

ANNA BULAKH

**UKRAINE AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN ACTION. UNCERTAINTY
AND TRUST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE POST SOVIET ERA**

UNIVERSITY OF FERNANDO PESSOA

PORTO

2012

ANNA BULAKH

**UKRAINE AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN ACTION. UNCERTAINTY
AND TRUST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE POST SOVIET ERA**

Presented to the University of Fernando Pessoa as
part of the requirements for the degree of Master in
Political Science and International Relations under
the supervision of Professor Ivo Sobral.

Abstract

This dissertation overviews the premises of the current foreign politics of the post-soviet state Ukraine after twenty years of its independence. This work explores concepts of the Security Dilemma and Soft Power tracing the state of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. The application of theories of the international relations gives us broaden picture of the deteriorating image of Ukraine in international politics. Using the theoretic hypotheses of Soft Power, interdependency and misperception altogether in contrast to the traditional hard dimension of Power makes this work distinguished from the majority of analyses on Ukraine. We intend to delve into the practical cases of the Nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, Gas disputes between Ukraine and Russia till today's negotiations and Black Sea Fleet question as the striking examples of the Dilemma that leads Ukrainian government towards zero sum decisions. We will overview the main current events and decisions in the EU-Ukraine-Russia relations to develop approximate predictions of the future state of Ukrainian Foreign Affairs, this can create a ground for policy recommendations. The aim of the dissertation is to fulfill the gap in understanding the process by which Ukraine became a buffer zone and a grey hub between the EU and Russia. We wish also to analyze the gap between superficial political comments and distinguished them from academic practices and analyses.

Resumo

Esta dissertação tenciona oferecer uma visão geral do estado da atual política externa da Ucrânia como estado pós-soviético isto após vinte anos da sua independência. Este trabalho explora conceitos do Dilema de Segurança e *Soft Power* analisando o estado das Relações Exteriores da Ucrânia. A aplicação das teorias das relações internacionais oferece-nos uma ampla visão de deterioração da imagem da Ucrânia em política internacional. Usando as hipóteses teóricas do *Soft Power*, interdependência e erros de percepção completam o contraste com a dimensão tradicional do *Hard Power* tornam este trabalho distinto da maioria das análises existentes sobre a Ucrânia. Temos a intenção de aprofundar os casos práticos do desarmamento nuclear da Ucrânia, as disputas de gás entre a Ucrânia e Rússia até as negociações de hoje, e ainda a questão da Frota do Mar Negro; estes casos são exemplos marcantes do dilema que leva o governo ucraniano em direção decisões de soma zero. Faremos uma visão geral dos principais eventos e decisões nas relações UE-Ucrânia-Rússia para desenvolver previsões aproximadas do futuro das relações internacionais da Ucrânia, o que poderá criar uma base para recomendações políticas. O objetivo da dissertação é preencher a lacuna na compreensão do processo que tornou a Ucrânia numa zona de tampão e um zona cinzenta entre a UE e a Rússia. Pretende-se igualmente analisar e diferenciar entre comentários políticos superficiais e a metodologia de análise acadêmica.

ABBREVIATIONS

BSF – Black Sea Fleet

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement

EU – European Union

HEU – Highly Enriched Uranium

IMF – International Monetary Fund

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT – Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSDC – National Security and Defence Council

START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UN – United Nations

UNR – Ukrainian National Republic

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INDEX

INTRODUCTION.....	9
I CHAPTER – Thesis Overview	
1.1 Methodology and assumptions.....	12
1.2 Organization of chapters.....	13
II CHAPTER – Historical background	
1. Security Dilemma in newly emerged post-soviet states.....	16
1.1 Historical legacy: prerequisites of the Dilemma.....	16
1.2 Paradox of perception of the common history between Ukraine and Russia.....	21
1.3 A history of balance: foreign affairs of Ukraine, a newly emerged post-soviet state.....	24
III CHAPTER – Theoretical approaches of the Security Dilemma in international affairs of the post-Soviet states	
1. Security Dilemma in newly emerged post soviet states.....	31
2. Soft Power: changing the approach towards the Security Dilemma in the case of Ukraine	36
3. Understanding the definitions of ‘friends’ and ‘friendship’ in international relations	43
4. Concepts of Uncertainty and Trust in international affairs: Ukraine between Russia and Western Europe.....	45
4.1 Application of uncertainty and trust	45
4.2 The fragility of international cooperation and rational egoism	47
4.3 Future uncertainties.....	50
4.4 Double standards.....	51

IV CHAPTER – Approach of the Security Dilemma concepts in politics of Ukraine

1. Security Dilemma in action.....	53
1.1 ‘Multi vector’ politics of Ukraine and zero sum outcomes of the Machiavellian pursuit of power.....	53
2. Continuity of deteriorating relations with Russia and the EU.....	56
2.1 Russia’s projects: Customs Union and Eurasian Union.....	56
2.2 Ukraine: gas transit and “gas wars” with Russia.....	60
2.3 Black Sea: source of tensions in Ukraine, Russia and the EU relations or “the dog that did not bark”.....	65

V CHAPTER – Ukraine Stands a Chance in the International Arena: trends and recommendations

1. Ukraine’s chance for positive changes.....	70
2. The future of the EU integration.....	72
3. The future of Ukraine-Russia gas disputes.....	73
4. New trends and new cooperation of Ukraine in the international arena.....	75
5. Recommendations.....	76

CONCLUSION.....	80
-----------------	----

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	82
-------------------	----

APPENDIXES.....	88
-----------------	----

ANNEXES.....	90
--------------	----

INTRODUCTION

Choosing the vector of the East or West, the European Union or Eurasian Union – the dilemma that follows and leads Ukraine for the last 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet regime. The outer point of the multi vector politics led to the jeopardy of Soft Power of Ukraine and isolation among its neighbors. Ukraine is “muddling through” on the margins of Europe constructing a bridge between two poles of power, East and West. The question accompanying a zero sum tactics is whether Ukraine should be anywhere at all, while the European Union is treating with “carrots” and Russia is imposing “sticks”.

The break-up of the Soviet Union brought the termination of the bipolarization in the world order. The Western dimension was interested in developing the common secure area including the Eastern states in its zone of influence. However, the change of the nature of governing regime does not guarantee the stability in the region. The Soviet heritage: corruption, inefficiency, incompetence and domination of the centralized interests were routed into the society of the newly independent post-soviet state. The power of the Machiavellian “nobles” transformed into “oligarchs” still undermines the level of the government degree in Ukraine. The rational egoism of personal interests leads to the failure of international cooperation of Ukraine with other states. Using a bottom up approach we assume the hypothesis that the division of specific interests handicap Ukraine in setting one political agenda what creates uncertainty and distrust in Ukraine-EU and Ukraine-Russia relations.

The escalation of distrust, uncertainty and misperception – premises of the Security Dilemma – takes the roots from the historical capital and geopolitical location of Ukraine. The past of incorporation by the imperial powers, serfdom and enslavement of the Ukrainian nation created the historical paradox of sharing the common Slavic history with Russia and preservation of the cultural heritage. Russia tends to re-establish its power on the world political arena in imperial manner while the European Union – to

spread its supranational power crossing the Eastern border. Ukraine became a zone of interest between powerful rivals, a buffer zone. Choosing one integration vector causes the shift of the balance of powers in the region. Sending diverge messages Ukraine damages the credibility of the country on both frontiers: the European Union and further Transatlantic space and “post soviet brother” Russia. Using the approach of Soft Power we are able to explain the importance of intangible methods of influence in foreign affairs what brings us a new perspective of the Security Dilemma. The power of ordering and imposing hard power has transformed in making others want what one state wants by the power of information and interdependency. Proclaiming the independence after the break-up of the USSR in 1991 Ukraine is still cornered by the economical, and consequently, political interdependency with Russia.

The distinction between *realpolitik* and liberalism in the Western approach towards Ukraine lost its limits, while Russian imperial methods to “collect post-soviet states” in one sphere of influence is an existential imperative. The rational egoism of all actors in the Ukraine-EU-Russia triangle creates prerequisites of the Security Dilemma for the stability in the region. We will analyse the premises of multi vector politics of Ukraine applying the concepts of the Security Dilemma and Soft Power overviewing major cases of disputes between Ukraine, Russia and Western unions.

The majority of political analyses and observations on Ukraine tend to represent mere understanding of the premises of the current deteriorating external relations and Soft Power of Ukraine on international arena. The international community perceives the post-soviet space as a single dimension and lacks the understanding of differences in histories between Ukraine, Russia and countries of the “socialist camp”¹. In this dissertation we intend to find an application of the hypotheses of misperception in international politics developed by Robert Jervis during 1970s.

¹ People's Republic of Albania; People's Republic of Bulgaria; Hungarian People's Republic; The German Democratic Republic; Polish People's Republic; The Romanian People's Republic; The Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic

Russia still treats Ukraine as the existential part of the Russian neo-imperial sphere of influence. The dominant state of the post-soviet space has not completely recognized the independence of Ukraine. In fact, the current active opposition of Vladimir Putin, the blogger and social activist Alexey Navalny addresses Ukraine as the historical and cultural part of the contemporary Russia. Thus, the leading opposition, which has emerged in 2011 during the Russian Spring, stops being pro-democratic and neo-liberal in the question concerning Ukraine.

This research might bring valuable conclusions to create a base for the policy recommendations for all parties in the EU, Ukraine and Russia relations. Starting from the historical background we will trace the up-to-date events in Foreign Affairs of the post-soviet state Ukraine what will give us an all angle overview and comprehensive analyses.

I CHAPTER – Thesis Overview

1.1 Methodology and assumptions

The main objective of the thesis dissertation is to research the current situation of Ukraine as an outcome of the last 20 years in transition. Collapse of the Soviet Union re-shifted balance of powers from the bipolar world order to the chaotic transformation period of the newly emerged states. The focal dilemma of the post communism era was the choice of the vector of development for independent states. The break of the Iron Curtain opened the perspective of the liberal systems developed among the European Union member states, while Russia established an agenda to re-establish its power with elements of the nineteen-century imperial state.

Ukraine inherited the former territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with 52 million population neighboring with the “socialist camp” states, which chose “to join the unified European family and NATO” after the communism yoke (Drumea, 2008). Ukraine was cornered between Russia and the growing European Union. The purpose to break the link with an old dinosaur economics of the Soviet Union brought challenges of the suppressed civil society, routed into the mentality corruption and high military spending. The question of the trust and insecurity created instability in all levels of the new state systems. We can find the evidences of the escalation of the Security Dilemma in new emerging states on social, economic and political levels. In this research thesis we will tend to apply the basic theory of the international relations to the current insecure position of Ukraine on geopolitical arena.

Today Ukraine presents a ‘multi vector’ player in international politics. Keeping all negotiation processes on the level of uncertainty may bring deterioration of the relations on the both sides of its neighborhood.

The research can bring a positive impact for the European Union strategic policy towards its important and costly Eastern Neighborhood Policy. The outcomes of the thesis research might find an answer in fundamental theories of international relations why Ukraine is ‘muddling through’ on the margins of Europe in vague perspectives and far achievable list of the EU high profile requirements searching for the EU accession ‘light’.

1.2 Organization of chapters

In *II Chapter* we observe the last 20 years that have led to the escalation of the Security Dilemma and finally the edge of the negative consequences for the international affairs of Ukraine. The historical overview will trace us to the prerequisites of the paradox of the *multi vector* foreign policy. We will approach historical analyses to understand insecurity as an unfortunate result of the past. Constant struggle for the independence forms historical capital of Ukraine and leads to the causalities of the Security Dilemma of the state on social and political levels. We are taking for granted the borders of Ukraine today that were established in such only 20 years ago. The nation that is called Ukraine today could preserve its cultural heritage after the Imperial tsars attempts to eliminate the Ukrainian language and the Soviet launch the culture of the masses.

After the collapse of the Communism, Ukraine with the legacy of insecurity, uncertainty and fear was plunged into the Dilemma to construct a sovereign state being a land ‘in between’: between different political systems, and cultures. The legacy of the unity with Russia ‘elder brother’, economic dependency and the raise of Russia’s politics of the ‘imperial global power’, faces Ukraine with the inability to contradict but to accept unbeneficial conditions for the state. Ukraine is dealing with the power using ‘*The Machiavellian Prince*’ and adopting the same rules of game in internal politics. A state controlled by the aspirations of a limited circle of ‘Machiavellian nobles’ and in case of the Eastern Europe ‘oligarchs’ with their short-term desires to make bigger

fortunes in contrast ‘common people always see the final result’, the system and the state ultimately will be in jeopardy.

Moreover, we will conceptualise the character of the European Union as a player in this triangle of escalating Security Dilemma. Using a *Realpolitik* concept the European Union is pursuing the global power attempts as well. The perception of this player by the international community tends to be positive and liberal. Nevertheless, are the goals of the EU – a supranational power – defined by its shared values or it tends to pursuit political power? We will analyse the importance of Ukraine for the European Union what presents another causality of the insecurity for the country in transition, escalating Security Dilemma and bringing Ukraine to the ‘zero sum’ international politics.

In the *III Chapter* we tend to find the application of the Security dilemma theory to the state of affairs of ‘new independent’ state after the Soviet Union collapse. We will define the themes of power, following the new concept of Soft Power in world politics developed by Joseph Nye in 1990s after the break-up of the Communist regime. We will approach a new angle of the Security Dilemma to Ukraine basing on intangible concept of power going beyond the traditional military strength.

One of the most important political events, the fall of communism, brought the challenge for this area to create new models of coexistence between sovereign states. That was the disappearance of one artificial order, the Soviet Union, and the task was to create a substitution to it. Nevertheless, the world politics is based on insecurity that didn’t find the equilibrium in 20 years time span. The Security Dilemma came into the action instead. We will discuss the importance of the diplomatic communication in dissolution of misperception and distrust in the international relations.

We intend to overview the fundamental theories of fear, trust and cooperation and apply them to nowadays state of affairs in the Eastern European region, precisely Ukraine.

The traditional analyses of the Ukrainian politics tend to be critical and publicist. There is a lack of deep analyses and academic approach. In this research we will apply concepts of the Security Dilemma nonmilitary threats. We will think of political security in defense of system-level referents, such as international society or international law referring to the fundamental research of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler. Emphasizing the security of the human rights in Ukraine, we will apply broad theory of insecurity from the international level to more personalized matter, as individual insecurity of citizens and separate political leaders, deteriorated rule of law.

In the *IV Chapter* we intend to conclude how the international cooperation and interdependence based on uncertainty, fear and distrust is a vulnerable zero sum process for the global players. Such politics leads the government to adopt negative decisions and fatalist practices. We will approach analyzed theories to three main cases in foreign affairs of Ukraine, which represent the main premises of the Security Dilemma escalation. Firstly, we will overview Russia's grand integration projects Customs and Eurasian Unions; the analyses of the pressure directed at Ukraine to join unions will lead us to the focal premises of the Ukrainian multi vector politics. Secondly, we will trace the events of the gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine that affect negatively the Ukraine-EU relations, what will assist to trace the motives of states involved in conflict and evidences of the distrust in Ukrainian foreign policy. Thirdly, we cannot avoid the analyses of the Black Sea region that represents another angle of the Security Dilemma for Ukraine. These three cases are the focal external factors of the Dilemma development in the politics of the post-Soviet state.

We might come to the assumption that failing international politics of Ukraine is not only an outcome of the current government and political leaders, but also an outcome of the insecurity caused by the historical capital of Ukraine becoming a sovereign state and a scope of external factors: pressure from the neighboring powers. The research might bring more clear understanding of the players, their disclosed and hidden political agendas, the causalities of the escalation of the Security Dilemma for Ukraine.

II CHAPTER – Historical background

1. Security Dilemma in newly emerged post-soviet states

1.4 Historical legacy: prerequisites of the Dilemma

The Security Dilemma involves questions of interpretation the history, legacy of the state foundation and its neighbours. Robert Jervis (Jervis, cit in Booth, 2008, p. 38) paid special attention to the detailed historical analyses emphasizing that “the security dilemma involves contentious questions of historical interpretation and continuing attention to semantic clarification”. Historical events could be analyzed under different angles and perceived with different attitudes, nevertheless, the history is the base of the establishment of a state and the legacy cannot be avoided. Ukraine was territorially puzzled by the surrounded by big powers for centuries. Today the uncertainty in the intentions of its more powerful neighbours creates one of the premises of insecurity. Mearsheimer argued that the security competition would only exist if it were assumed that states could never be certain in intentions of others (Booth et al., 2008).

