portuguese *contenda* over territorial claims on the coasts of Angola and Mozambique.

Six motivating factors have been identified as important in this process.

1. Wrapped in the more appealing guise of an ideal of national revival, a nationalism fused with a renewed drive for empire in Africa, as well as an imperially-minded Portuguese national, 'civil religion.'
2. The increasingly popular notion after 1875 in various levels of Portuguese society that saving and building up the African empire was Portugal's only chance in re-establishing status and gaining respect among the Powers in Western Europe as well as a guarantee against potential aggressors (Spain) in Iberia.
3. Portugal's first Scramble for Africa, 1838-1861 as well as a series of on going territorial claim and trade disputes over sections of the African coast in Angola and Mozambique (and in Guinea-Bissau with France), since 1822 or earlier as well as pressures from the Alliance.
4. Perceived threats to Portuguese claims and sovereignty from the travels, writings, and other actions of influential foreigners in Angola and Mozambique or in the Central African territory between these two colonies which tended to arouse Portugal and her imperial servants to greater concern and activity.
5. Specific diplomatic and political incidents, whose outcomes generated feelings of anger and humiliation in popular circles in Portugal and determination in diplomatic and military circles, from the various "ultimatums" given to Portugal by English Foreign Office and Naval leaders including the policy statements and documents (cited above) of 1846, 1860, Feb. 1885 and Jan. 1890.
6. The actions, opinions and influence, backed by a variety of political, social and economic motives, of Portuguese individuals in Lisbon and in the

empire who ranged from Ministers like Andrade Corvo and Barros Gomes, colonial activist-publicists-writers like Luciano Cordeiro, explorers like Serpa Pinto, Capelo, Ivens, Cardoso and Carvalho, and *sertanejo*-activists like Silva Porto, to expand Portuguese sovereignty in Africa.

If Portugal had acted earlier to insure her sovereignty over tracts already part of Angola and Mozambique and to expand sovereignty over new tracts of coast and hinterland, what were the chances of territorial outcome different than that of 1891? In order to begin to answer such a question, the historian must weigh Portugal's advantages with disadvantages during the general Scramble, 1875-1891.

Her major advantages were a colonial presence on the coasts and immediate hinterlands of Angola and Mozambique, the results and lessons from the first Portuguese Scramble, 1838-61 in Angola and that of the 1860s in Mozambique, a lack of interest in those coasts by powers other than Britain until after 1877, proposals and plans to claim and annex these areas before other Powers acquired interests there, and the evidence of historic claims as well as the accomplishments of traveller-activists like Silva Porto and others. The disadvantages which were most important were less Portugal's lack of financial resources, for we observed how in the 1880s when Portugal was determined to mount well-equipped, prepared and purposeful scientific-political expeditions (i.e., Carvalho's in eastern Angola, 1884-87) she could, than a scarcity of naval power where it counted on the coasts of Angola and Mozambique and when it was needed (the crisis of Feb. 1885 in the Congo River mouth, for example); lacks of diplomatic and political power in the councils of the Powers in Europe, and a poor reputation morally and socially in the popular mind in England, her oldest ally, as well as among powerful lobbies in London (the Scottish Missions and British merchants in Africa). In the last analysis, Portugal had to back down and Governments had to resign following the "ultimatums" of February 1885 and of January 1890 because she lacked the political and military power and influence to confront great Power interests in the territorial disputes in Africa and because her oldest Ally either refused to back her final claims (Congo River mouth, Feb. 1885 case) or because her Ally's territorial claims were in direct conflict with her own (Shire Highlands and Mashonaland case, Jan. 1890). In these cases and in others involving a long history of territorial claim disputes, largely coastal, the critical context of Portugal's direct action in the Scramble was dominated by the fact that Portugal was both beneficiary and victim of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Since Portugal required the benefits of protection in Europe from the Alliance yet was blocked in her territorial claims in Africa, Portuguese leadership sometimes vacillated between accepting the inevitable Protectorate Britain exercised over Portugal during much of the century, yet resenting the process and seeking greater freedom of maneuver within it. King Pedro V of Portugal's confidential

thoughts<sup>77</sup> in a letter of 1860 reflected on the disadvantages of the Alliance, following yet another "ultimatum" over Portuguese territorial claims and expansion on the Angolan coast:

"England should realise the benefits of not souring her relations with a nation forced to be faithful to her obligations, but who some fine day may be tempted to revolt against her history...[i.e. radical change in Portugal's foreign policy by means of altering or dissolving the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance]

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The young, ill fated King went on to analyze why Portugal's first Scramble in Africa failed.

Many of our misfortunes in Angola clearly originate in the policy of expansion, which the Overseas Council began, and which today we find ourselves obliged to continue because of circumstances. To follow this policy, it is necessary to accept all the consequences, and these are the weakening of the Metropolis in favour of the [African] Colonies. These are matters not discussed in public, but better left thought out in private."

