

Sive Thompson

Turkey: Emboldened Geopolitical Player

**The Shifting Horizon of Regional Turkey's Geopolitics and
Identity in Light of European Energy Needs**

Universidade Fernando Pessoa

Porto, 2012

Sive Thompson

Turkey: Emboldened Geopolitical Player

**The Shifting Horizon of Regional Turkey's Geopolitics and
Identity in Light of European Energy Needs**

Universidade Fernando Pessoa

Porto, 2012

Sive Thompson

Turkey: emboldened geopolitical player

The Shifting Horizon of Regional Turkey's Geopolitics and Identity in Light of European Energy Needs

I certify that this dissertation is entirely my own original work

Work presented submitted to Fernando Pessoa University as a requirement
for the attainment of the degree of Masters in International Relations with the Arab and Islamic World

Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to examine whether Turkey has managed to become an emboldened geopolitical player in recent times.

Since the end of the Cold War the global geopolitical situation experienced a reshuffling of priorities, directions and regions of interest. The energy question rapidly moved up the list. Energy is crucially important to the western developed world and is of ever increasing importance to the developing world. The European Union, along with other western powers, is aware of the need to secure energy supply for the future. The strategic location of Turkey combined with its relationship with Europe has made it the central player in this game. Yet, this is not the only facet to the question. Turkey holds in its hand the key to the energy gateway of Central Asia and the Middle East. To what extent is Turkey pushing its geopolitical limits in order to form bonds, improve relations and foster cooperation to make itself into an emboldened geopolitical power on the world stage?

Resumo

O objectivo desta tese é o de avaliar se a Turquia se terá conseguido tornar um *player* geopolítico fortalecido nos tempos mais recentes.

Desde o fim da Guerra Fria, a situação geopolítica experienciou uma reestruturação na ordem de prioridades. Assim, a questão energética rapidamente ascendeu naquela lista. A energia é essencial para o mundo ocidental e desenvolvido, sendo de uma crescente importância para o mundo em desenvolvimento. A União Europeia, tal como outras potências ocidentais, está consciente da necessidade de assegurar, para o futuro, o fornecimento de energia. A localização da Turquia, combinada com o seu relacionamento com a Europa, tornam-na num jogador central neste jogo. Contudo, esta não é a única faceta nesta questão. A Turquia detém a chave da porta de entrada da energia da Ásia Central e do Médio Oriente. Até que ponto estará a Turquia a forçar os seus limites geopolíticos de forma a criar laços, melhorar relações e promover cooperação de maneira a tornar-se uma potência geopolítica fortalecida no palco mundial?

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my coordinator, Professor Ivo Sobral for all his valuable advice and patience. I would also like to thank the International Relations department at Universidade Fernando Pessoa for having provided the opportunity to travel a conference hosted at Istanbul Technical University which inspired the dissertation that follows.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Resumo	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Introduction	1
I. Historical Overview of Turkey	4
1.1 The Ottoman Era.....	4
1.2 Kemal and the era of nation building.....	8
1.3 1946-1980 Unstable democracy and intermittent coups.....	13
1.4 The Özal years and beyond.....	18
II. Dynamics of EU-Turkish Relations.....	24
2.1 History of relationship with EU.....	24
2.2 Areas of difficulty	32
2.3 The Cyprus Issue	37
III. Energy: Geo-strategic Relevance	43
3.1 Overview.....	43
3.2 Neighbouring Region.....	45
3.3 EU's energy needs	51
3.4 Turkey's relevance.....	52
IV. Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy.....	59
4.1 Identity	59
4.2 Turkish Foreign Policy through the decades	62
4.3 Alterations Since the AKP.....	66
Conclusion.....	71
Bibliography	73

Introduction

In 2007 I completed undergraduate studies in European Development Studies (University College Cork, Ireland), an area which I found very interesting and which also introduced me to broad geo-political considerations. Following the completion of my degree I worked for 6 months, as part of an internship, with an engineering firm in the area of power generation. I became quite interested in the topic of oil and gas and its role in world politics. To further complement and extend my studies, I wanted to continue studying international relations so I was delighted to discover the Masters in Arab and Islamic Studies in Fernando Pessoa University. During the course of study I also was given the opportunity to travel to Istanbul for a conference which sparked a deeper interest in the country and its relevance. Turkey was somewhat of a ubiquitous topic during my degree, and logically it reappeared many times in Arab and Islamic studies. When it came to choosing the topic for my dissertation, I decided that examining the role of energy in the shifting geopolitical landscape or Turkish accession to the EU would fit perfectly.