Before analyzing the last 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the historical overview is needed. Routs of insecurity, inability to trust to the ‘near neighbourhood’ countries go decades back. Insecurity is an outcome of history, it is an unfortunate result of the constant fight for the independence in the past that forms the history capital of Ukraine and leads to the causalities of the Security Dilemma of the state on social and political levels. We are taking for granted the borders of Ukraine today that were established as such only 20 years ago. Before it saw numerous attempts of reunification: the Ukrainian National Republic, the Ukrainian State under Hetman Skoropadsky, the Western Ukrainian National Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Carpathian Ukraine, and finally Ukraine as we see it today (Boroda et al., 2010). The activism to preserve the cultural heritage (e.g. Ukrainian language and aristocratic elite) was oppressed by the laws during the incorporation into the Russian Empire during

XVIII century. The Western Ukraine had a strong aristocratic layer in the XVI century that faced the catastrophe of persecution by the Polish and Lithuanian remained till the end of the XX century. Thus, the main creators of the Ukrainian literature and philosophy in order to reserve all the basic privileges integrated themselves into foreign structures. Thus, the energy of the elites was directed to a process of adaptation and lost its deep Ukrainian identity being unable to make a positive influence on national culture (Pasko, Chapter XV). Bolshevism was based on the development of the culture of “masses” centralizing all identities into one socialist ideology. Under the communist yoke the public sphere and civil society were limited considerably. Thus, the communication between state and society was abolished and could not revive during 1990’s to the level of an active civil society in Ukraine.

The central problem of the Ukrainian nation is the historical process of the establishment of its borders. During the period of the XVIII till the incorporation into the Russian Empire, Ukraine was under the Lithuanian statutes until the modification into the autonomy status by Catherine II in XVIII. The limitation of the Ukrainian national culture by the legislations of the Russian Empire and Polish-Lithuanian states led to the damage of the national identity. Most of the centuries Ukraine was the land of the dependent peasantry. XVI century brought the period of serfdom into the history of Ukraine (Pasko, Chapter XV).

We can put an emphasis on three different waves regarding the so called “Ukrainian enslavement”. The first is dating back to 1596 when Polish-Lithuanian decree entered into force enslaving the Ukrainian people. After the rebellion period when democratic segments of the Ukrainian population altogether with the military forces called Cossacks, came the second wave of the enslavement by the Russian Empire in 1783 until the official reverse of the serfdom decree in 1861.

The analysis of the period of the Soviet Ukraine allows us to emphasize the third wave of the enslavement. The Soviet regime forcefully applied the mass collectivization

system between 1929-1933 that brings us back to the chronology of the period of the serfdom (Pasko, Chapter XV). The manmade famine holodomor² in 1932-1933, which is recognized as the genocide of the Ukrainian population, represents one of the crucial historical routes for the Security Dilemma of Ukraine as the nation and state.

Every time the state was arising back from the ruins and the nation came out with stronger believe in its identity. Emerged from ashes of the strong empire that has suppressed the weaker state, the sense of trust was replaced by the fear and straggle to save the national integrity. Ukraine represents the unique case; it managed to come out richer being transformed from the agricultural ‘bread basket’ of the Russian Empire into the industrial center of the Soviet Union (Boroda et al., 2010). From that moment, the interdependence has changed, as the economic boost of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic transformed it into the independent unit. This was the final step towards the sovereignty; nevertheless, routs of interdependency are giving its outputs even 20 years after the Soviet Union collapse.

Thus, the outputs in sum have created Security Dilemma of the state. From both sides of the neighborhood big powers have their own agendas concerning the place of Ukraine on geopolitical map. Russia tends to bring back the ‘near abroad’ state into its orbit. The European Community is trying to develop a more secure environment inside the framework of the Eastern European Neighborhood. Experts argue the altruistic motives of the supranational power. Threats and opportunities for the European Union are clearly calculated: energy supply, geopolitical influence and access to the Central Asia and Middle East regions.

We can trace the *Realpolitik* concept in the process of the EU pursuing the politics of the global power. The perception of the EU as the player tends to be positive and liberal. Nevertheless, goals of the EU are defined not only by the shared values of

² Holodomor – the famine genocide in Ukraine recognized by the Ukrainian Parliament in 2006.

democracy among the Member States, but the agenda to pursuit its political influence on the global level.

Russia's approach towards Ukraine was never remained unchanged in the process of the transformation of the Imperial Russia into the Communist regime and then towards a liberal state. Historical and political scientists unanimously claim the imperial ideology of Russia in its Foreign Policy. According to the political scientist Andrey Piontkovsky in his interview commenting Russia's policies towards Ukraine:

This tradition [imperial ideology] was before 1917, including the Russian liberals and Democrats. Russian liberalism has always disappeared in the Ukrainian question. This imperial tradition is genetically older than the communist ideology. Now communism has died as a religion, but an imperial spirit is deliberate and encouraged. I emphasize that it [communism ideology] does not rule the masses; it is a complex of the Russian elite that has injured the loss of imperial status³.

The year 1991 that is marked with the collapse of the Soviet Union brought a new reality for Russia and the newly emerged independent states.⁴ Nevertheless, dramatic changes could not transform the way of thinking of the political elites. The western terminology addressed Russia as the 'power in transition' (Bachkatov, 2009) considering aspirations of Russia to rebuild its imperial legacy into new neo-imperialist policy. Russia did not change the attitude to the 'near abroad' states after 20 years of the 'transition':

Russian policies towards the CIS reflect the fact that Russian elites do not recognize the border between Russia and the rest of the CIS. Russia has proposed allowing non-Russian CIS citizens to

³ Piontkovsky, Andrey (2011). *Tretiy shliakh do rabstva. [The third way to slavery]*, Russian politician and political scientist, professor at Hudson University, Washington, addresses the sentence of Yulia Tymoshenko and dictatorship in Russia, The Ukrainian Week, Online Edition, 31.10.2011, Available at: <<http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/33491>>

⁴ Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belavezha Accords on December 8, 1991. The accords proclaimed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

join its armed forces. Such a policy is consistent with the view commonly held in Russia that the “Near Abroad” (the CIS) is not entirely foreign (Kuzio, 2004).

Two types of transformations took place on the post-Soviet space. First, Russia has followed the goal to regain its power on the international arena. Second, other CIS states had to create new political and economic systems to be able to exist independently after the centralized soviet system and emerged as ‘states in transition’. While CIS states had a historic momentum in constructing their states without any supranational body, Russia was concerned to keep its neighbors in the area of its influence and to keep its status of that supranational state in contra balance of the EU:

Russia has preferred to maintain the “Near Abroad” as less than foreign by not demarcating its 61,000-kilometer border with the CIS states. Russia prefers to keep these borders as only delimited, a position that is only slightly better than the one that pertained during the Soviet era, when the borders were internal to the Soviet Union, and therefore semi- fictitious (Kuzio, 2004).

Two particular waives of the transformation in the post soviet area had core contradictions. Russian vector of transition took a trajectory to maintain its influence over the newly emerged states; other CIS countries, on the contrary, have started active nation-building, transformation of political and economic systems. The clash of both vectors of transformations in the post-Soviet area has lead to a chaotic transformation process that remains a reality for the last 20 years:

Many transition studies assumed that even if transformation were not literally the end of history, it would lead to the creation of societies from East Berlin to Vladivostok that would become ‘just like us’ (Rose, 2009).

We came up to the assumption that the process of transformation took different ideological ground in Ukraine and Russia. The causality of the transition divergence is the historic legacy. National histories are prerequisites of diverging attitudes among Ukrainians and Russians towards neighbors. Ukraine was straggling for its consolidation starting from the Ottoman Empire invasion. Russia had strong imperial beliefs in the society. Later, the Communist party has set the dictatorship of the

proletariat governed both for decades. Nations with diverging beliefs had to accept one doctrine, to accept the communism ideology giving up their freedom, private property into collective ownership of the state. After the above analyses of the Ukrainian history we can advocate that the society had centuries of experience regarding the preservation of its cultural heritage, language and national identity.

To understand the reason of the chaotic transformation process that took place in the post-Soviet territory and the outcome of Ukraine facing the Dilemma in Foreign Affairs, we should always go back to the analyses of the process of the nation building before the transformation. According to Richard Rose the answer to the question “Where is Europe” is “When?”

1.2 Paradox of perception of the common history between Ukraine and Russia

One of the prerequisites of misunderstanding and distrust in the political dialogue between Ukraine and Russia take roots from the interpretation of their ‘common history’. The narration of the history can influence the present state of affairs:

In discussing the early modern period, Ukrainians emphasized those areas that were distinct from Russia and saw in them evidence of Ukraine’s autochthonous development. Russians emphasized those aspects that Ukrainians held in common with Russia and saw in them proof that Ukraine had been and always would be Russian (Kappeler et al., 2003).

Smaller states frequently cherish their history of keeping the sovereign status as the national achievement. The nineteen-century represents the epoch of the European imperial powers and monarchies inherited or acquired by marriages in aim of the politics. In Central and Eastern Europe the Habsburg, the Prussia and the Tsarist empires were the main poles of power. Small states were demarked and divided with high frequency.

Therefore, the territory of Ukraine has been split between Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist empires till the end of the First World War. After the period of revolts in threshold of the bolshevism, Ukrainian republics proclaimed their independence. The Ukrainian People's Republic and the West Ukrainian People's Republic were the main separatist unities. Nonetheless, Ukraine could not establish any sovereign entity, history took its vicious cycle and the state was divided again. The western part was given to Poland and the eastern was proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic inside the Soviet Union.

In 1991 Russia and Ukraine have entered the era of the politics of misunderstanding based on misperception of the common history. In fact, the dissonant perception of both states still exists among current leaders. Russia's political authorities believe that Ukraine still belongs to the "near abroad" orbit of influence. Kiev-based analysts Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr Lytvynenko (Bogomolov et al, cit. in Motyl, 2012) admit:

For Russia, maintaining influence over Ukraine is more than a foreign policy priority; it is an existential imperative. Many in Russia's political elite perceive Ukraine as part of their country's own identity.

The Government of Ukraine cannot find consensus choosing the vector of the external politics. On the one side, Ukraine had strong economic interdependence with Russia. In 1991 country received its independence but not its energetic one due to highly energy consuming economy. Ukraine was taking for granted the lowest price of the gas coming from Russia. On the other side, post Soviet country proclaimed its European vector of development as a sovereign state. Russia's growing austerity in gas pricing has reminded that the independence has its price. Kiev and Moscow are blamed for mutual and frequent misunderstandings and misperceptions, while the statecraft of the decision-

making should be based on a full awareness of the intentions of other government, according to Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008):

The challenge faced by one set of decision-makers when trying to read the minds of the decision-makers of other states takes place in an international political cockpit in which the cost of getting it wrong could mean national disaster.

The national disaster for Ukraine in terms of the current events is an international isolation and a “zero-sum” outcome of the multi vector politics. Declared in 2010 neutrality and non-bloc status in the constitution of Ukraine creates in long terms perspective a not very favorable climate for the foreign affairs of the state.

Concurrently, the phenomena of dilemma can lead not only to a negative outcome. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008, p.6) claim that, “ there are always hard choices between contending propositions in any security dilemma, but the choice is not necessarily between negative possibilities, not must the outcome necessarily be grim”. In fact, the options of choice can be both positive. We cannot make allegations that any of the integration perspectives for Ukraine inside the European Union or Russia and CIS countries can be negative. Integration, economic and political, has a scope of benefits for entering the alliance, simultaneously, the discussion around the negative aspects find its audience and critics.

Referring to Miles Kahler (1995), “economic integration will create demand for overcoming the disadvantages of political segmentation and maximizing the gains from economic exchange by coordinating or harmonizing national policies”. Both perspectives, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the European Union or Customs Union created by Russia, will boost the economy and strengthen institutions of Ukraine.

Soft power presents high importance and goes along with hard power. In XXI century security challenges conventional military threats follow the information insecurity, damage of the image of the state on the international level. Thus, applying the theory of the Security Dilemma, which was commonly perceived with hard power, we tend to overview threats and apply soft power dimension into the Security Dilemma concept.

Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008, p.6) argued:

While security dilemmas in the international arena seem more often than not to present decision-makers only with choices between negative possibilities, positive outcomes are available in principle.

Ukraine faces the damage of its Soft power on international level. Misperception, distrust and misunderstanding are a prevailing obstacle on the way of both integration perspectives, DCFTA with the EU or Customs Union with Russia. In today's international arena the power of cooperation and integration creates higher level of security rather than the power of one state. Effective cooperation should be a priority for a country with the geopolitical location of Ukraine connecting the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian alliances.

1.3 A history of balance: foreign affairs of Ukraine, a newly emerged post-soviet state.

Bipolar world has collapsed with the break-up of the Soviet Union. According to the Resolution from 24th of August 1991, “implementing the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic solemnly proclaims the independence and creates an independent Ukrainian state”.⁵

⁵ Resolution of Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, *On the Independence of*

As an independent state on the international arena Ukraine became the third nuclear power in the world with the centrally planned Soviet economy. Therefore, the fall of the Iron Curtain opened a perspective of the developed Western world. Ukrainian presidents chose the path of balancing between major powers of the West and Russia. Historical division of the Ukrainian nation in questions of the language and self-identification perplexed the landscape of preferences. Ukrainian society was historically and culturally ravelled and the poles of self-identification were on the borders: Poland or Russia. Thus, Ukrainian government have initiated the politics of building relations in the Trans-Atlantic area with the same intense as ‘brother’ relations with Russia.

“Negotiating with the Russian Bear” is today’s challenge for the EU and Ukraine, taking into the consideration the analysed above misperception, distrust and misunderstanding barriers in Ukraine-Russia and Ukraine-EU relations. Simultaneously, we cannot deny Ukraine’s economic and mainly energy sector dependency on Russia. The tactics of the EU negotiation process is based on “carrots”, while Russia inclines towards “sticks”. Autocratic and centralised character of Russia at the table of negotiations can play “divide and rule” tactics confronting democratic and segmented European Union (Meerts, 2009, p.4). The segmentation of the EU as an integration unity is possible by its bureaucratic and systematic political culture. This cannot be compared to segmentation and confrontational political culture that is dominant inside the Ukrainian government. Thus, changing government of a young sovereign state could not perform effective bargaining rather than maneuvering tactics between Western Europe and Russia.

Concurrently, proclaiming the independence in accordance with The Declaration of Independence of Ukraine, newly emerged state has eluded “the grave danger that had threatened Ukraine in connection with the coup in the Soviet Union on August 19,

Ukraine, Supreme Council of Ukraine (VVR), 1991, N 38, st.502. [In Ukrainian]. Available at: <<http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1427-12>>

1991".⁶ Vladimir Putin, Russia's long-standing president, has described the Soviet Union break-up as the "greatest geopolitical disaster of the last century".⁷ Beyond any doubts, drastic coup in 1991 has led to a harsh period in life of an average citizen and insecurity for newly emerged states. Later, in 2005 Vladimir Putin in his speech admitted remaining consequences of the abrupt transition:

Savings of citizens have been devalued, the old ideals destroyed, many agencies dissolved or reformed in haste. The integrity of the country was disrupted by the terrorist interventions and the subsequent Khasavyurt capitulation. Oligarchic groups possessing unbounded control over information flows served exclusively in their own corporate interests.

In 1990s Ukraine entered the transition period with an agenda to establish sovereign and democratic state, to seize the opportunity of independence that was finally given after centuries of being incorporated by imperial powers. Nevertheless, being a part of one economic, political and powerful security system, Ukraine did not have any experience of running the state apart.

Ukraine has received the recognition by 17 States during December 1991. As a diplomatic step the first President Leonid Kravchuk paid a visit to the United States, Canada, UK, France, Belgium, Finland, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Romania, China to establish diplomatic relations, the development of legal framework for cooperation between new actors in international relations, agreements on trade, scientific and technical cooperation, and discuss the problems of border areas. 132 countries recognized the independence of Ukraine, and 106 have established diplomatic relations with it by the beginning of 1993 (Miroshnichenko, 2008, p.133).

⁶ Ibid. 5., *Resolution of Verkhovna Rada*

⁷ President of Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, Communication to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation, Kremlin, Moscow. April 25, 2005. Available at:
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/04/25/1223_type63372type63374type82634_87049.shtml>

On July 2, 1993 Verkhovna Rada approved the "Main Directions of Ukraine's foreign policy" establishing the main principles of foreign policy:

- Cooperation within the CIS;
- Cooperation with the States of the European community and NATO;
- Participation in UN activities;
- Participation in the process of nuclear disarmament;
- Participation in the European institutions on Security and Cooperation.⁸

Ukrainian leaders have accepted the tactics to maneuver between West and Russia. Such foreign policy strategy brought new term in international relations a 'multi vector' politics. In resolution adopted in 1993 on The Principles of Foreign Policy of Ukraine new government declared vectors of future politics:

Building relationships with Western European countries will create conditions for restoration of ancient political, economic, cultural, spiritual ties between Ukraine and European civilization, accelerate democratization, market-oriented reforms and improvement of the national economy. Such cooperation will become foundation for increasing of participation of Ukraine in the European structures and future integration of its economy into European and world economic space. In this context, particular importance for Ukraine represents relations with the United States, a country which politics significantly affects the development of international events.⁹

Simultaneously, Russia and other CIS countries remained to be in the priority list for further international cooperation following newly declared European And Trans-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine.