Four years earlier in London Portugal's Minister Lavradio, one of the key Portuguese players in the decision-making of the first Scramble for Africa by Portugal (1838-1861) wrote in a resentful spirit about why Portugal's participation in that effort was a matter of national honour: he urged the current Minister of Navy and Overseas in Lisbon to stop

"...the English, who already have stolen from us all we possessed in Asia- who were also the principal authors of the separation of Brazil, from robbing us by indirect means of what we still possess in Africa."<sup>78</sup>

At another level of thought and action in the colonial movement, the *sertanejo* Silva Porto, in the same spirit as King Pedro V and the Portuguese Minister in London (Lavradio), defended the expansion policy of pre-1861 and its adherents, including a tired, discouraged Governor-General of Angola who saw his policy thwarted by English pressures; as the Oporto native wrote in his diary in December 1860:<sup>79</sup>

"...as if he<sup>80</sup> were responsible for such event! It would be better for those minds to fight the reprehensible leadership of England in all affairs acting as if Portugal were a colony of England. Contrary to this, they berate the man whose greatest defect is to seek the aggrandisement of his Fatherland."

<sup>77</sup> Letter of King D. Pedro V to Fontes Pereira de Melo, principal architect of Portugal's *Regeneração*, May, 8, 1860, in Ruben A. Leitão (Ed.) *Cartas de D. Pedro V Aos Seus Contemporâneos* (Lisbon, 1961), Doc n<sup>o</sup>-168, p. 307.

<sup>78</sup> Conde do Lavradio, *Memórias do Conde do Lavradio* (8 vols., Lisbon, 1937-42), vol. VI, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> Silva Porto, *Viagens e apontamentos*, vol.II, Entry for Dec. 22, 1860, p.113.

<sup>80</sup> Refers to governor-general of Angola, Col. Jose Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral (his dates are 1808-1873), in office, 1854-1860, first term in Angola;1868-70, second term. Died on military campaign in Mozambique, 1873.

In some respects, then, the 1890 "Ultimatum" of 30 years later was only the last blow in this war, the final humiliation in a long history of African territorial claim disputes with England since 1822.

It is possible, if not probable, that Portugal could have acquired more of the Central African plateaus if she had carried out expansion plans before the rival Powers became determined to preclude her action. If Portugal had followed up the 1869 proposal of the Governor of Quelimane and occupied effectively Mashonaland before Rhodes agents and Company moved in 1889, Portugal might have ended up with more of what is now eastern Zimbabwe. If Portugal had acted on the 1865 Luanda merchants' petition-plan-proposal to make a deal with France over Guinea and the Congo Mouth, long before the International African Association and King Leopold were active in the area, and if ally England had acquiesced (highly unlikely before the Morier mission to Lisbon, 1877-81), Portugal might have acquired sovereignty over all of the Congo River mouth. As it was it might have been too late for Portugal to make good her claims as late as 1879, when Stanley was mobilized for Leopold, and definitely as late as late 1882 when French interests became too committed to the region to allow room for Portuguese interests to triumph. In the Congo question, the handwriting was on the wall by late 1882 for Portugal and the Feb. 1884 treaty with England was *ultrapassado* before the ink was dry on the paper.

Considering the disparity in respective resources and power between Portugal and the rival Powers in Africa, the acquisition of about 8% of the continent's area was a colossal imperial victory which a small, poor country could scarcely take full advantage of at the time. Following the further shock of the 1890 Ultimatum and the 1891 Treaty, it hardly seemed rational to argue that Portugal could either defend or effectively occupy much less control vast sections of most of Angola and Mozambique. It was not rational<sup>81</sup> to deny the truth that large sectors of African polities in the hinterlands of both colonies until 1920 believed that the Portuguese might leave soon or that the veneer of civilization was razor-thin.

Rationality and reasonable arguments based on a clear-eyed vision of self-interest were rarely what imperialism and territorial expansion were all about. It is true that there was always an economic if not economising basis which was - a part of Portugal's reasons for being in Africa and it remains true that for centuries, to quote the great American missionary to Angola, Gladwyn Murray Childs, the Portuguese were "the most tenacious traders of all the Europeans who have gone to Africa"<sup>82</sup>. But there was much that was

<sup>81</sup> Gladwyn Murray Childs, *Umbundu Kinship and Character* (London, 1949), p.191.

<sup>82</sup> Nor was it rational to deny that the failure of Portugal's coastal expansion strategy of 1838-61 and concentration on Congo mouth and Delagoa Bay claims weakened the *contra-costa* plans

irrational about the motives and *raison d' être* of the informal imperialism of Silva Porto's caravan trade and farming, along with the original impetus to emigrate to Angola from Brazil and from Oporto to Brazil to seek his personal fortune. There was much that was irrational about Silva Porto's decision to remain in Angola and to carry on trading despite debt and no great fortune to show after 45 years in the *sertão*. His social status in an African context, not economic success in a pre-capitalist or mercantile sense, was more essential and his political and nationalistic arguments in favor of Portuguese expansion were idealistic and irrational. Silva Porto up to his decision to commit suicide in March 1890, an act that may have been more rational than the notion of continuing to carry the flag for Portuguese imperial expansion could not have survived without non-economic ideals and dreams. To some extent, the *sertanejo's* reasons for remaining in Angola, despite the heavy odds against success, resembled those of his Fatherland.