In this dissertation, I give an overview on the ever-evolving balance of power between the Turkish republic and its neighbours – particularly in recent years – focusing on how the energy issues have affected the existing geopolitical structure, and ultimately, in what sense has that balance been redefined as a consequence. Therefore, the objective of the thesis is to examine to what extent the changes and evolutions of the global energy situation have affected the policy of Turkey and its relative power in the region, with a particular focus on the EU accession and Europeanisation process.

In methodological terms I have raised the above question for investigation. I then researched various authors who have focused on the subject matter, either in part or fully. I analysed the historical, political and economic context of the topic, while positioning the various within this framework. I have addressed in each chapter a section of the argument and in the conclusion attempted to assemble the findings.

I have examined a wide variety of sources to research this thesis, including books, academic journals, news items, government reports, intergovernmental reports, non-governmental organisations reports, research institutes reports and industry journals. The wide variety of sources was necessary in order to fully investigate the various elements of the topic. It is a topic that spans political science, public and foreign policy and history at one end of the spectrum. At the other it required research and understanding of global economic trends and power generation engineering and priorities.

In the first chapter, I deal with the formation of the modern Turkish nation, from the fall of the Ottoman Empire through the evolutions of the Republic up to the present day. The next chapter aims to understand the nature of the relationship between Turkey and the EU from initial contact to current situation; the problematic areas in the accession process are also highlighted. Chapter three deals with the Turkish regional energy question and its relevance to the EU, this includes the some of the pipeline projects that are underway. In the final chapter I attempt to assess the role that identity has played on the foreign policy of Turkey over the decades, to assess whether the foreign policy direction of the current government is an attempt to expand its geopolitical portfolio and finally whether the Islamist popularity of the party is related to the over insistence by the military through the decades on secularist policies.

Each element in the relationship between the EU and Turkey has a great many layers, and each layer can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Added to these considerations, the complexity of the issue at hand merely in terms of the number of topics involves and by extension the number of areas-ranging from economics and politics, to engineering and the environment makes it a challenge to investigate. The relevance of topics such as science, religion, immigration, minority issues and political philosophy is not to be underestimated. One of the difficulties in relation to a number of topics is the question of bias, which is of course an important consideration in social science; however one of the particularities that I would like to underline is the role that language can play on the accessibility of information. This is particularly relevant to the question of Cyprus, where the range of information is often biased towards the Greek Cypriot side. This may be attributed to the internationalisation of that part of the island, therefore allowing

for more contact with the English language, and potentially for more international students of the topic. I noticed a particular gap in the availability of information regarding the Turkish Cypriot and often the research originated from Turkish institutions of education. There are similar difficulties when researching equally contentious issues such as the question of the Kurds. Potentially a distortion of the facts can occur, it is important to note this and be aware of it during the course of research.

I. Historical Overview of Turkey

1.1 The Ottoman Era

For a broader perspective and a deeper understanding of the formation of the country of Turkey that we see today, it would be necessary to trace the history back many centuries in time. This is not always possible so in order to minimally comprehend the nature of the formation of the post Ottoman republic and the succeeding nation that emerged, we must look at the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In examining the ending of this empire, some important elements need to be considered: the reasons for the break up within the historical context but in as succinct a manner as possible; the external factors that lead to the process of disintegration, and perhaps most importantly both the internal factors and players that helped to bring about the downfall.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire can be attributed to a variety of factors, each requiring its own attention. There are the external players and situation to be considered, the internal developments and difficulties as well as the events that served as catalysts to the whole process. During the first half of the 19th century the Ottoman Empire began to suffer a degradation of sorts (Mohapatra, 2008). The previous century had seen a number of critical events take place in Europe whose effects had not reached as far as the Ottoman lands, or at least not very far into them. The enlightenment, the renaissance, the industrial revolution and the political revolutions of the late 18th century had had little impact of the perennial goings-on under the rule of the sultans; this led to stagnation within the empire and a weakness that was exploited by the empire's neighbours. To demonstrate this point we need only look to the defeats suffered by the empire in this period, from various defeats at the hands of Russia to the revolts of the Serbians and the Greeks, even to the independence of Egypt (Kosebalaban, 2011). It was clear that the empire was crumbling at the edges.