The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, has involved a third party in difficult negotiations with Russia concerning the elimination of the nuclear weapons. This step put the first milestone for a multi vector politics. This process ended with signing by three sides, USA, Russia and Ukraine, trilateral statement on reduction of the nuclear weapon from the territory of Ukraine. After long negotiations, Ukraine accepted those conditions introduces by big powers that are putting country in insecure position in

⁸ Resolution of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *The Principles of Foreign Policy of Ukraine*, Adopted on July 2, 1993 N 3360-XII. [In Ukrainian]. Available at < http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/law/93_zpu.html>

⁹ Ibid. 8., *Resolution of Verkhovna Rada*

future. Trilateral statement provides in reality no specific security guarantees for the country that gave its nuclear power. This agreement indeed assisted to build a promising start-up for relations between recently emerged state Ukraine and old strong power USA, trying to cut some strong attached strings with Russia and find contra balancing guaranties to Russia from the US.

Fear and insecurity put Ukraine in position to accept conditions dictated by stronger states. Finally, Trilateral statement gave short-term benefits, financial support for nuclear arsenal transportation and double cover of the perspective cost benefits of using Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) consequently, Ukraine became fourth in the world biggest recipients of US aid, around 900 millions of dollars. At the same time, security guarantees appeared quite vague. Year 2013 will put a final point in the deal of the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal reduction, it will become a nuclear zero country with no security guarantees. Almost a decade after signing the Trilateral statement, analysts are claiming that Ukraine needs new agreement or the fear and insecurity will take their part in the decision making process of the government leaders.

During the presidency of Leonid Kuchma more agreements with the US and the West were established. The agreement of the NATO-Ukraine partnership and the cooperation with the EU were approved. At the same time, Moscow was not going to lose its zone of interest and the agreement on the Black Fleet in Crimea was signed.

Times of weakening of the relationship between Kiev and Moscow came with the Orange revolution in 2004 that inspired the West towards the post-soviet area and the hope to see one vector politics of Ukraine. Nevertheless, Russia as a strong player could not accept such shift of events. The era of gas and information wars damaged the image and soft power of Ukraine on international level. Obviously, the state “in between” cannot trust any party, cannot dictate its conditions and finds itself faced with threats put on a table by its strong neighbour players.

Today, Ukraine proclaimed no alignment status within any military international organization. Such strategy is negative in long-term perspective for a country located on a crossroad of big powers. Ukraine became a 'grey' zone and county "in between". The scenario, where geopolitically important country has no strong military and security systems and no security guarantees, brings us to the concept of fear and insecurity that lead to the Security Dilemma.

This process of transformation led to the problem of the post-transformation society. There is a need to "improve standards of governance and to make up for economic growth that was lost under the Communism" (Rose, 2009). Soviet regime developed significant corruption culture, exiled representatives of the civil society and deteriorated the sense of the civil participation in the nation building. We should take a grim outlook on the premises of corrosion of the institutions that manifest interests and the will of citizens.¹⁰

From the era, when Ukraine was incorporated in the Russian empire, the absence of the developed civil society in the growing revolution of the masses led to the collapse of the ruling shell. Thus, Ukraine and the whole Russian empire did not have permanent practice of self-government forming municipal authorities not by the rulers but by citizens. Revolts of the masses caused rapid transition and establishment of representative government under the slogan "Vlast' – sovetam" ("Power to the councils"). Such transformation of the ruling system led to the dictatorship of the *proletariat*, followed by the interception of power by *nomenclature* in a relatively short transition period. Nevertheless, the process of its expansion was damaged by the lack of effective self-organization of institutions. Consequently, society was pledged into the gradual disintegration, it was transforming into a "community of private interest, which

¹⁰ Civil society: 1) the aggregate of non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests and will of citizens or 2) individuals and organizations in a society which are independent of the government. Civil society. (n.d.). Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. from Dictionary.com website. Available at: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/civil_society>

left an open space to the power of private corporate governance structures (clans)". (Neklessa, 2012).

After the break-up of the Soviet regime Ukraine took the direction to develop democratic system. Nevertheless, the barrier to build a state with active civil society turned to the establishment of the government based on "clan" ruling. However, Ukraine cannot afford isolation after the Constitutionally approved European direction. Referendum in 1991 showed the support of 80 percent of Ukrainian citizens aspiration to re-establish independency and reduce the corrosion of the soviet nomenclature corrupted system into the liberal.

Richard Rose (2009, p. 191) stated, "the population recourses and the geographical location of these Central and East European states means that independence is not the same as being able to ignore neighbouring countries [...] must adapt to being a part of a new system of interdependence in which the focal point is not Moscow but Brussels." The dilemma of choosing one vector is handling Ukraine into the zero sum outcomes.

III CHAPTER – Theoretical approaches of the Security Dilemma in international affairs of the post-Soviet states

1. Security Dilemma in newly emerged post soviet states

In our society have elaborated not only the energy of self-preservation, but also the will for a new, free life.¹¹

The Cold War brought the new concept of the conflict from the open confrontation between nations to the strategic agenda of one state putting political and economic pressure on another. Along with the different angle of the conflict, the misperception and distrust have raised in importance on the stage of the international competition. The Iron Wall brought new dimension of the Security Dilemma. Images of the actors during the Cold War were formed on the limited puzzled information. Robert Jervis has opposed the assumption of specialists in psychology and international relations that “decision makers usually perceive the world quite accurately and that those misperceptions that do occur can only be treated as random accidents”. According to Robert Jervis (1976) “we can find both misperceptions that are common to diverse kinds of people and important differences in perceptions that can be explained without delving too deeply into individuals’ psyches. This knowledge can be used not only to explain specific decisions but also to account for patterns of interaction and to improve our general understanding of international relations”.

The knowledge of the perception in the world politics is vital for the decision makers to apply relevant measures and to avoid further confrontations. With the reference to Robert Jervis (2001) in his work addressing the Security Dilemma during the Cold War: ‘If each side had been able to discern the other’s motives (or archives), much of the conflict would have been avoided’.

¹¹ Ibid 7., Vladimir Putin, *Communication to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation*

After the collapse of the Soviet Union newly emerged states faced the first phase of the transition period that led to the number of neo-liberal economic models, more precisely, the alternatives to the liberal models. The disruption of an isolated but stable system was the historical event while the transformation was a process. The expectations from the western side of the fallen Iron Wall were focused blindly on the doctrines of the democracy and market economy. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy (2006) during the analyses of the phenomena of the human security and new threats after the collapse of the Communism regime came up to a valuable assumption that:

The break-up of the Soviet Union, and with it the end of the Cold War, saw a demise of the alternatives to the neo-liberal economic models. The triumph of liberalism meant a shift from isolated national policy making to networked solutions concocted by global actors and national elites linked through common outlooks and experiences.

Democracy became to be seen as the best method to overcome the grim past of the Cold War and create stability (Chernoy et al., 2006). The international community drafted an ambitious picture of the secure world while states of the Soviet area had no real vision and understanding the way to rebuild single-party state system. According to Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy (2006):

Liberal theorists such as Doyle believed that societies with democratic systems and free market economies based on neo-liberal patterns do not fight each other. [...]. This model is based on the belief that the West has experienced long-standing peace due to the existence of democratic institutions and liberal economic instruments.

The approach towards the international stability brought the Western and newly emerged Eastern states backwards to the misperception. The West saw the way to achieve aviating security in diffusion their sphere of influence on the Eastern European

area, while new sovereign states were pursuing transition. At the same time Russia envisioned its goal in rebuilding its imperial power.

At this historical point the Security Dilemma has appeared for the post-communist states. Ukraine found itself not capable to compete on the world market being dependent on the heavy industry. We should apply a grim outlook on the process of the transition.

Ukraine has taken different way of reforming its national economy than Russia. In 1991-1993 Ukraine has applied macroeconomic policy in a populist way with the outcome of the hyperinflation. The reform of economy has stimulated the development of the services sector that led to the considerable step forward from the heavy industry. Nevertheless, the positive shift did not decrease the gas consumption. Ukraine remains one of the most energy consuming economies, its dependency on export of the Russian gas recalls the reality: gas pipelines were constructed in Soviet times through the territory of Ukraine providing gas transit to the European Union today. Thus, 20 years of political and economic aspirations to move away from the interdependency with Russia still cannot be realized (Pirani, 2010). Soft power of Ukraine is in constant jeopardy due to the gas disputes with Russia that have emerged again in 2009.

From the theory of Soft Power that was proposed by Joseph Nye in 90s (the overview of application of Soft Power to Ukraine we proceed in the next paragraph *Soft Power: changing the approach towards the Security Dilemma on the case of Ukraine*) we can apply one of the intangible aspects of power that arises from the interdependence. In the case of Ukraine the supply of the natural resources from Russia causes the interdependence and limits the success in bargaining of smaller state with stronger. Superiority in economic and natural resources of one state causes the shift of the balance of power in the region. Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia came out a dominant state with the “power of the debtor” (Nye, 1990).

According to Joseph Nye (1990), “if a relationship is beneficial to both parties, the possibility that the weaker side might collapse under the pressure limits the leverage of the seemingly stronger partner”. Ukraine faces the threat of failure being incorporated in common economic and political unity with CIS countries for decades. The importance of the stability in domestic affairs is significant for the region in whole. After the fall of the Iron Wall the European Union envisioned its goal to sustain stability in the region. Accession of the Eastern European countries in the European Union in 2004 and 2007 de-limited the sphere of influence of the union. Ukraine became the main threat of the migration influxes, illicit trafficking and contraband. Moreover, today the permanency of the energy supply through Ukraine is the top issue in the Security agenda of the EU. Thus, the failure of the developing country might decrease the ability of the EU to influence Ukraine’s policies on the international issues.

Simultaneously, policies of the European Union towards Ukraine lacked realistic recommendations. The international community has imposed the rhetoric of the democracy building and application of the state systems based on experience of the pan-European countries. Thus, post-communist states faced the challenge to rebuild national economies from the centrally planned soviet economy, institutions and the political system with no clear agenda to do so. Such approach has failed and caused social and political chaos.

To understand the Security Dilemma of Ukraine as a geopolitically important state located between the economic and political confederation, the European Union, and raising power Russia, we should preliminary determine the frames of the theme of the dilemma. Ken Booth and Nicolas J. Wheeler have explained the security dilemma in relation of the main three themes: uncertainty, fear and weapons. Uncertainty appears “in inescapable mistrust in a world of sovereign states when other minds cannot be accessed”. Fear takes its prerequisites from the “primordial emotion that runs through history, culture and politics”. And, finally, conventional threat and precondition of the

majority of conflicts: weapon as the “inherent ambiguity of the instruments of physical violence”. We can claim three themes as factors of the threat system in international politics.

Referring back to the analyses of the historical capital of the Ukrainian nation we have deduced profound premises of fear and uncertainty as an application of the terminology provided by Booth and Wheeler. Three waves of enslavement are palpable preconditions of raising “primordial emotion” and self-preservation from the level of the society to the statecraft. Uncertainty as the element of the threat system became a momentous in the politics of Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ukraine was proclaimed an independent state and faced an “inescapable mistrust in a world of sovereign states”. Thus, we emphasize the themes of the uncertainty and fear applying the concept of the Security Dilemma to Ukraine in the process of its nation building and the formation of the current foreign affairs.

Two factors of the threat system, fear and uncertainty, have escalated and became the focal points in the process of the nation building during the post-Soviet transition period. The question is why the historical legacy of Ukrainian nation being incorporated by other powers did not escalate into the violent conflict with Russia as it emerged between Russia and Georgia and gave an outrageous outcome, the five-days war in 2008? In 1991 sovereign Ukraine has unified the Western Ukrainian speakers Catholics, Eastern Russian speakers Orthodoxies and Crimean Tatars inside of the established borders. Any neighbor of the newly emerged state could “play the nationalist card” using the language affiliations. Barry Posen found an explanation in the nuclear deterrence between two new states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nuclear forces were mainly present on the territory of Ukraine what made the newly emerged sovereign country one of the world nuclear powers. The shadow of the past is one of the premises of mistrust in foreign policy of Ukraine starting from the transition period (Posen, cit in Booth, 2008, p. 75).

Consequently, the fall of the Iron Curtain brought new reality to the world ex-power Soviet Union: cornered by the competition between the leading states and economies, smaller states in transition found the way to maneuver between both poles receiving short-term benefits. Ukraine has developed its *multi-vector* politics.

The premise of the ability of Ukraine to play multi vector game is the confidence in its geopolitical importance. The card of the insecurity to the national integrity and interdependence with Russia restrained the Western countries from harsh policies. In the foreign policy Ukraine plays the role of the object rather than the subject capable to self-determine its own vector (Pifer, 2012).

Some Member States of the European Union proceed from the geopolitical considerations in the development of the EU policies towards Ukraine. Nevertheless, the geopolitical approach is not popular in current attitude towards Ukraine. For the majority of the EU Member States the determining factor with regard to Ukraine is its commitment to democratic values. These countries believe that a democratic Ukraine is more reliable, transparent and predictable partner than non-democratic (Pifer, 2012).

2. Soft Power: changing the approach towards the Security Dilemma in the case of Ukraine

The XXI century brought the shift from the conventional military threat and hard power towards new insecurities and increasing dominance of soft power on international arena. We have already deduced three focal elements of the threat system and weapon stands-in with uncertainty and fear in international politics. Discussing the question of power we should go beyond conventional perception of hard power, towards new angles of “the ability or official capacity to exercise control and authority”¹². We tend to colligate

¹² The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. Available at: <<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/power>>

power with the possession of the military superiority, frequently excepting more broad understanding of the terminology. The strength in war customarily was the seal of the power.

In the analyses of the common perception of power Joseph Nye (1990) emphasized that “the ability to control others is often associated with the possession of certain resources, politicians and diplomats commonly define power as the possession of population, territory, natural resources, economic size [...] political stability”. In the work *Soft Power* (Nye, 1990) the author have delimited the definition of power, he assumed that:

The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important.

Proposed arguments are essential for our application of the Security Dilemma to Ukraine that is perceived as a buffer zone between powers in the world politics. In 1990s the concept of power have undergone a considerable shift what creates new challenges for states to influence the flow of the international events. Joseph Nye (2011) has accumulated hard and soft terms of power into the smart power, the ability “to combine both the power of coercion or payments with the power of narrative and values, which attract and persuade others”.

Consequently, we can assume that the country with the strong civil society that can influence the government, with the respect of the human rights and economic development can achieve influence on international arena, “political leaders and philosophizers have long understood the power of attractive ideas or the ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes others’ preferences” (Nye, 1990). The new aspect of power that is defined an intangible power finds it sources of influence as culture, civil society, international institutions and ideology. The cooperation in today’s politics is based on shared values taking for the case the European Union or the Trans-Atlantic alliance. Moreover, the information has

gained a considerable significance in the international politics and became a form of the intangible power. Thus, we can envision the transition from the “capital-rich” rivalry between states to the “information-rich”. Joseph Nye (1990) influence significantly in determining new angle of power:

This second aspect of power – which occurs when one country gets other countries to *want* what it wants – might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of *ordering* others to do what it wants.

If we look at Russia, country with the world's largest reserves of mineral and energy resources, the third largest nominal military budget, one of the five recognized world nuclear weapon state, has all premises to be called a power in the world politics. Though, Russia cannot pretend on a soft power in its foreign and internal affairs, “the Russian have not yet coped with the fact that old ways of the hard power need to be coupled with soft power” (Nye, 2011).

Why we should consider soft power over the traditionally accepted along the history hard power? As we have assumed earlier, the importance of the cooperation and integration holds the momentous position in the world politics of the XXI century. Ukraine has played the multi vector politics and facing a zero-sum outcome: jeopardy of its image. The image of the state, perception of the country by its neighbors and partners create soft power. Thus, the cooperation values the persuasion rather than the command. In relations between the Western European states and the US with Russia, we can follow the line of rivalry, misperceptions, distrust and, finally, the attempt of the “reset”. Though, Russia did not give its final willingness to “reset” relations with the US. Such diverging messages are coming from the political echelon of Russia have created a dissonance, thus, soft power cannot be established. Vladimir Putin started his new term of the Presidency with not promising political gesture, “his (Vladimir Putin) sudden refusal to come to the U.S. to participate in the summit of the Group of Eight became the subject of numerous commentaries in the United States”¹³.

¹³ Zhigalkin, Yuriy (2012). *Vladimir Putin kak mogil'shchik "perezagruzki"/ Vladimir Putin as the gravedigger of the "reset"*. Radio Svoboda 12/05/2012. [Online]. Available at <<http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/24578363.html>>

Simultaneously, positive nation branding is important for Ukraine, current leadership cannot afford any tactics of Russia, it does not possess such resources what causes the interdependency and lacks internal development and stability. Ukraine was raising its soft power as a young democratic country, but the clashing messages of the Ukrainian government caused its jeopardy. It created not fruitful ground for the cooperation with countries from both sides: the EU and Russia.

According to Joseph Nye (2011), who has introduced the definition of soft power in the theory of international relations, Ukraine “has the capacity to generate soft power as well [...] soft power makes country attractive and comes from its culture, so the aspects of traditional Ukrainian culture can attract others, as well as its history”. Ukraine is capable to re-establish its international image despite the promotion of democratic values and human rights, but mainly by “policies, which are taking into account the interests of others and therefore are regarded as legitimate”.

With the reference to Joseph Nye (1990) we can assume that soft power brings new challenges to change the behavior of states, the shift of the nature of power bringing new goals in sphere of the national security:

In the traditional view, states give priority to military security to ensure their survival. Today, however, states must consider new dimensions of security. National security has become more complicated as threats shift from military (that is, threats against territorial integrity) to the economic and ecological.

Moreover, hard power is more expensive than soft power; an efficient combination of both creates smart power for the state in the XXI century political order. Therefore, applying Security Dilemma to Ukraine we involve the threat of the damage of soft power over the military threats. To analyze the causalities of the Security Dilemma we should answer the question: “Does Ukraine have the capacity of soft power and which states are attracted by it?”

Due to the geopolitical location and the historical background the state borders with 7 countries, 4 of which are the EU Member States from the southwest and Russian Federation from the northeast. Perception and attraction of neighbors towards the vector of Ukraine are the main indicators of the level of soft power. With the reference to the survey implemented by the Kiev based think tank *Institute of World Policy*, we can forgather divergent views considering the political situation in Ukraine. Georgia is aspired by the Orange Revolution that is correlated with its Velvet Revolution, while Poland expresses disappointment in democratic jeopardy. Overall index of "soft power" in Poland, Ukraine is equal to 4 points of the 10 points maximum (see Tab. A).¹⁴

The survey of the intellectual elite collected opinions of the politicians, journalists, and experts from the bordering with Ukraine countries. The final result shows dissimilar attitudes and perceptions among 7 states. In frames of the project the Institute of World Policy involved artists from Ukraine and its neighborhood to create a series of caricatures "Ukraine through the eyes of neighboring countries" (see Annex 2). The exhibition created by the Kiev-based think tank the Institute of World Policy (IWP) became a part of the project “ “Soft power” of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy” in March 2011. The combination of the data and images creates a broad overview of the perception of Ukraine in is neighborhood what will add a value to our research.

After the analyses of the survey we can assume that Poland identifies Ukraine as a state with the deficit of democracy and the problem of oligarchs and corruption on the first place (see Tab. 1). The overwhelming expectations after the Orange Revolution undergone considerable shift towards the bitter comments among the political leaders and experts, after the elections of the current President of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovich, Polish journalists started to cover in a critical manner issues connected with Ukraine.

¹⁴ The index of Soft Power was determined by the Institute of World Policy with the assistance of Joseph Nye based on the poll of opinion-makers and experts (journalists, politicians, political scientists). Each of the respondents exhibited his individual score parameters "soft power" of Ukraine in Belarus. The result was derived arithmetic mean index-index. The maximum value is 10 points.

Polish observers claim that, “since Victor Yanukovich became the President of Ukraine, the Polish press has produced increasingly critical coverage of Ukrainian politics. In contrast to Belarus, Ukraine’s democratic “backsliding” has not gone unnoticed in Poland: the persecution of the opposition and dubious democratic reforms (the Constitutional reform of 2010 was especially resonant in Poland) are frequently and sharply covered by the Polish media).”¹⁵ Thus, Soft Power of Ukraine has deteriorated despite the common history, Polish society saw in its neighbor successful follower of the Solidarity movement that freed Poland from the Soviet yoke. Political representatives in Poland made a step backwards in offering a strategic inclusion Ukraine in the European space, today’s agenda includes partnership and support in integration aspirations of the neighbor.

Another EU Member State Romania diverges in perceiving Ukraine mainly due to lack of information about the neighbor. The main associations are linked to the major events: Orange Revolution, gas disputes (see Tab. 2). The case of the Snake Island represents the top notion: International Court of Justice resolved the delimitation of the Island located in the Black Sea between Romania and Ukraine. In 2009 the final verdict stated that Snake Island cannot form part of the Ukrainian coastal configuration, consequently, Romania received 80% of the disputed area.¹⁶

Despite the limited information about Ukraine, Romanian society reciprocally interconnects Ukraine with Russia, some experts claim it as “Russia’s close ally”, thus, identities of both post-Soviet allies are hardly differentiated in perception of Romania. We can make one more valuable assumption for the analyses of the Security Dilemma in Ukraine approaching Soft Power regarding the popular opinion in Romania: dissonance in the geopolitical direction of Ukraine. Additionally, the Index of Ukraine’s Soft Power is the lowest 2,88 of 10 among other bordering countries; we might correlate this fact with the limited information considering Ukraine and the perception

¹⁵ “*M'yaka syla*” *Ukrainy: TOP-30 asotsiatsiy z Ukrainoyu u rehioni*. [“Soft power” of Ukraine: TOP-30 association with Ukraine in the region]. Institute of World Policy, Kyiv, 2011. – S. 13

¹⁶ *EU's Black Sea border set in stone*. EUobserver, February 3, 2009. Available at: <<http://euobserver.com/9/27525>>

of Ukraine precisely with Ukraine-Russia disputes over the energy resources and Ukraine-Romania disputes over the territory (see Tab. B). Moreover, diplomatic activity between both states is quite random and lacks strategic approach. Ukraine as a sovereign state signed Treaty on good neighborliness and cooperation between Ukraine and Romania on June 2, 1997 under the first visit of the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma almost in eight years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, Ukraine did not stimulate relations with Romania. In six years Romanian President Ion Iliescu paid visit to Ukraine on June 17, 2003 to sign the agreement on the Ukrainian-Romanian state border, cooperation and mutual assistance on border issues. And the last visit of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko was paid in 2007.¹⁷ Thus, bilateral relations with time gaps do not bring states closer and result weakening of Soft Power of Ukraine among the European Union Member States what leads to loss of possible advocates and results the misperception on international level, one of the premises of the Security Dilemma.

The poll conducted in Russia showed controversial results, “many experts consider Russia and Ukraine to be close countries, namely due to family connections and common Slavic roots” denying that Russia intends to compromise Ukraine’s sovereignty.¹⁸ Thus, proposition of reunification of the CIS countries, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, by the Customs and Eurasian Union are justified by the notions of the common history (see Tab. 3). The sentiment of “one Slavic nation” is strong among general population in Russia and more skeptical among experts and political leader who use the notion in promoting economic and political integration projects, at the same time, among the Ukrainian citizens this trend is decreasing with the raise of the Ukrainian identity. After the analyses of Ukraine’s historical capital conducted in the Chapter I *Historical legacy: prerequisites of the Dilemma* we can make valid assumption that the past of the incorporation, serfdom and three waves of enslavement bring us to the paradox of the common history and premises of the insecurity and distrust in some issues of Ukraine’s politics and social attitudes (especially in the Western part of Ukraine).

¹⁷ Embassy of Ukraine in Romania. Available at: <<http://www.mfa.gov.ua/romania/ua/25344.htm>>

¹⁸ Ibid. 16., “*Soft power*” of Ukraine: TOP-30 association with Ukraine in the region

Boris Dubin pointed, "liberal share of Russians in Russia today is very small, but for those, who still are, value in Ukraine - the absence of rejection and imperial, national ambitions, even at the level of rhetoric. Hence, political pluralism, peace (reluctance to threat with weapon) high, compared to Russia, the level of political and civil liberties."¹⁹ The index of Ukraine's "soft power" in Russia is considerably low among the polled neighbor countries with 3.5 points out of 10 possible (see Tab. C)

Due to the detailed overview of Soft Power and perception of Ukraine by its neighbors, we can conclude that the premise of the multi vector politics comes from the diverge vectors of politics and economics, social structure in CIS and European countries. Joseph Nye (2011) emphasized, "Some of your (Ukraine) progress in democratic development can be attractive in the eyes of the Poles, alarm the Kremlin and even irritate Belarus. If your neighbors have different vision of politics, it is difficult to overtake the path that will interest all and be all equally attractive".

3. Understanding the definitions of 'friends' and 'friendship' in international relations of the post-soviet states

For a deeper understanding of the attitudes and perceptions proceeded in the previous paragraph *Soft Power: changing the approach towards the Security Dilemma in the case of Ukraine*, we intend to analyze the term "friend" and "friendship" that is commonly used in the politics among the post-soviet states. We have emphasized the importance of Soft Power for implementing efficient foreign policy. Integration projects promoted by Russia are justified by common cultural, historical heritage with Ukraine referring to the long-standing "friendship" and "brotherhood". However, Russia cannot be treated equally among other CIS states, and Ukraine is traditionally called a "younger brother" among the Russian political echelon what brings us to the paradox of "friendship" as relations based on equality. Reviewing the medieval Russian chronicles we should emphasize that "the "friends" (*drugii*) are often mentioned a *druzhina*. This term can designate a prince's armed guard or the circle of his advisers, as well as a

¹⁹ Dubin cit. in "Soft power" of Ukraine: TOP-30 association with Ukraine in the region.

trading community for shipping goods down the Dnieper and even a community of religious pilgrims” (Kharkhordin, 2010).

Friend and friendship in international relations might be a non-appropriate terms to use. The concept of the word ‘friend’ in Russian language and post-Soviet society correlates with the approach of the friendship in politics of Russia and newly independent states. Politicians are using the friendship terminology from the tribunes in ambitious speeches calling up to the peace and partnership between nations:

This usage of the word friend is somehow reminiscent of the way Prime Minister Putin addresses a large audience: “Friends! Today I would like to discuss with you...” It is clear that, in the acutely psychologized and individualized way it is understood today, there is no friendship in this phrase at all. We almost always see political friendship as deficient: it is too obviously dominated by instrumental motives (Kharkhordin, 2010).

In ideal, we approach the equality of every side of friendship. Friendship on interpersonal level do not intend to develop an agenda and strategy, while on the international relations and political level one party expects the other to bring beneficial outcomes in the cooperation. In the political world an equally beneficial ‘friendship’ can never exist. When one state agrees to step into an international agreement or treaty, perspective benefits lead this decision. More often the aspiration is an insecurity of one side searching for protection from another, whether one of the parties is imposing the ‘friendship’ by its power.

Addressing the presumption that the term ‘friendship’ cannot be taken in its common understanding from the interpersonal level and be applied in politics. The international relations analysts frequently address Ukraine as the ‘younger brother’ and a ‘friend sharing common history and culture’. From such terminology the international community perceive the region as the common space with shared values. This assumption is wrong with reference to the analyses of the emergence of the

independence of Ukraine and preservation of its national identity. Addressing the perspective for Ukraine to join Customs or Eurasian Union we cannot avoid the Russian question, whether the integration projects can pretend to be based on common ideas and balance of powers. Oleg Kharkhordin (2010) have argued:

Russia, as it seems to many, has an over-abundance of friendship. Some link it to the non-developed formal institutions, which force people to rely on informal relationships to achieve their goals. Others link it to the Stalinist past, which made friendship a dearly earned achievement, rather than just an innocuous ascription: in the society where relatives informed on each other, an ultimate and real friend was a person who withstood the threat of terror but did not betray.

The USSR and the Socialist ideology have created the ‘comrade’ culture among all states under the communist yoke, “in contemporary Russian speech acts, we can appeal and always must appeal to “friend” when there is no friend” (Kharkhordin, 2010). Thus, the word “friend” was substituted by the party ideology into the “comrade” as a respectful appeal among coworkers, communist party members and later was routed into the daily social life. Political scientist Vladimir Shlapentokh stressed the significance of the friendship in day-to-day life of the Soviet people; friendship was a source of opportunities a citizen could seize through social network and social capital. The term was perceived as one of the moral and ideology implications of the central ruling party to build an equal society and lost its true meaning of “a bond of mutual affection”, reliance and trust.

4. Concepts of Uncertainty and Trust in international affairs: Ukraine between Russia and western Europe

5.1 Application of uncertainty and trust

Trust is an ongoing two-way relationship. Taking into the consideration Ukraine - Russia we cannot see the stable providence of the trust going back into the historical

background. The brotherhood legacy has not been a barrier for pressing measures from the Russian side. Information wars, gas negotiations and trade disputes initiated by Russia towards Ukraine, gave a solid ground for distrust in sphere of inter state relations. Here comes the evident analogy of trusting and betting, 'acting in uncertainty and uncomfortable conditions, we take risks, we gamble'. On an arena of the EU-Ukraine-Russia relations we see a clear gambler in Ukraine that got trapped in between uncertain conditions created by the EU and Russia, by those two poles that have divided Ukrainian politics on 'multi-vector' one.

According to Martin Hollis trust requires actors to be prepared to eschew the satisfaction of their own utilities, to be egoistical in own benefits. When 'promises and agreements' are represented in consequential terms they lose their 'power of binds'. The direct application of this statement we can see in the European Union policy towards post-soviet state Ukraine. Vague perspectives and promises of the EU are hidden behind constant critic towards Ukrainian government.

Ukraine appeared to be a 'grey' zone between two powerful geopolitical poles. On the one side, there is a supranational European Union, community with its shared security system. On the other side, an imperial power Russia, an energy sources based growing economy.

To understand the concept of trust and its gradual fade-away, we should apply the concept of the institutionalized building of trust. The theory of trust and its implication rooted in the 'human factor'. Such question drills into the complex issue of the relationship between reasons and causes in explaining and understanding any human action (Booth, 2008). Considering this statement, we should get back to the overview of the existence of Ukrainian society in a slavery of the Russian Empire. The age of numerous division of borders, prohibition of Ukrainian language lead to mistrust from the roots. Here appears selfishness as a leading motivation from the ground of the society to the administrative top of the government.

We can give the definition of trust in the framework of the politics and international relations. Considering that one side is following its will puts value issues under another's side control based on the judgment that there are no risks of losing. Ukraine has made step in this direction, giving up its nuclear arsenal with no clear security guarantees is an obvious step towards international vulnerability. Short-term benefits were the dealing factors for Ukraine signing the Trilateral Statement. Nevertheless, to be a dealmaker or a trust-builder makes difference. Ukraine-Russia and the EU relations seem to be a deal-making process with unfortunate long-term outcomes of losing trust. What is worth to bear in mind while playing *realpolitik*, that states act in assumption of mistrust on the first place.

We have made a preliminary assumption that Ukraine and Russia have significant differences in perception of their common history. Russia puts emphasis on power politics; Ukraine keeps manoeuvre tactics in international relations. One of the outcomes of the common history is the mistrust. Mistrust as an outcome transforms into the cause of the Russia-Ukraine jeopardy.

4.2 The fragility of international cooperation and rational egoism

We have conducted thorough analyses of the concept of trust in the preceding paragraph *Concepts of Uncertainty and Trust in international affairs*. Therefore, with the reference to the statement of Fukuyama (1995) we can assume that trust is a key; the feeling of trust and the sense of community synergistically interact once the decision has been taken to place the relationship on a different plane. The assumption that post-Soviet states shared sense of community being unified under the communism brings us to the analysis of the state of affairs after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Soviet Union had one big enemy in face of the US, propaganda and control from the centre created one source of fear and mistrust – the West. Year 1991 re-shifted the perception of the threat among the newly emerged independent states: states found themselves in

mistrust pursuing their own danger rather than collective. Removing the Iron Curtain, the world of competition, industrial boom and free markets have created the sense of insecurity in social, political and economical aspects.