In order to offset the weakening and stagnation of the empire, a series of reforms were introduced. Some reform had been implemented during the reign of Sultan Selim III and again with Mahmud II, during which time the Janissary was abolished, having been seen to have become too powerful (Kamrava, 2005). During this period many

educational institutions principally medical and military were also established. However it was not until the reign of Abdülmecid I that reform was given a chance to really take hold. The previous reforms had been to some extent military in nature. This new era of reform, known as the Tanzimat era (meaning reorganization) and ushered in with the edict of Gülhane was to reorganize and centralize government and finance to retain control over the empire (Boztemur, 2005). Significantly it also gave equal rights and citizenship to all subjects in within the empire. This would be the end of the *millet* system whereby religious affiliation was the basis for governance (Kosebalaban, 2011, p30). Interestingly, *millet* in modern Turkish means nation, whereas at the time it referred to the system of division according religious groups that were the make-up of the empire. Boztemur (2005 p30) makes the point that these reforms “benefited mainly non-Muslim groups, the commercial, entrepreneurial, urban and educated groups at the expense of Muslim agrarian groups”.

The reforms continued through 1856 and a period of alliance with the European powers in exchange for support against Russian advances. While the reforms were an attempt to follow a policy of social inclusion for the peoples that made up the Ottoman Empire national sentiments had begun to form and the policy was ineffective in stopping them. A nationalist wave was spreading through the European wing of the empire. The seeds of independence were sown in this period in many Christian dominated lands, leading up to the Balkan war of 1912/1913 (Öktem, 2011, p23). In addition to the Russian advances, many other European powers had begun to take interest in the decaying edges of the empire. This swallowed large parts of the Ottoman lands in North Africa, including Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.

The ages of revolution and industrialization had an important effect on the Ottoman Empire not because of their presence in the empire but for the lack thereof. Perhaps it could be argued that they were the catalysts that heralded the end of an empire, but that view alone would be an externalist one without taking into account the internal factors. Yet the internal factors are clearly linked to these two waves. The greatest challenges that faced the empire throughout the 19th century were twofold. Firstly, the need to internally reform in order to include all members of its empire, that is to say to counter the effect that the spread of nationalist sentiment was having in eroding the sovereignty

of the empire. The second was the need to compete with the pace of European economics, however the economic situation was largely driven by industrialization, an area in which the ottoman empire had allowed itself to lag, being too engaged with internal issues. This led to an inability to afford the payments owed to European creditors, who were funding the reforms. Parallel to this the empire was beginning to become over-dependant on imports, resulting from its lack of industrialization (Öktem 2011, pp16-17). As the turn of the century approached, the economic situation was becoming more and more untenable. Not only this, but the reforms had failed achieve the desired effect of strengthening the empire at its borders, and in addition the reform would prove to be even more actively detrimental to the health of the empire with the emergence of new generation of European minded and educated people.

It was in the context of these reforms and the growing economic difficulties that a new political movement began to take shape. Most of the reforms looked west for their inspiration and realization, leading to a significant shift in perspective for the emerging generations of military and educated classes. A great number of American, English and French educational institutions were founded in this period, educating in the region of 100,000 students by 1914 it is estimated (Kosebalaban, 2011 p32). The generations that emerged from this background of instruction were to be some of the most important for this period Ottoman and Turkish history. A movement named the Young Ottomans began to emerge, a “western outlook bureaucratic elite” (Şeker, 2005, p61). Whose ideas stemmed from the westernized education they had received, while still maintaining their Muslim identity. Their goal was to find new solutions to the problems plaguing the empire. These “new classes of articulate modernists” (Kamrava, 2005, p27) were instrumental in the introduction of the 1876 constitution. Though it was short lived, surviving just two years, it laid the foundations for the liberalization of the empire and a return to the theory of constitution in 1908.

It had become clear in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere¹, that a multinational, multi religious empire were no longer viable in the new era of nations. And while the attempt

¹ The Hungarian and Persian Empires were suffering difficulties at this time also, and in part as a result of similar damaging factors.

at reform was well intentioned it had merely served to train up a bureaucratic generation that would go on to produce the movement that would one day assume power from the Sultan caliph. The Young Ottomans were born out of a combination of factors stemming from the socio-political culture of 19th century reform in Turkey, including the Tanzimat reforms and the subsequent westernization of the educated and bureaucratic elite.