A range of variables coming from the security competition can undermine the international cooperation. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008, p. 131) suggested that, “cooperation cannot survive, and indeed flourish, if it is based on no more than rational egoism”. Robert Jervis (cit. in Booth et al., 2008, p.131) assumed, “without the power of at least some shared values, without some identification with the other, without norms that carry moral force, cooperation may be difficult to sustain”. Egoism allows one state to gain benefits in losses of others. The absence of shared ideology as a base of cooperation, what leads to the zero-sum world and loss of the long-term strategy.²⁰ In the case of the Nuclear disarmament of Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine appeared in the middle of the zero-sum process under the rational egoistic logic. Russia and the US actively initiated relocation of all nuclear arsenals on the territory of Russia without properly agreeing it with Ukraine:

The Russian Federation unilaterally and without agreeing with Ukraine made a decision to liquidate the CIS Unified Command under whose operational control the Ukrainian nuclear weapons had been placed.²¹

It was the violation of the Minsk agreement on strategic forces and could not be implemented. After the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine reviewed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), it was ratified altogether with signing Lisbon Protocol with further transportation of the arsenal – the world’s third largest at the time – on the

²⁰ Zero Sum world was defined by Robert Jervis (1999): Any gain of territory or power by state *A* would have to come at the expense of some other state, but if it diminishes state *B* or state *C*, this might aid state *D*, at least in the short run, if *D* is the rival of *B* or *C*. Here the situation is zero-sum (or, more technically, constant sum) overall, but not all actors are hurt, and some may be advantaged, by another’s gain.

²¹ CD/1221 Ukraine: Statement concerning nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. 27 August 1993

territory of the Russian Federation and reduction 36% of the strategic Soviet means of delivery.

Russia applied the measures to relocate the power in one centre, Moscow, and re-establish Russia's influence in imperial manner. We can apply the logic of rational egoism analyzing tactics of Russia, the pressure it applied on Ukraine and the result it received were far from seeking all sides beneficial in the beginning of the nuclear disarmament process. According to the official statement by the Government, Russian Federation declared itself a solely possible inheritor of the USSR nuclear weapon:

The Russian Federation, as the only successor to the USSR where possession of nuclear weapons is concerned and as a depository of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, cannot accept as legal any claims or actions that run counter to the international agreements on the preservation and enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.²²

Ukraine used leverage of bargaining, understanding the importance of nuclear capacity for Russia, and followed the rational egoism tactics to obtain the highest possible benefit from giving up USSR heritage. We can assume the failure in international cooperation possibility due to lack of common ideology and dominance of the rational egoism. Ukraine received "high payments from both United States and Russia. The first U.S. payment, pledged under the Nunn-Lugar legislation, was \$175 million. Ukraine has become, almost over-night, the fourth largest recipient of American aid. In 1994 it got \$350 million in economic aid and \$350 million towards dismantling nuclear weapons, besides an extra present of \$200 million bestowed by President Clinton" (Jehiel, 1996). Additionally Ukraine bargained another \$3 billion to complete dismantlement.

We can trace the failure of the international cooperation with the zero sum outcomes in this case. Ukraine had nuclear weapon not valuing it, while Russia had a priority to get USSR nuclear heritage and acquire more power. The US holding a considerable nuclear

²² CD/1213 Russian Federation: statement related to nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory 12 August 1993

capacity did not need to increase it. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union – a single US rival – it faced the developing multipolar world, a range of newly independent states. Thus, the threat was shifting from one centre, which was easier to control and calculate risks, towards chaotic systems in transition. Uncertainty increased the price of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. For the US it was strategically better control if the Soviet nuclear capacity was located in one state. In any case, relocation of weapon in Russia caused a negative externally on the US, while Russia incurred high costs. Consequently, the outcome is zero sum, when “all sides are hurt” (Jervis, 1999).

Ukraine followed the tactics of gaining a short-term benefit over the long-term strategy with a zero sum outcome, giving up all security guarantees to one power, Russia. Experts are still criticizing the prompt decision over the NPT that left Ukraine without proper security agreements with Russian Federation or the US. The Trilateral Statement that was signed by the President of Ukraine, the USA, and Russia on January 14 in 1994 and the following Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on December 5 in 1994, which do not contain a clear mechanism of the protection guarantees in the case of threat (Appendix 1). In accordance to these agreements Ukraine can have consultation if the threat will appear, while any member of the UN Security Council can veto those consultations. Thus, Russia can be one of vetoing states, which supposed to be the main provider of the security guarantees for Ukraine.

4.3 Future uncertainties

The process of the NPT and nuclear disarmament in Ukraine represents an example of a short-term benefit agreement. If the key actors on international arena start to calculate the short-term effectiveness of perspective cooperation, then they will begin themselves to take countervailing actions to seize benefits. Such strategy will lead to the demise of the cooperation and can “generate dilemmas of interpretation and response on the part of other governments, and if this security dilemma contagion gathers momentum the risk will grow” that the cooperation will be dissolved (Booth et al., 2008).

We can assume that the main motives of the prompt decision of Ukraine to give up the nuclear arsenal: to avoid possible confrontation with Russia and US and to receive a

considerable pay-off for the disarmament. The key factor of the failure of international cooperation is the assumption of *future uncertainties* in other states behavior. Analyzing the NPT process, “uncertainties about the long-term potential of the regime to constrain future weapons proliferation undoubtedly play a part in states deliberation” (Booth et al., 2008, p. 132). *Future uncertainties as an outcome* of the failed international cooperation presume that Ukraine as a disarmed player in the NPT triad received no national security guarantees, while other players on the contrary increased their capacities.

We can advocate that the international cooperation tends to dissolve if it is based on rational egoism that leads to zero sum world and escalation of the Security Dilemma for Ukraine.

4.4 Double standards

When great powers employ double standards [...] it erodes their claim to be acting as “great responsables” (Booth et al., 2008. p. 134). The question is whether the European Union still entitles Ukraine as inclusive country rather than exclusive in order to preserve the EU coherence. Peterson (2008) saw the dilemma in the tactics of the EU whether showing ‘hospitality’ or increasing the “double standards” towards the perspective candidates. A supranational power tends to be “master in the house of the EU” preserving its exclusiveness. However, using the method of “carrots” and promises towards Ukraine the European Union creates dissonance in perception in foreign affairs of both while Russia is imposing “sticks” (e.g. gas disputes) without hidden agenda.

Addressing the article 49 of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union if the state fulfills “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” it can apply to become a member state.²³ After the

²³According to Article 49 TEU, any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU may apply to become a member of the European Union. Article 6 (1) describes these principles as those of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.

In the context of the fifth enlargement round, the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 laid down the basic criteria for accession which future members would have to meet in addition to the conditions in

Orange revolution Ukraine showed stable policies implementing the mentioned above requirements. Ukraine officially manifested an “Europeanization” launched by the first democratically elected president Leonid Kuchma in the late 1990’s, the reformist Viktor Yushchenko claimed closer achievement of the membership perspectives in 2004 establishing the boarder assistance in Trasnistria region what was a mild milestone in fulfilling the EU action plans. Indisputably, Ukraine could not manage to sustain a stable strategy to achieve Copenhagen criteria on a short-term basis. Nevertheless, experts were assuming that even if Ukraine “manages to implement the institutional reforms as they promise the follow-on of the situation would be a sort of “double standard” for accession, [...] membership is still projected into the undefined future” (Petersen, 2008).

The difficulty to “read the minds of the decision-makers of other states” creates a feeling of irresolvable uncertainty preparing for the worst outcome in cooperation (Booth et al., 2008). Western countries deviate in proceeding further cooperation with Ukraine facing uncertainty in reaction of the third party – Russia. Indisputably, Russia possesses significant importance in the world politics (e.g. supply of the energy resources, veto the UN decisions), consequently, “where Ukraine there is Russia” is still a common practice among western politicians.

the Treaty, namely:

— stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

— a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;

— the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union and adoption of the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law — the *acquis communautaire*

IV CHAPTER – Approach of the Security Dilemma concepts in politics of Ukraine

1. Security Dilemma in action

1.1 ‘Multi vector’ politics of Ukraine and zero sum outcomes of the Machiavellian pursuit of power

The main issue analyzed in the thesis is why Ukraine became *a multi-vector* player in international politics. We have determined external factors: foreign affairs of the neighbor states and historical legacy of Ukraine that create uncertainty and insecurity for its internal and external policies.

Robert Kagan (2008) gave comprehensive explanation of the rivalry between the US, EU and Russia:

Russia and the European Union are neighbors geographically. But geopolitically they live in different centuries. A 21st-century European Union, with its noble ambition to transcend power politics and build an order based on laws and institutions, confronts a Russia that behaves like a traditional 19th-century power. Both are shaped by their histories. [...]. The contours of the conflict are already emerging - in diplomatic stand-offs over Kosovo, Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia; in conflicts over gas and oil pipelines; in nasty diplomatic exchanges between Russia and Britain; and in a return to Russian military exercises of a kind not seen since the Cold War.

For the EU it is important not to lose its last puzzle in the Eastern Neighborhood Partnership programme. The reason is in geopolitics as well as in geo-economics. Ambitious and high cost free trade negotiations with Ukraine held 20 rounds and overstepping big controversies the agreement was initialed in March 2012 overstepping big controversies. Such concessions of the EU towards Ukraine could be explained by the desire to use the last weak chance to keep the post-Soviet state away from Russian orbit of influence:

They (the EU) also fear resurgent Russia. They realize that by enlarging eastward, Europe acquired a new Eastern problem. Or, rather, the old Eastern problem, the centuries old contest between Russia and its near neighbors (Kagan, 2008).

Moreover, the global financial crisis has showed that strong in geopolitical sense states remain keeping position of the geo-economic power as well. The effect of the financial crisis had harming effect on security. In this context the security of the population has emerged significantly that has undermined the stability of states.

A significant factor that stands-in with the external factors is the internal division of power between political elite and oligarchs in Ukraine. Goals of the business elite directly influence the decision-making process in the government. Simultaneously, the political elite receives incentives from the oligarchic lobbyists to maintain power. The application of the Machiavellian statecraft brings us to the prime sources of power, “the men you’ve armed will be under an obligation to you” (Machiavelli, Chapter 20). We have delimited themes of power from the traditional military to the intangible forms of power. Therefore, we can consider oligarchs that “arm” Ukrainian political leaders with financial support and promotion seize the opportunity to settle certain vectors of internal and external policies to be beneficial for their personal benefits. “You cannot in good faith give the nobles what they want without doing harm to other; but you can with the people”, assured Machiavelli (Chapter 9) proving that a limited round of people, who accumulate benefits, would act in egoistic purposes only. The power that comes with “the support of the wealthy nobles” leads to weak state with the fate of collapse.

Crony capitalism is a core-damaging premise of the dissonance in the Ukrainian politics. The shield over the property rights – crony capitalism – means that a limited circle (e.g. businessmen) is politically favored. Possessing certain privileges and protection from the state, “they may pay lower taxes, or their competitors may be subject to raids by the authorities. Because the state uses its apparatus to deter competition – both informally, through arbitrary enforcement of property rights, and formally, through trade restrictions – crony capitalism is not only unjust, but also

inefficient” (Balcerowicz, 2012). Crony capitalism and centralization of the benefits have short-term success for individuals, but the state may fail, the economy based on selective distribution dissolves ideology from the politics, as the leading motivation of oligarchs is personal welfare.

Ukraine’s national aspiration for integrating in the Western European community is correlated with the refocus of the Ukrainian corporations and oligarchs to the EU and the US markets for doing their businesses in recent years. Nevertheless, global financial crisis was a stroke for Ukrainian corporations and forced to re-shift the geographic vector of business again. The demand on the Ukrainian steel – the main export source – has decreases drastically in October 2008. The plunge reached 49% point what has led to the bankruptcy of some enterprises (Gnedina, 2011). Ukraine lost its position in the credit ratings. The main holdings of Ukraine, Metinvest, Interpipe and Energostandard have received bailouts provided by Russian banks. This measure to keep Ukrainian business on the float brought Ukraine back into more tight interdependence with Russia.

Unfavorable economic climate for the major Ukrainian corporations and Russian bailout brought Ukraine closer to the Eurasian Union and common economic area with CIS countries. As a consequence, Russia’s numerous attempts to take control over the gas transport system (GTS) – main transit rout of the EU energy supply – gained traction. The negative outcome of interdependency is a zero sum world, accepting the short-term benefits from Russia over the long-term strategy towards the EU perspectives Ukraine will become a grey hub. Robert Kagan (2008) emphasized rising economics of Russia as one of its power methods:

Russia is back on its feet, rich and resentful, seeking not to join Europe but to take a special path back to great-power status. Putin laments the fall of the Soviet Union and seeks to regain predominant influence in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, as well as over Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and the rest of what Russians call their "near abroad."

The mentioned above holdings are in possession of the richest oligarchs of Ukraine. The national politics is one of their spheres of influence. Rinat Akhmetov, the 16th world's billionaire referring to Forbes, is in charge of the DTEK holding, main supplier of electricity to the EU member states, in particular, to Eastern parts of the Union (Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland).²⁴ DTEK had clear pro-Russian vector of business strategy and cooperation until last years. The tactics of DTEK has changed after the launch of agreement with Ukrenergo what enabled to bring the business on the Western market. Thus, Ukraine lacks the power of setting the national strategy; limited circles of the business elite have direct influence on the decision-making process in the government. Dissonance inside the political echelon undermines a credible image of the state on international level.

Ukraine fails to maintain one direction in development of its Soft Power. The dilemma of choosing one integration vector stays on the way to make state's power "seem legitimate in the eyes of others (we assume "the others" is international community), it will encounter less resistance to its wishes". Ex US Ambassador to Ukraine Stephen Pifer emphasized that Ukraine lacks the implementation persistency creating uncertainty in perception of the West and Russia. It is a prime prerequisite of Soft Power and the dilemma of uncertainty on both poles: the EU and Russia.

2. Continuity of deteriorating relations with Russia and the EU

2.1 Russia's projects: Customs Union and Eurasian Union

Ukraine has been standing at the crossroad between closer integration with either Russia or the European Union without choosing either – known as 'multi-vector' foreign policy for unacceptably long period of time (Gnedina et al., 2012). Whether it can be questioned which side of the relations is loosing or winning, we can assume it a zero-sum process. Ukraine is demonstrating series of setbacks from time to time, from one

²⁴ *Profile of Rinat Akhmetov*. Forbes. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.forbes.com/profile/rinat-akhmetov/>>

government to another. Russia is imposing more pressing tools to keep its area of interest under personal control. Year 2011 after the finalization of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, Russia stepped in with the invitation to join the Customs Union and Eurasian Union.

Both projects are initiated by Russia to create the EU-type of the former Soviet-space economic area. According to words of the re-elected in 2012 Russia's President Vladimir Putin (2011) Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have agreed on the Customs Union code in 2009 that came into force on 1 July 2010:

On July 1, 2011 customs control over goods passing through the borders between our three states was lifted. This completed the establishment of a fully developed common customs area with clear prospects for implementing highly ambitious business initiatives. Now we are about to move from the Customs Union to the Common Economic Space.

Three parties have adopted a single tariff that will reduce barriers for the movement of goods. Newly emerged market with the 170 million population aggregated the potential of 600 billion USD industry and 112 billion USD agricultural production. More important is the joint capacity of the 90 billion barrels of the oil reserve in the Union. President of Kazakhstan Kazakh Nazarbayev presented such statistics on 27 November 2009 in the doorsteps of the agreement initiation.²⁵ The additional geopolitical power to the project can add intentions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to join the Customs Union.

²⁵ *Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan agree on Customs Union*, Saturday, 5 December 2009. Available at: <<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/93507/russia-belarus-and-kazakhstan-agree-on-customs-union.html>>

New integration project for Eurasia is the common economic area in the post Soviet space. Vladimir Putin (2011) has presented the idea in his personal article “New integration project for Eurasia - a future that is born today”²⁶:

A crucial integration project, the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (CES), will kick off on January 1, 2012. This project is, without exaggeration, a historic milestone for all three countries and for the broader post-Soviet space.

The road to this milestone was difficult and often torturous. It began two decades ago when the Commonwealth of Independent States was established after the Soviet Union’s collapse. To all intents and purposes, the selected model helped preserve the myriad of ties, both of civilization and culture, which unite our peoples and also forged links in production, the economy and in other vital areas essential for our lives.

The project is ambitious and already invites other neighbor states. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are on the way of entering Customs Union and Eurasian Union, Ukraine has more severe consequences of joining. Putin (2011) has underlined that no pressure can be applied for attracting perspective members:

The Eurasian Union is an open project. We welcome other partners to it, particularly CIS member states. At the same time, we are not going to hurry up or nudge anyone. A state must only join on its sovereign decision based on its long-term national interests.

In this respect, I would like to touch upon an important issue. Some of our neighbors explain their lack of interest in joining forward-looking integration projects in the post-Soviet space by saying that these projects contradict their pro- European stance.

From the statement we can assume that Ukraine is one of “some neighbors” that sees the threat to its “pro-European stance”. Nevertheless, we can argue the statement that

²⁶ Putin, Vladimilr (2011). *Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlya Yevrazii — budushchyye, kotoroe rozhdaetsya segodnya*. [New integration project for Eurasia - a future that is born today]. [Online]. Available at: <<http://izvestia.ru/news/502761#ixzz1qz6pnmH9>>

Russia does not “nudge” Ukraine. “Gas wars”, recent trade restriction can give the full picture.

Obviously, academia and politicians have already found affiliation of the Customs Union and Eurasian Union with the Soviet Union and the European Union. Russian political elite is reaffirming the international community in transparency of the future activities of Unions:

It took Europe 40 years to move from the European Coal and Steel Community to the full European Union. The establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space is proceeding at a much faster pace because we could draw on the experience of the EU and other regional associations. We see their strengths and weaknesses (Putin, 2011).

Nevertheless, one fact does not have to mislead: the European Union was created on a base of solidarity heading towards coherence in all spheres of decision-making and common policies. After the break of the Iron Curtain countries from the “socialist camp” eagerly took the directing of reunification with the Western neighbors to rebuild the statecraft on the common democratic values. Advocates of the fast reintegration process assume that “European integration also means the return of these countries into the European mainstream as equal partners and not merely as “little brothers””, considering the USSR example (Drumea, 2008). Therefore, new independent countries could count on equality in the integration union, being free from one dominant state that appears in the Eurasian Union grand project. Thus, “long oppressed by a regime imposed from outside, these countries can finally defend their interests in the democratic framework that the European Union offers” (Drumea, 2008).

Eurasian Union has one strong dominant member Russia from economic to political sectors. Vladimir Putin (2011) claimed, “Russia will be promoting a common agreed position of all Customs Union and CES members”. In fact, Russia introduces an agenda to represent all members of the Eurasian Union that proves limitations of the integration model based on equality.

Considering the size of Russia, its energy resources it is automatically a dominant member of the Union. Advocates of the integration project should bear in mind dependency of the Eurasian Union member countries on Russia. Researches are calling Putin a “collector of the soviet lands” and emphasizing that the Eurasian Union will become a unipolar entity with one centre of decision-making, Moscow. One of the outcomes of Russia’s dominance in the balance of powers in perspective union that “the potential members of the Eurasian Union will respond with resentment to the guaranteed dominance of Russia. While in the European Union no single state holds the commanding position, in a future Eurasian Union the size of Russia’s market and GDP surpasses by far those of any other potential participants”.

Eurasian Union idea is based on the European Union role model, but the supranational power of the European Union that is presented by all member states in the Commission and the European Parliament, in the Eurasian Union such perspective cannot become a reality.

While Russia is on the way creating a strong alliance in the post-Soviet space, unifying its “younger brothers”, obviously, country is becoming one of “the centers of power in a future multi-polar world” (Alexandrova, 2011).

2.2. Ukraine: gas transit and “gas wars” with Russia

The price of gas negotiations is a sphere of influence, and eventually geopolitical ambitions of the country. This process is highly politicized. Russia has much more manipulative tools in its energy control. Over the past years Russia lost its influence in several ‘post soviet brother’ countries Georgia and Ukraine.

Security of the stabile energy supply became the top issues in the agenda of the European Union Member states. Push factor in reconsidering the diversifications of the gas supply were three waves of the disputes between Ukraine and Russia: 2006 that was followed by 2009 cut of the gas supply to the European Union and 2011 had all

premises to be called: the beginning of the third “gas war”. Prerequisites of the deteriorating relations over the gas and oil take their roots in 90s. According to Antonio Marquina (2008): “Since the end of the 1990s, international energy experts have stressed the increasing strategic importance of supply security in the ‘energy triad’, to which economic competitiveness and environmental compatibility also belong. But only in the aftermath of the winter 2005-2006 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine has the future security of the European energy supplies become the focus of a broader political debate”.

The economics of the energy market is considerably separated from the politics. Consequently, policies tackling the energy questions are mainly determined by the political echelon based on geopolitical goals in the framework of the National Security Strategies. Thus, we can assume the political ground that damages Soft Power of Ukraine and represents insecurity on international level in the case of deteriorating Ukraine-Russia relations over the gas transit.

Indisputably, the leading player in the chessboard over the gas pipelines is Russia. We should go back to the analyses of power proceeded in the previous Chapter in Paragraph *Soft Power: changing the approach towards the Security Dilemma in the case of Ukraine*. Russia possess traditional tangible power of the state rich in resources “holding more than 25 percent of the world’s natural gas and hard coal reserves and 6 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, [...] has also considerably increased its strategic position in many of the successor states of the USSR and in the new EU member states” (Marquina, 2008). Monopolization of the Russian energy market by the energy corporation Gazprom makes negotiations for the EU and Ukraine frustrating. The only tool to secure energy supply lies solely in the hands of Russia’s political leaders and this fact should be considered in the question of the Security Dilemma of Ukraine. Words of Antonio Marquina (2008) reflect this problem:

For many years, [...] Western Europe have largely ignored the fact that Moscow has indeed used

its energy exports and pipeline monopoly as instrument of foreign policy to intimidate and blackmail neighboring states - albeit with little success – since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Today Russia is persistently initiating to create the Customs Union in the post-soviet area, admitting that without joining of Ukraine it won't be complete in geopolitical, economical perspectives and one more of manipulative attractions to join the union is perspective discounting prices on gas. Vladimir Milov, President of the Institute of Energy Policy and in an ex-Deputy Energy Minister of Russia commented clearly the main motives of Russia regarding the gas issues:

Main motives - political. There is a group of countries that do not just choose and carry out the pro-Western policies, these countries are implementing very different than Russia's political and social model. The Kremlin sees it as a challenge, as a demonstration that you can live differently than we do in Russia or Belarus, or Kazakhstan... And we see that in recent years the Kremlin works very hard, trying to regain lost influence in the region...

Another political objective pursued by the Kremlin, initiating gas conflict (2009) was the purpose to discredit Ukraine in the eyes of the West. To put it simply unreliable energy partner, and to demonstrate to the West that this is exactly the same corrupt and inefficient system of post-Soviet bureaucracy like ours. And to pursue that the West simply cannot cope with such a country... In the subtext: that only we (Russia) know how to 'deal with these guys', so give them to us.²⁷

Assuming that “the only security in the new age of uncertainty is common security”, Russian approach towards the energy policies leads to the mistrust from the states incorporated into the common energy supply chain. Clear risk in policies limited by the state *egoism* rather than *rational egoism* is the raising feeling of insecurity of the states dependent on the gas and oil distribution. The European Union has already integrated energy security into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2003 and strengthened it after the 2009 gas supply crisis. Sharing risks among 27 member states allows the union to lower threats. Therefore, “Russian leaders must appreciate that manipulation access to oil and gas supplies create anxieties among Western

²⁷ President of the Institute of Energy Policy Vladimir Milov, in 2002, Deputy Energy Minister of Russia. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.sovsekretno.ru/magazines/article/2107>>

governments about future Russian motives and intention” that causes the scenario of refusing Russia as a partner (Booth et al., 2008).

The European Union member states are developing strategies to lower dependency on Russian supplies. We should regard the agreement adopted between German energy EON Ruhrgas, the Russian "Gazprom" and the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy on the division of the Lithuanian gas company Lietuvos dujos into two separate companies. Agreeable to the contract, one side will be engaged in selling gas; another will take over the gas pipeline. Political symbolism of the decision is considerable; it leads to the demolition of the Russian gas monopoly in the European Union. In diplomatic rounds an intelligent word "division" means that "Gazprom" was corny removed from the management of the Lietuvos dujos company and remains the only right to sell gas (Korol'chuk, 2012).

For Ukraine the division of the Lithuanian gas company Lietuvos dujos is an “example of a direct warning of the non-allocation of shares in the format "33%-33%-33%" in the course of future development and incorporation of the consortium on management of as transport system (GTS)” (Korol'chuk, 2012). Lithuania has deviated from such distribution system and aims at further reducing “Gazprom” monopoly by 2018 in cooperation with Poland.

We have emphasized the importance of Soft Power in application of Security Dilemma of Ukraine, and tracing gas disputes and Russia’s approach to use hard power being a resource rich state. However, when ideals became “an important sources of power, the classic distinction between *realpolitik* and liberalism becomes blurred. The realist who focuses only on the balance of hard power will miss the power of transnational ideas” and Russia is facing the EU’s attempts to decrease energy dependency, while Ukraine is carrying political and economic losses (Nye, 1990).

We can trace the dilemma of the market and political gas pricing. Alexander Wendt argued that the Security Dilemma itself is a social construct, and that “is possible to mitigate it by changing the identities of two previously hostile states”, we would add that the amendment of the identities would require revision of perceptions as a premise of misconception in political dialogue (Wendt cit. in Booth et al., 2008, p. 93). Supremacy of the language in facilitating cooperation should be emphasized in constructing negotiations. Indisputably, if the supreme barrier in the gas disputes was the market pricing, the disagreement could be resolved in one round of discussion between the representatives of governments and economists. Accentuating linguistic communication in diplomacy Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008, p. 93) argued that “those constructivists who stress the importance of dialogue capture the process that give the potential to transform identities and interests in world politics”, this proves our earlier claim of the importance of the perception and Soft Power in foreign affairs that could lead to distrust and uncertainty as prerequisites of the Security Dilemma.

Advocate of the Soft Power concept Joseph Nye (1990) also emphasized the importance of the diplomatic dialogue in new era of intangible power claiming that, “traditional instruments of power (force) are rarely sufficient to deal with new dilemmas of world politics”. Prerequisite of not effective diplomacy in Ukraine is its inconsistency, sending diverging messages from internal and foreign ministries, politicians. Ukraine’s position in international communication is weakened by a sharp confrontation among political elites, the imbalance of the system of government, permanent domestic political crises. There is a critical shortage of strategic vision for partnership weather with the European Union or Russia. Simultaneously, Russia's policy towards Ukraine is more coordinated, focused and rigid. The Russian leadership is actively using the levers of political and diplomatic pressure "gas dependence" of Ukraine, the pro-Russian sentiments among the political establishment and a large part of Ukrainian citizens. The European Union’s tactics in diplomacy is its deep bureaucratization with focal point in Brussels what brings to fatigue promises to Ukraine.

Joseph Nye (1990) suggested that “new power resources, such as the capacity for effective communication and for developing and using multilateral institutions, may prove more relevant” in comparison to the conventional military power methods.

2.3. Black Sea: source of tensions in Ukraine, Russia and EU relations or “the dog that did not bark”

We can trace the dissonant diplomatic communication of Ukraine regarding the policies over the Black Sea region. Ukraine has the second longest coastline along the Black Sea.²⁸ The paradox of the maritime region is the correlation of the greatest range of economic interests and a hub of threats for Ukrainian foreign affairs. Possible disputes over the maritime area bring another angle of the Security Dilemma. Crimean Peninsula with the collapse of the Soviet Union became a part of the Independent Ukraine and formed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The location of the peninsula is the strategic link between Europe and Central Asia (see Figure. 1). Therefore Russia has kept its presence sharing the Navy Fleet based in Sevastopol. In the geo-strategic sense the peninsula connects states that share different cultural heritages and political directions. There are two EU member states (Bulgaria, Romania), NATO members (Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania), Russia and Post Soviet states (Ukraine, Georgia).

We cannot apply the Security Dilemma to Ukraine avoiding the analysis of the Black Sea significance; security of the state brings all aspects into the consideration. The maritime geostrategic importance of the Black Sea is more diverse due to the presence of the NATO member state Turkey that gives the connection with the Mediterranean Sea bypassing straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelle, energy transport routs. While the land security takes in concern all border lines, the maritime – the main entry points from the sea. Considering that Ukraine holds fourteen ports and the main centre of the Black

²⁸ The total length of the Ukrainian coastline within the limits of the Sea of Azov and Black Sea is nearly 3000 km.

Sea – Sevastopol, all fifteen entry points from the sea space represent channels of the sea power. In accordance to the words of the Dutch-American geo-strategist, Nicholas Spykman (Spykman cit. in Rogers, 2010):

Different conceptions [...] of the conquest of space indicate one of the outstanding differences between land and sea powers. A sea power conquers a large space by leaping lightly from point to point, adjusting itself to existing political relationships wherever possible, and often not establishing its legal control until its factual domination has long been tacitly recognized. An expanding land power moves slowly and methodically forward, forced by the nature of its terrain to establish its control step by step and so preserve the mobility of its forces. Thus a land power thinks in terms of continuous surfaces surrounding a central point of control, whereas a sea power thinks in terms of points and connecting lines dominating an immense territory²⁹.

Having a bridge connecting Europe, Asia and the Middle East –with the potential to serve as an economic artery linking major economies – the Black Sea is of considerable geo-strategic importance for a diverse set of stakeholders.³⁰ Cooperative structures are able to resolve security threats.

At the end of the Cold War, the states around the Black Sea regained their freedom and escaped from a bipolar conceptual straitjacket striving to gain more control over the area and recognition of their identities denying the Soviet past (Celikpala, 2009). Therefore, 1991 was a milestone of the foundation of a new Black Sea sub-region from a geopolitical point of view. The second era for the Black Sea as a geopolitical entity has its origins in 2007 with the enlargement of the European Union (Bulgaria and Romania) reaching the Black Sea shores. Not only did the EU move eastwards, the Black Sea has got a direct access westwards and can be recognized as an integral part of the European project. Politically, sub-regional cooperation in the area was justified as a step towards integration within the new European architecture. From a stability

²⁹ European Geostrategy. [Online]. Available at:
<<http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneuropa.eu/2010/02/18/to-rule-the-waves-again/>>

³⁰ Defined as the littoral states; Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Turkey, and those states in the vicinity including; Greece, Albania, Serbia, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan (based upon membership of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation – BSEC).

perspective, sub-regionalism was seen as a means to become a part of the undivided Europe.

The importance of including Black Sea in the analyses of the Security Dilemma for Ukraine traces us in the first place to the Ukraine-Russia relations. The issue of the Russian Fleet in Crimea is one of the most acute on the agenda of bilateral dialogue. Conflicts around the navigation facilities, conducting maneuvers without notice to the Ukrainian side, the Russian military violations of the Ukrainian legislation, ignoring the rules of crossing the border³¹. Russia's actions can block potential EU policies towards its member states (Bulgaria and Romania) that have direct access to the Black Sea region. There can be no doubt about the fact that Russia is one of the principal actors when it comes to defining regional stability and security. Russia's main concern in the "near abroad" is to maintain and consolidate its power and to restrict the presence of other powers (Kagan, 2008). Historically Russia has considered the Black Sea Region to be a crucial component of its national security and for this reason the protection of the Russian sphere of influence is deemed to be in the national interest.

We can assert that the presence of the Russian fleet in Crimea has a political and ideological rather than military and strategic importance, given the level and nature of threats to Russia originating from the Black Sea region³². We can trace one more aspect of intangible power that arises from the concept of interdependence.

The Security Dilemma of interpretation is escalating in premise of the balancing actors: Russia seeks to keep the United States, NATO and the EU security strategy initiatives out of the region. While Ukraine and Georgia feel that Russia is a threat, the Russian Federation in turn feels that it is being encircled and contained by the West. The situation around the Russian military base in Sevastopol significantly escalated after the

³¹ *Politycheskie faktory dvustoronnego sotrudnichestva*. [Political factors of bilateral cooperation]. Razumkov Research Center. Policy Paper. National Security and Defence. No 4, 2009

³² *Ibid.* 16., *EU's Black Sea border set in stone*.

conflict in the Caucasus, which involved Russian Black Sea Fleet ships. The President of Ukraine on August 13, 2008 issued a decree on implementation of the solutions NSDC of Ukraine, which establishes rules and procedures of crossing the Ukrainian border of the BSF troops and equipment.³³

The problem of deriving the Black Sea Fleet units in 2017 dramatically actualized in 2008. "Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea fleet in Ukraine", in fact, laid the bomb in slow motion on strategic partnership of Ukraine and Russia in the future. This document provides the extension of stay of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for 25 years (up to 2042). It is unprecedented, asymmetric political and economic barter - the exchange of conventional economic preferences of Russia's strategic geopolitical concessions from Ukraine. The contract was signed with the condition of the 30% gas price reduction by Russia after several gas disputes. These disagreements led the gas supply crisis for the EU members in 2009 and new round of 'gas war' in 2011. Agreement has not led to real price advantage for Ukrainian consumers compared with consumers in EU countries. In reality, gas disputed between Kiev and Moscow did not decrease, but on the contrary - deepened.