The Young Ottoman movement attempted to create a renewed vision for the remaining Ottoman land, the fatherland or *vatan*, and a loyalty to it. The goal was to create an Ottoman loyalty, irrespective of millet or religious base, to unify what remained of the empire into a modern nation based on European principals but also on Islamic tradition and of course not forgetting the large Muslim majority that would have to be convinced by these ideals. Kosebalabann (2011, pp34-35) argues that they translated the western political ideals into a Muslim context but not only that, as a result of their bureaucratic background they were in a position to formulate practical solutions combining the Islamic tradition with the modern liberal concepts. This is an important period in modern Turkish political history as it is one of the primary steps of the Muslim world in the attempt to conform to the western political value system. Thanks to the reforms implemented in the Tanzimat era, a new generation of Muslim thinkers was born but a generation whose training allowed them to envision a practicable way forward.

Ultimately Ottomanism and the Young Ottoman movement failed to garner the support that was needed for survival. Their ideals were viewed as dated and not workable in the emerging international context. The abolition of the Young Ottomans by the sultan created a void which was then filled by the newer generations in the form of the Young Turks. Appealing to the educated elites, their ideals of nationalism and anti-imperialism were soon combined with a militarist element (Kosebalaban, 2011; Şeker, 2005). The Young Ottoman movement had sought to appeal to the educated, westernized classes and based their ideals within an Ottoman multicultural context. The Young Turks would continue with some of those modernist values, but would break away from the Ottomanist discourse, though not before allying itself with Sultan Abdülhamid II. The Young Turks helped bring the Sultan to power and quickly demanded that a constitution be introduced, leading to the brief constitutional era of 1876. However this was short

lived, as the empire was suffering international military defeats which led to the Sultan revoking the constitution in order to consolidate his power. His reign lasted three decades and his policy was one of continued modernization, but with a strong authoritarian overtone. The bureaucratic elite that had been growing out of failed Ottomanist project assisted in his plans for modernization and pushed for democratization but finally would force him out power with the implementation of the 1908 constitution.

With the declaration of the second constitutional era the CUP was elected. There were a number of years of unrest but ultimately in 1913 a CUP coup brought them to definitive governance. The Ottoman Empire had sought to create an all inclusive multi ethnic society, but the empire was unable to support the transition into a modern multicultural environment. The CUP instead chose to strengthen the barriers that had existed in the millet system (Şeker, 2005). This era of democratization came within a context of growing international tensions. European designs on the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire were growing. Soon after this, the empire entered the war on the side of Germany, having been forced to make such a choice by the French and British alignment with the empire's greatest threat Russia.

Following its defeat and the signing of the treaty of Sevres, it looked as though the empire would be entirely divided up between the European powers. What ensued was a war of National liberation, led by military officer Mustafa Kemal, which resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne, and the declaration of the Republic of Turkey (Kosebalaban, 2011).

1.2 Kemal and the era of nation building

“Few can deny that the cumulative effects of what occurred in Turkey were revolutionary” (Kamrava, 2005)

As the last remnants of the empire disappeared so began the birth of a new nation formed by the military leader who had helped save the salvageable part of the empire. Mustafa Kemal set about reforming and renovating Turkey to create a new nation on a par with its international counterparts. One of the factors of which to be mindful when

analyzing the birth of the republic in Turkey was that it emerged from a dying empire, an empire that collapsed as a result of a combination of elements but one which should not be overlooked is the interest in nationalism that had been sparked across it. It is therefore comprehensible that the country that emerged from this fallen empire, having been felled by the axe of nationalism, would try to outdo its deserters in defining its own brand of nationalism.

It was an era of nationalism and nation building, not only in Turkey but elsewhere across Europe. In a fashion not dissimilar to other leaders at the time Kemal's approach was one based on 6 principles; Populism, nationalism, statism, republicanism, secularism and reformism (Kamrava, 2005, p53). From these principles he would attempt to build a new nation state, one that was religiously and ethnically homogeneous (Öktem, 2011, p33), that was secular in existence and economically viable. He would also set out to reshape the social and cultural identity, to break with the past and to reject most everything that the Ottoman Empire had stood for. Yet as much as he tried to reject the Ottoman past, much of what became part of the Kemalist philosophy had its roots in the final years of the empire. Two of the predominant ideologies of the Kemalist era, those of nationalism and of secularism were mere continuations of what had been forming previously (Öktem, 2011, p25).

Nationality

The first task of building a new nation was not to be an easy one, given the mobility that had existed during the Ottoman Empire there was a great number of people within the borders of the Turkish state some of whom were not ethnically Turkish but Muslim and some who were not Muslim but ethnically Turkish. There was a belief by some that pan Turkism was a favourable movement over pan Islamism as the latter was likely to irk colonial leaders in other parts of the Muslim world (Kosebalaban, 2011, p41). There were also those who were neither Muslim nor Turkish and these were certainly not part of Atatürk's vision, a vision of creating an ethno-religiously homogenous state and society that was secular in its expression. Herein lies an interesting irony, while the new Turkey was to be modern and secular, it would be drawn on religious lines, assuming that Sunni Muslims were the only true Turks, other groups would be, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish citizens but under the title of minority (Kosebalaban, 2011;

Heper, 2007). One could argue that it was actually reverting to the pre-reform era of the Ottoman Empire in terms of social division. Though it was considered that only Turkish speaking Sunni Muslims were the true Turks, in the case of the Kurds and Laz an exception was made on the grounds of their being Muslims. This would allow for their facilitated 'Turkification' (Öktem, 2011, p27). As a result of events like the Armenian genocide in 1915, the Greek occupation of Smyra and subsequent mass retreat of not only Greek troops but also many Greek orthodox residents, combined with the redefining of the borders of the former empire, a more homogenous society was created than had been in existence during the empire. Kamrava (2011, p 58) points out that by Atatürk's time the only remaining significant minority were the Kurds. The country was already on the path towards an almost mono-ethnic demography, and the policies put in place by Atatürk brought it closer to reality.

The Treaty of Lausanne set out an agreement for an exchange of population between Greece and Turkey, with Turkey receiving Muslim populations and Greece receiving Greek Orthodox. There was also an influx of Muslims from the Balkans and the Caucasus (Kamrava, 2005, p52). A policy of dispersion of other minorities was also implemented whereby in any given area the percentage of non Turks could only range between 5% and 10%. Minorities were encouraged to give up certain ethnic privileges as set out by the Treaty of Lausanne and by previous Ottoman agreements (Şeker, 2005). Everything was passed under the banner of modernization, and enforced with militarization. When there was dissent from the Kurdish population, as happened with the rebellion of Sheikh Said in 1925, it was unequivocally quashed with great force (Öktem, 2011, p35). The one party system made sure to keep a tight reign on the control and demography of the Republic.

Social

During this period other sweeping social changes were made. These were to affect in a more tangible way the daily lives of the majority of the population. They ranged in scope from the removal of the forms of address and the introduction of surnames to the dress code, whereby Atatürk banned the Fez and introduced more westernized clothing. While the veil was looked down upon, it was not entirely banned (Kamrava, 2005). As part of the modernization and westernization process the Turkish language was to be

written not in the traditional Arabic script, but in the Latin one. There was also a campaign to rid the Turkish language of its borrowed words. This meant a Turkification of some of the phrases and expressions that came from other languages, Turkish lost at this point some of the richness and depth that it had accumulated through centuries of Ottoman multi-culturalism. Not only did it lose some depth, the country also lost one more link to the past and to the identity that it had held for centuries (Okte, 2011, pp27-28). Other linguistic changes were made, such as the call to prayer being made in Turkish and not Arabic, this was the only time when Muslims were called to prayer in a language other than Arabic. This can be viewed as a linguistic change but also as a religious one, as Kemal was known to have expressed his distaste for religion one can only assume that the decision to break with religious tradition was made easily by him. Yet, this too was not simply a question of religious belief, it signified a more profound change to the way people's lives were lived; the cornerstones of the average Turkish Muslim were being constantly shifted so that the orientation moved farther and farther away from what it had traditionally been.