The Ukrainian side has undertaken a number of attempts to formalize this topic. President of Ukraine issued a decree "On additional measures for socio-economic development of Sevastopol." According to the document, the working group was established, the duties of which were attributed to the development of proposals "for use after 2017 infrastructure of Sevastopol Bay in non-military purposes, re-profiling and modernization of the logistics, including port infrastructure".³⁴ Thus, Ukrainian government launched the priority to increase the level of presence and control over the Fleet. We can claim the externalities of Russian influence limit the decision-making process in Ukraine.

³³ Ibid. 16., *EU's Black Sea border set in stone*.

³⁴ The presidential decree. *On additional measures for socio-economic development of Sevastopol*. No1204, 26 December 2008.

Ken Booth and Nicolas Wheeler (2008, pp. 62-64) applied the concept of “the dog that did not bark”, when it had to react on any intruder, the dog kept silence in the night-time, what could signify that intruder was not a stranger. At the political level it is not common to show the fear: it is not rational way to “engender the confidence of one’s own community or to deter those who might be threats” (Booth et al., 2008). Russian naval military forces are located on the territory of a foreign state; intention of Ukraine to join NATO alliance implies unacceptability of the presence of external military units that creates a core contradiction. The main document on monitoring the foreign military presence: the Law of Ukraine "On the procedure of admission and residence conditions for subdivisions of the Armed Forces of other countries on the territory of Ukraine" was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on February 22, 2000. The document establishes the procedure for admission and residence conditions of subsections of the armed forces of other states on the territory of Ukraine, it also defines the procedure for exercising control over their activities during their stay in Ukraine. It should be noted that the law is fully responsible to the interests of the National Security of Ukraine, internationally accepted principles and conditions for solving such problems from the international practice. The law specifies and defines the procedure for realization of the constitutional powers of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: the President carries the power of the main decision.

These limitations primarily take into account the non-nuclear status of Ukraine and its national security interests. Considering that Ukraine is a nuclear zero state after the relocation of the nuclear arsenal on the territory of the Russian Federation, Russia possesses direct influence capabilities on the National Security of Ukraine. Indisputably, Ukrainian-Russian relations are advocated as “Slavic brotherhood” and the dog will never bark at night keeping the uncertainty and insecurity in the prejudice of the shared culture and history. However, the presence of the Russian Naval Fleet creates a barrier for cooperation with Western alliances in perspective. We can assume that externalities (e.g. presence of the subdivisions of the Armed Forces of other countries) are prerequisites for escalation of the Dilemma in foreign affairs of Ukraine

V CHAPTER – Ukraine Stands a Chance in the International Arena: trends and recommendations

1. Ukraine’s chance for positive changes

The democratic transformation is a painful process for the post-soviet states. What distinguishes Ukraine from the successful states of the “socialist camp”, precisely, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, which form today the Visegrad group, is the latter group historically was perceived as an occupied territory by the Communist regime. Nevertheless, all without exception were heavily corrupted and interdependent with the centralized political and economical power in Moscow.

After the Freedom House issued in 2012 new report on countries in transition the expert of Robert Nurick explained why some nations are still facing monopolization of politics and economy:

One is that culture matters, and by culture I (Robert Nurick) mean history, not genetics. There is a difference between countries, which have had some memory of a democratic experience, and those, which have not. It's one of the reasons why we've seen such positive results in the Baltic states.

Today the political elite of Ukraine finds excuses for failed integration in its controversial geopolitical location. Indeed, maneuvering between the EU and Russia leads to zero results. The current President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich claimed that Ukraine is reconsidering its vector of integration and cooperation and seeking more economic cooperation with China and other Central Asian countries. According to his statement the modernization of the state in the modern globalized world requires more

active engagement in Central Asia.³⁵ We can agree with such proclamation considering the current global trends.

Nevertheless, Ukraine cannot avoid relations with its neighbors. According to a former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Poland Laszek Balcerowicz (2012), “when a country like Ukraine develops slowly and remains poor, it is not because of natural disaster or resource constraints [...] bad policies pursued by bad governments are to blame”. An excessive concentration of the political power in the ruling Party of Region³⁶, the Honorary Leader of which is the current President of Ukraine, creates a considerable discordance in messages concerning the vector of the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs. Upcoming Parliamentary elections can bring a positive shift in government of Ukraine from one ruling party to more multi-polarized system. The President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich understood that Vladimir Putin is not a “friend of his or of Ukraine” (Kramer cit. in Trehub, 2012). According to the president of the foundation Freedom House David Kramer:

Some leaders in the region, including Ukraine, have taken the bad example he set in the region showing consolidated control of the media, pressuring civil society, trying to create a rubber stamp parliament, all of the going after opposition. With the upcoming election here there is a possibility to reduce the consolidation of power.

³⁵ *Yanukovich ne Vvazhae Evrosoyuz Strategichnim Partnerom*. [Yanukovich do not consider the EU a strategic partner]. ZN.UA. [Online]. Available at: <http://news.dt.ua/POLITICS/yanukovich_ne_vvazhae_evrosoyuz_strategichnim_partnerom-104759.html>

³⁶ The Forerunner of the Party of Regions was "The Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine" (PRRU), established in October 26, 1997. On March 29, 1998 PRRU participated in its first parliamentary elections, received 0.9% of the vote in a multi-seat electoral district and took the 19th place among 30 participants. In 2007 the Party gained 34,37% votes in Parliamentary elections, since 2011 there is considerable decrease of support. The official web-site available at: <http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/en/>

The report published by the Freedom House in 2012 shows the decline of scores of Ukraine among 7 Nations in Transit. Nevertheless, David Kramer justifies such reverse as a natural process of states in transition “crossing over the threshold and return back” comparing it to the recent reverse of Hungary from the progressive democratic development (Kramer cit. in Trehub, 2012). Current President of Ukraine came to power through the democratic election, but the methods he is using are consolidative. The Parliamentary elections can change the situation for better in Autumn 2012.

According to the Freedom House Ukraine “should provide more transparency and predictability” (Nurick cit. in Trehub, 2012). The main step towards implementation of recommendations given by the international community is democratic and fair electoral process in Autumn 2012.

2. The future of the EU integration

To make a prediction of the Ukrainian future vector of politics, we should overview the current trends among the main players in international political arena. We should take into the consideration the resent statement made by the Regions Party MP Leonid Kozhara:

The question of Ukraine's EU membership is purely theoretical. The financial crisis is raging in Europe, and it's already obvious that the economies of EU member states are failing. We saw the European Union before crisis - a wealthy life and dynamic development - and after that. Today, the situation is the opposite.³⁷

³⁷ *Regions Party: Question of Ukraine's EU membership now 'purely theoretical'*, Kyiv Post, December 15, 2011. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/119031>>

We can claim that the future intention of Ukraine to enter “the common European house” will depend mainly on the economic trends. In the paragraph *The fragility of international cooperation and rational egoism* we have identified that the leading force in the Ukrainian politics is the rational egoism of the business elite. Thus, we can assume that common European values cannot be the “carrots” in relations with Ukraine. According to our hypotheses that the international cooperation cannot sustain based only on rational egoism of players without sharing common visions, we can already predict further deterioration of the EU-Ukraine relations. Leonid Kuzio has declared that:

We should have a pragmatic approach to accession to the EU, first and foremost, in terms of our foreign economic interests. In the end, we'll see whether the EU is ready to accept Ukraine, and whether Ukraine itself is ready to join the European Union, only when our state obtains associated membership of the EU.³⁸

Thus, we can trace the correlation between the changing Ukrainian political vectors and trends in global economics and politics. While the EU is facing a financial crisis, Ukraine will pursue closer engagement with China.

3. The future of Ukraine-Russia gas disputes

Yanukovich stressed the energy interdependency with Russia what will lead to unavoidable development of Ukraine-Russia cooperation and relations. We can assume that after the Parliamentary elections that will take place in Autumn 2012, Ukrainian government will activate the gas negotiations with Russia. Experts emphasize that the requirements of the current Ukrainian-Russian gas contract will cause the risk of default in the nearest future for Ukraine. The numerous attempts of Ukraine to lower the gas price led to significant decrease in foreign investments. The current government of

³⁸ Ibid. 37., *Regions Party: Question of Ukraine's EU membership now 'purely theoretical'*

Ukraine is avoiding cooperation with International Monetary Fund due to the unpredictability of the negotiation with Russia. Ukraine faces the risk on inability to pay 11,9 billion of USD of the government debt that increases the risk of default (Petrovskaya, 2012).

The expert Daryna Krasnolutska (2012) in the report of the Bloomberg Businessweek claims that:

While Ukraine faces a widening current-account gap, slowing economic growth and limited access to global capital markets, President Viktor Yanukovych has refused to raise household gas tariffs to restart a \$15.6 billion IMF aid package as support for his ruling party ebbs before October elections.

Ronald Schneider, who manages the emerging-market debt at Raiffeisen Kapitalange GmbH in Vienna, stated that, “it is a question of willingness to pay a political price”. Thus, Ukraine faces the increase of skepticism from the international community “without a resumption in IMF disbursement” (Krasnolutska, 2012).

We can predict negative economic consequences for Ukraine that will have a direct influence on its Foreign Policy. Experts assume that, “economic growth may slow to 3.9 percent this year from about 5 percent in 2011, the government estimates, as the euro-region turmoil threatens its steel exports and cold weather curbs the grain harvest” (Krasnolutska, 2012).

The International Monetary Fund has already warned that the trend of weakening of the national currency due to fell of the foreign-currency reserves from 3,3 to 31,8 billions of USD leads to widening of the current-account deficit from 2,2 to 5,5 percent of Gross Domestic Product. Thus, while the IMF loan that was obtained by Ukraine in 2010 was frozen as the government of Ukraine do not approve the increase of the consumer

energy cost (Krasnolutska, 2012). We can assume that Yanukovich is blocking such austere measure to increase gas prices for the population not to lose perspective votes for the upcoming Parliament election.

Thus, the issue of Ukraine-Russia gas negotiations is the focal for Ukrainian external and internal politics. Tracing the negotiation process we can predict the future of the post-soviet state on international arena.

4. New trends and new cooperation of Ukraine in the international arena

The aspiration of Ukraine to tighten its relations with China is linked to Russian question as well, Tai Adelaja (2012) assumed that, “with Russia turning its back and Europe giving it the cold shoulder, Ukraine is trying to hedge its bets with closer engagement with China”. The debate on the legislation on the Russian language turned away the attention of the Ukrainian electorate. Simultaneously, Ukrainian Parliament passed the bill on Chinese investments in the post-soviet state farming area. The adopted legislation provides China “the ability to influence developments in that country, which experts say is of far greater strategic importance to both Russia and Europe” (Adelaja, 2012).

We can assume that the post-soviet state chose a “third way” for its Foreign Affairs and international cooperation. While the EU implements austere measures boycotting the football championship Euro 2012 and freezing the process of initialing DCFTA, Russia uses the neo-imperial methods pressing Ukraine with gas contract, China enters the market of an important geopolitical location, the buffer zone between Russia and the EU. According to Sergei Nalivka, the representative of the Ukrainian Consulting firm, “growing tension puts a strain on Ukraine’s relationship with both the European Union and Russia, Ukrainian politicians are also turning east to embrace China” (Adelaja, 2012). The attractiveness to cooperate with China for Ukraine is the absence of the

political agenda. Chinese are interested in economic expanding and in “easy access to fertile land around the world” (Nalivka cit. in Adelaja, 2012).

The agreement was ratified on the 3d of July, 2012 and will attract 3 billion of USD in the Ukrainian agricultural sector on the first stage. From the Ukrainian side there will be an increase of the grain production, oil, corn and soybeans supply to China. In future China expects to boost its investment activities if Ukraine will adopt a law permitting the sale and lease of the agricultural land. Experts are warning that Ukraine can follow the case of Kazakhstan, “where the Chinese invested over 20 billion of USD to take control of 70 percent of that country’s natural resources, including oil and gas” (Adelaja, 2012). Furthermore, both sides of the agreement are going to use only national currencies for the transactions to avoid involvement of the third party.

Ukraine benefits from the short-term incomes that can help to cover part of the government debts. Nevertheless, the main recommendation that Ukrainian government has to follow is to build long-term strategy and cooperation within its neighborhood. The pro-Europe Ukrainian lawmaker Vladimir Makiyenko emphasizes, “while it is understandable that working with the Europeans could be harder and more expensive, such cooperation might be worthwhile because the long term result can be more beneficial” (Adelaja, 2012).

5. Recommendations

Ukrainian political elite should understand that joining the European Union and initializing the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement is not a political act. These steps towards bilateral cooperation require internal development of Ukraine. If the post-soviet state will implement all conditions, systematic changes will shift the orbit of Russian influence far from the Ukrainian border on economic and society levels. The attitude of the Ukrainian government to the cooperation and further

integration in the EU as the political game should be changed towards effective partnership. The Ukrainian society needs basic changes in the rule of law and economic development. This simple formula will lead towards initialing DCFTA with the EU and economic boost in long-term perspective. Short-term benefits should be replaced by the strategic approach in the tactics of forming foreign policies of Ukraine.

The focal recommendation for Ukraine is implementation. Ukrainian government lacks the ability to deliver given promises to the electorate and international community. A zero sum game of “muddling through” on the margins of the neighborhood puts Ukraine in isolation today.

From the other side, the European Union should distinguish further the EU-Ukraine and the EU-Russia relations. The “European common house” still pursues the double standard approach towards Ukraine. Indisputably, such important issues as the energy supply is on agenda in both partnership. Nevertheless, for 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukraine demonstrated the aspiration to reduce dependency of Russia paying for it considerably high political price for gas.

Ukraine should build strategy of cooperation with both Russia and the EU. On the agenda of Ukraine-Russia relations the main priority is to avoid monopolization of the Gas Transit System of Ukraine by Russian “Gazprom”. Ukraine has agreed on the Brussels Declaration of 23 March 2009 regarding the modernization of the Gas Transit System.³⁹ Thus, the act of implementation can reset Ukraine-EU bilateral relations. Eastern Member States of the EU depend on supply of Russian gas via Ukraine. The gas crisis in 2009 shifted the EU Member States attitude to the post-soviet transit state towards the negative pole. Moreover, Ukraine can decrease its dependency on Russian energy resources by reducing the energy intensity of the national economy.⁴⁰ Ukraine

³⁹International Centre for Policy Studies, Institute of World Policy (2010). *A New Foreign Policy for Ukraine. Expert perspectives*. Kyiv, 137 pp..

⁴⁰ Ibid. 39., *A New Foreign Policy for Ukraine*

can reach the energy efficiency by introducing energy-saving technologies and foreign investments in modernization of the Gas Transit System.

In Ukraine-Russia relations the issue of depoliticizing the studies of Ukrainian history in Ukraine and Russia is important for the post-soviet state to preserve its identity. The Parliament of Ukraine created one more wave of social frustration over the language bill introducing new law that ratifies Russian language on official level in June 2012. Ukraine should maintain preservation of its cultural and national identity promoting Ukrainian language. The use of Russian is strong among the majority of the regions in Ukraine, while Ukrainian language requires government support from education institutions to mass media. Indisputably, Ukraine is a bilingual state that should not allow separatist movements inside the country.

On the agenda of Ukraine-EU relations the main priority for Ukraine is to reset and maintain its status of key state in the Eastern Neighborhood Partnership. Ukraine should institutionalize bilateral cooperation with the EU except the official meetings it would be beneficial to establish a Ministry for European Cooperation and Integration. The fatigue of entering the EU is vague, but the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement is a practical step forward in Ukraine-EU cooperation. Thus, the priority for Ukraine now should be to reset its relations with the EU by implementations of the EU official resolutions and transformation of the internal system: to carry out constitutional, administrative, territorial, judiciary reforms and energy efficiency.⁴¹

For the EU the main priority on the agenda of Ukraine-EU relations is the improvement of relations with Moscow. Ukraine is one of the milestones and sphere of interest for both Russia and the EU. Thus, sustainable relation with Moscow is the guarantee of further productive cooperation with the EU. Nevertheless, Ukraine should avoid

⁴¹ Ibid. 39., *A New Foreign Policy for Ukraine*

Russian integration projects: Customs Union and Eurasian Union. Russia is the dominant party in the proposed Union what will increase the dependency of Ukraine.

The government of Ukraine should consider establishment of relations with Ukraine-skeptic member states of the EU. Poland has always been the main promoter of the EU-Ukraine cooperation. Nevertheless, the decision making inside the supranational entity of the EU, the European Parliament and Commission, is based of unilateralism. Therefore, Ukraine has to broaden the specter of its partners inside the EU.

CONCLUSION

In the dissertation we have traced the major events in the history of Ukraine to understand the current controversial situation of the state that gained the image of the grey hub and a buffer zone between Russia and the European Union. We can assume that three waves of incorporation of Ukraine by imperial powers led to prerequisites of mistrust and escalation of the so called Security Dilemma. The central problem of the Ukrainian nation is the historical process of the establishment of its borders.

After the analyses we can assume that the focal premises of the escalation of distrust, uncertainty and misperception in Foreign Affairs of Ukraine correlate with its historical capital and geopolitical “handicapped” location between the major Powers in international politics. Concepts of the Security Dilemma, mistrust and misperception assisted our research in understanding the multi vector politics of Ukraine on international level. From both sides of neighborhood Ukraine faces two powers of supranational entity the European Union and neo-imperial power Russia. Ukraine maneuvering from being consistent in its foreign policy keeping all negotiation processes on the level of uncertainty. After the analyses we can claim that such tactics brings deterioration of the relations on the both sides of the neighborhood.

In the beginning of the research we have asked the question whether Ukraine should be anywhere at all, whether any of the integration projects of the European Union or Russia’s Customs and Eurasian Unions are the options for the development of the post-soviet state. After the analyses we can assume that cooperation and integration can sustain on the base on the common values and vision, which stand behind the rational egoism of the Union members. Ukraine lacks the implementation and transformation sustainability inside the state. Thus, the focal premise of being the country “in between” is the internal factor that correlates with failing external policies. We have applied Machiavellian Prince to understand the crony capitalism system of Ukraine and

interdependency of politics and business that jeopardize the image of the state in its neighborhood as unreliable partner.

We have traced the practical cases of the Nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, Gas disputes between Ukraine and Russia till today's negotiations, Black Sea Fleet question and the perspectives of the Russian Unions integration as the striking examples of the Dilemma that have led Ukrainian government towards zero sum decisions.

After the analyses and observations of bilateral meetings we can claim that today Ukraine cannot sustain consistent negotiations with the EU due to the inability to apply structural changes in the corrupted system. The majority of the representatives of the business elite are interested to enter the European free trade area, what have stimulated the process of the DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU. Simultaneously, Ukraine's oligarchs are not ready for the transparency and cannot implement the basic requirements of the EU. Thus, we can see the zero sum result when the final initialing of the DCFTA was paused on unidentified period in December 2011.

In the assumption we can make the same parallel in the Ukraine-Russia relations: in 2008 the major companies of Ukraine were bailed out by Russia, what have re-shifted Ukrainian business backwards to the Eastern dimension. Concurrently, business elite perceives the perspective of the common free trade area with Russia in case of entering the Customs Union as the one of the leverages of the dominant state to overtake the control, precisely, over the energy sector. In the main conclusion over the disputes between Ukraine and Russia we should emphasize the notion among the political elite in Russia that the independence has its price and Ukraine has to get used to pay it. We can claim that the post-soviet state and Yanukovich government do not have bargaining power in comparison to Russia and the EU what creates premises for escalation of the Security Dilemma and becomes a liability to the of Soft Power of Ukraine.

Developing constructive recommendation for the Foreign policy strategy of Ukraine we should emphasize that the lack of the implementation is the undermining premise of the internal and external jeopardy of Ukrainian politics. The outcome of the Dilemma and deterioration of Soft Power of Ukraine led to the isolation of the post-soviet state. The government should build a long-term strategy to reset its relations with its both key partners Russia and the EU rather than accepting short-term benefits from cooperation with China. Indisputably, current global trends and perspective foreign investment are beneficial for the state in transition. However, we assume that the international cooperation cannot be sustainable and be fruitful if it is based on no more than rational egoism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adelaja, Tai (2012). Tensions push Ukraine to look to Beijing. The Moscow News. [Online]. Available at: <<http://themoscownews.com/economics/20120716/189966637.html>>. [Retrieved on 14/07/2012].
- Anderson, Malcolm., Bort, Eberhard (2001). *The Frontiers of the European Union*. Palgrave Publishers Ltd. New York, p. 244.
- Alexandrova, Lyudmila (2011). *Putin's plan for Eurasian Union meets with doubts in CIS countries*. Itar-Tass World Service. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/241445.html>>. [Retrieved on 39/05/2012].
- Boroda, Maxim. Zhovkva, Ihor. Lvova, Olga (2010). *Inside Ukraine*. International Center for Policy Studies, ICPS #9.
- Booth, Ken. Wheeler, J. Nicholas (2008). *Security Dilemma Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. February, 5.
- Buzan, Barry. Wæver, Ole and De Wilde, Jaap (1997). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 240 pages. LC: 97-21300.
- CBOS (2010). *Attitude to other nations. Polish Public Opinion*. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2010/01_2010.pdf>. [Retrievien on 15/05/2012].
- Celikpala, Mitat (2009). *Security in the Black Sea Region*. Policy Report II, Commission on the Black Sea.
- Chenoy, Anuradha. Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou (2006). *Human Security: Concepts and implications*, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics, December, 12.
- D'Anieri, Paul J. (1999). *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999, 278 pp..

- Dobanton, Anni (2011). *Ukraina: metamorfozy nezavisimosti*. [Ukraine: the metamorphosis of independence.] Translated from French. Omelyanchika VI. - K.: Publishing House of Dmitry Burago, 2011. – 352 p.
- Drumea, Dumitru (2008). *The fall of the Soviet Union and Reunification of Europe. An explanation of the perestroika*. The New Federalist. [Online]. Available at <<http://www.thenewfederalist.eu/The-Fall-of-the-Soviet-Union-and-Reunification-of-Europe>>. [Retrieved on 9/06/2012].
- Freedom House (2012). *Ukraine. Freedom in the World 2012*. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/ukraine-0>>. [Retrieved on 15/07/2012].
- Fukuyama, Francis (1995). *The End of History and the Last Man*. Maxwell Macmillan, Inc. New York, 403 p.
- Glebov, Sergey (2011). *Ukraine's Changing Foreign Policy: Implications on the Black Sea Security*. Insight Turkey. April, 1.
- Gnedina, Elena., Sleptsova, Evghenia (2012). *Eschewing Choice: Ukraine's Strategy on Russia and the EU*. CEPS Working Document N. 360/ January.
- Havel, Vaclav (1994). *The Need for Transcendence in the Postmodern World*. The speech was made in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, July 4, 1994. [Online]. Available at <<http://www.worldtrans.org/whole/havelspeech.html>>. [Retrieved on 05/03/2012].
- Institute of World Policy (2011). “*Myaka syla*” *Ukraïny: TOP-30 asotsiatsiy z Ukraïnoyu u rehioni*. [“Soft power” Ukraine: TOP-30 association with Ukraine in the region]. Kyiv, 2011. – S. 13.
- Jehel, Philippe., Moldovanu, Benny., Stacchetti, Ennio (1996) “*How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons*,” *American Economic Review*, 86 (4), pp.812-829.
- Jervis, Robert (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 355.

Jervis, Robert (2001). *Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?* Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 36–60.

Jervis, Robert (1999). *Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperatio Understanding the Debate*. International Security, 24:1, pp. 42-63.

Kagan, Robert (2008). *New Europe, Old Russia*. The Washington Post. February 6, 2008. [Online]. Available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502879.html>>. [Retrieved on 05/03/2012].

Kahler, Miles (1995). *International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration*. The Brookings Institutions. Washington.

Kappeler, Andreas., Kohut, Zenon E., Sysyn, Frank E., Von Hagen, Mark (2003). *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Russian-Ukrainian Encounter (1600-1945)*. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 381 S.

Kharkhordin, Oleg (2010). *Reassembling Friendship: Friendship and Politics in Contemporary Russia*, European University, St. Petersburg.

Korol'chuk, Yurii (2012). «Gazprom» otzhali. [“Gazprom” wringed out]. Informational cite of political comments: Politkom.Ru [Online]. Available at <<http://politcom.ru/13928.html>>. [Retrieved on 9/06/2012].

Krasnolutska, Daryna (2012). *Ukraine Fans Default Risk in Russia Bet as Vote Molds Policy*, Bloomerg News, February 23. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-23/ukraine-fans-default-risk-in-russia-bet-as-vote-molds-policy.html>>. [Retrieved on 12/05/2012].

Kuzio, Taras (2004). *Russia's imperial designs*. Kyiv Post Op-Ed, February 18, 2004.

Kyiv Post (2011). *Regions Party: Question of Ukraine's EU membership now 'purely theoretical'*, Kyiv Post, December 15, 2011. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/119031>>. [Retrieved on 15/06/2012].

- Marquina, Antonio (2008). *Energy Security. Visions from Asia and Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 243 p.
- Miroshnichenko, Nikita (2008). *Kak ukraintsy kapitalizm sebe stroili. Novejšaya istoriya Ukrainy (1991-2001)*. [How Ukrainians were building capitalism. The newest history of Ukraine (1991 - 2001)]. Donetsk, p. 340. ISBN 978-966-8722-01-1.
- Motyl J. Alexander (2012). *Soft and Hard Power Threat to Ukraine*. Ukraine's Orange Blues, World Affairs, March 16, 2012. [Online]. Available at <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/soft-and-hard-power-threats-ukraine>>. [Retrieved on 29/05/2012].
- Neklessa, Alexandr (2012). *Genetika grazhdanskogo obshchestva*. [Genetics of the civil society]. Politcom, April 9. [Online]. Available at <<http://politcom.org.ua/?p=2322>>. [Retrieved in 10/06/2012].
- Nye, Joseph S (1993). *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*. Harper Collins College Publishers.
- Nye, Joseph S (1990). *Soft Power*. Foreign Policy, No. 18, Twentieth Anniversary. Pp. 153-171.
- Petersen, Jeppe Juul (2008). *Ukraine – On the Track towards EU*. Europeum: Institute for European Policy, Prague.
- Pifer, Stephen. US Ambassador in Ukraine (2012). *Opinion: Miscalculation Yanukovich*. Korrespondent, N21, 1/06/2012. [In Russian]. [Online]. Available at: <<http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1355897-mnenie-proschet-yanukovicha>>. [Retrieved on 04/05/2012].
- Putin, Vladimir (2011). *Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlya Yevrazii — budushcheye, kotoroe rozhdaetsya segodnya*. [New integration project for Eurasia - a future that is born today]. [Online]. Available at: <<http://izvestia.ru/news/502761#ixzz1qz6pnmH9>>. [Retrieved on 12/04.2012].
- Rogers, James (2010). *To rule the waves again?* European Geostrategy. Feb 18.

[Online]. Available at:
<<http://europeangeostrategy.ideason europe.eu/2010/02/18/to-rule-the-waves-again/>>. [Retrieve on 10/04/2012].

Rose, Richard (2009). *Understanding post-communist transformation: a bottom up approach*. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Trehub, Hanna (2012). *Ukraine Still Stands a Chance. Interview with David Kramer and Robert Nurick*. The Ukrainian Week, June 6. [Online]. Available at:
<<http://ukrainianweek.com/Politics/54782>>. [Retrieved on 20/06/2012].

Velychenko, Stephen (2007). *Ukraine, the EU and Russia: history, culture and international relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zerkalo Nedely (2012). *Yanukovich ne Vvazhae Evrosoyuz Strategichnim Partnerom*. [Yanukovich do not consider the EU a strategic partner]. ZN.UA. [Online]. Available at:
<http://news.dt.ua/POLITICS/yanukovich_ne_vvazhae_evrosoyuz_strategichnim_partnerom-104759.html>. [Retrieved on 12/05/2012].

Internet web sites:

www.kremlin.ru – Official website of the Russian Federation

www.mid.ru – Official website of Russian foreign affairs

www.europa.eu – Official website of the European Union

<http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en> - Official Website of the Ukrainian government

<http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/> - Official Website of the Ukrainian committee of Statistics

APPENDIX 1

K-6

SECURITY ASSURANCES

Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

[5 December 1994]

The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State, Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time,

Noting the changes in the worldwide security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces.

Confirm the following:

1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
2. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
4. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to

Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

5. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm, in the case of the Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.
6. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments.

This Memorandum will become applicable upon signature.

Signed in four copies having equal validity in the English, Russian and Ukrainian languages.

ANNEX 1.

Index of Soft power of Ukraine

Tab. A: Index of "soft power" of Ukraine in Poland

The "soft power"	The average value
Domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine	4
Influence of the Ukrainian community	4
Activity of the Embassy of Ukraine	3
Rating of Ukrainian culture	5
Rating of Ukrainian products	3
AVERAGE INDEX	4

"Soft power" of Ukraine in the region: tool of effective foreign policy. Institute of World Policy. Kyiv, 2011. – S. 111

Tab. B: Index of "soft power" of Ukraine in Romania

The "soft power"	The average value
Domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine	2,93
Influence of the Ukrainian community	2,73
Activity of the Embassy of Ukraine	2,93
Rating of Ukrainian culture	3,07
Rating of Ukrainian products	2,73
AVERAGE INDEX	2,88

"Soft power" of Ukraine in the region: tool of effective foreign policy. Institute of World Policy. Kyiv, 2011. – S. 111

Tab. C: Index of "soft power" of Ukraine in Russia

The "soft power"	The average value
Domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine	3
Influence of the Ukrainian community	2,2
Activity of the Embassy of Ukraine	2,2
Rating of Ukrainian culture	5,6

Rating of Ukrainian products	4,5
AVERAGE INDEX	3,5

"Soft power" of Ukraine in the region: tool of effective foreign policy. Institute of World Policy. Kyiv, 2011. – S. 111

Top 5 notions towards Ukraine

Tab 1: Top 5 notions of Poland towards Ukraine

Poland
1. Corruption, Democratic Deficit, Oligarchs
2. Common History
3. Hospitability
4. Divided/Undefined Country
5. Partnership

"Soft power" of Ukraine: TOP-30 association with Ukraine in the region. Institute of World Policy, Kyiv, 2011. – S. 13

Tab 2: Top 5 notions of Romania towards Ukraine

Romania
1. Cossacks
2. Gas and Related Problems, Russia
3. Orange Revolution
4. Serpentine Island / Territorial Issues
5. New Democracy

"Soft power" of Ukraine: TOP-30 association with Ukraine in the region. Institute of World Policy, Kyiv, 2011. – S. 13

Tab 3: Top 5 notions of Russia towards Ukraine

Russia
1. Summer, Rest
2. Kyiv
3. Not Russia
4. Culture
5. Slavs, Close Country, Motherland


"Soft power" of Ukraine: TOP-30 association with Ukraine in the region. Institute of World Policy, Kyiv, 2011. – S. 13

ANNEX 2.


The exhibition created by the Kiev-based think tank the Institute of World Policy (IWP) "Ukraine through the eyes of neighbors" in frames of the project “ “Soft power” of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy” in March 2011. Caricatures "Ukraine through the eyes of neighboring countries", were performed by artists from the surveyed countries, as well as from Ukraine, on the order of the IWP.

Electronic reproductions are available at the official cite of the think tank Institute of World Policy <http://iwpp.org.ua>

Soft Power of Ukraine: perception inside Ukraine



The Institute of World Policy. Available at <
http://iwpp.org.ua/img/karikatures/ukraine/kustovskiy_ukraine_2.jpg>



The Institute of World Policy. Available at <
http://iwpp.org.ua/img/karikatures/ukraine/kustovskiy_ukraine_3.jpg>

Soft Power of Ukraine: perception in Poland



Author: Wojtek Filipoviyak, Poland. "Soft power" of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy. The Institute of World Policy. Available at <http://iwpp.org.ua/img/karikatures/poland/filipoviyak_poland_1.jpg>




Author: Wojtek Filipoviyak, Poland. *“Soft power” of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy.* The Institute of World Policy. Available at <
http://iwp.org.ua/img/karikatures/poland/filipoviyak_poland_1.jpg>

Soft Power of Ukraine: perception in Russia



“Soft power” of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy. The Institute of World Policy. Available at <
http://iwp.org.ua/img/karikatures/russia/bogorad_russia_7.jpg>




Author: Victor Bohorad, Russia. *“Soft power” of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy.* The Institute of World Policy. Available at http://iwp.org.ua/img/karikatures/russia/bogorad_russia_5.jpg

Soft Power of Ukraine: perception in Romania




Author: Pavel Constantin, Romania. "Soft power" of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy. The Institute of World Policy. Available at <http://iwp.org.ua/img/karikatures/romania/pavel_romania_1.jpg>



Author: Pavel Constantin, Romania. "Soft power" of Ukraine in the region: the effective tool of foreign policy. The Institute of World Policy. Available at <http://iwp.org.ua/img/karikatures/romania/pavel_romania_3.jpg>

ANNEX 3.

Figure 1: Geostrategic importance of Black Sea



Available at: <<http://www.blackseanews.net/files//image/00-00-00-08/001.jpg>>