Legal

Kemal wanted to secularise the country through “the consolidation of the modern Turkish state by legitimacy other than religion hitherto the basic source of authority” (Boztemur, 2005, p27), in 1922 he abolished the Sultanate, but allowed the Sultan to continue in his position as Caliph however only for two more years as he then abolished the Caliphate in 1924 (Kamrava, 2005, p52). This was a bold move on his part, as the caliph was the leader of the Islamic world, and by ending the caliphate, the connection that Muslims had to Istanbul was now severely weakened, most especially for the non Turkish Muslim community living in Turkey-the Kurds. Finally, in 1928 Islam lost its place as state religion. This shift of power from religion to state was in line with the Kemalist ideals of secularization. After the banning of the Caliphate, there needed to be a new way to rule the country, “an instrument used to create a new society rather than create a normative basis for justice” (Öktem, 2011, p29), this resulted in the complete overhaul of the legal system. The previous system of Sharia was replaced by the Swiss civil code, the Italian penal code was introduced and the German commercial code.

Economic

The economic congress of 1923 helped shape the policies of the subsequent decades. Participation was mainly from tradesmen and landowners; this was partly responsible for the emphasis placed on foreign investment and trade. Turkey's largest external trade just before the outbreak of World War II was Germany-again showing the republic's reference to the Europe of dictators. Since the crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression, there had been a shift away from liberal economic tendencies, the Anglo-saxonic model, and towards either socialist or corporatist (Kosebalaban, 2011). Here the choice would appear to have been Soviet or German. A logical continuation of the direction followed by the Republic in other areas, like the introduction of the commercial code or the similarity of discourse and policy in relation to minorities, the German economic model was adopted. It was highly praised by some members of the government². In addition a programme of intensive industrialization was undertaken, with major support from the government, reflecting the corporatist policy at the time as well as the protectionist outlook (Kamrava, 2005, p55).

The overhaul carried out by Atatürk in the initial years of the republic was principally motivated by the rejection of the Ottoman system. One major difference between Ottoman system and Kemalist system was the imposing of a uniformity and conformity to the Muslim Turkish standard, and the limiting of the autonomy that had been enjoyed by other, now vastly reduced, communities during the period of the empire according to the millet system ((Şeker, 2005). Though Kemalism attempted induce and enforce secularism in Turkey, it relied heavily on the Muslim identity to achieve its goals of unity and nationalism. Where the Ottomanists tried to create closer ties between the Ottoman subjects, in lights of the expansion of citizenship and rights, Atatürk wanted to do the very opposite, even to reverse what had already been set in motion. The aim was to fortify Sunni Muslim ethnic Turks, other groups were at best marginalized and ignored, and at its worst the republic followed violent policies of oppression against those it did not wish within its newly defined post World War One borders.

² Recep Peker, following visits to Germany and Italy in the 1930s, praised the similarities between the systems.

Ultimately Atatürk sought to replace the Ottoman system with what he believed to be a modern, opposite and infinitely superior system. The place of religion in government and legislation, and to a lesser extent society changed drastically. The functioning of many elements of Turkish society was re-thought, reviewed and in many cases it was taken apart and rebuilt in an entirely new fashion. The alterations hoped to create a modern, secular yet homogenously Muslim society. This was heavily enforced by the military, part of the machinery that had given birth to the movement in the first place. The heritage of this era, in both political terms and in societal terms is still evident in Turkey today. The foundations that were laid “have contributed significantly to the political structures and ideological fault lines of modern Turkey” (Oktem, 2011). It was during this period that Turkey lost its history and its sense of place. Many of the institutions that defined the culture had been removed. The republic moved away from its Ottoman past, as it so wished, and weakened its links with Islam causing a rupture with the Arab world. Atatürk, it seemed, would rather have his people look west than east. This was despite the fact that it was of the western powers that he had to rid his country, as they were on the verge of claiming it for themselves. It was a paradoxical wish to emulate those who had caused the most trouble for the Anatolian heartland.

1.3 1946-1980 Unstable democracy and intermittent coups

Perhaps one of the most defining elements of the decades that followed the rule of Atatürk is the reoccurrence of military coups throughout the period. The position of the army in Turkey is of a particular nature, that is to say the army has always held a prestigious and privileged position. Since Ottoman times the armed forces had always been the protector of the empire. The birth of the first republic came from within the ranks of the army, by means of Mustafa Kemal reacting to the imminent European threat. It would seem that the army favoured and continued to play this role through-out the 20th century. As external threats were no longer an issue, with NATO affording a security that had not previously existed, the army was more keenly aware of instabilities arising from internal issues such as political strife and ethnic tensions. The post-bellum decades were not lacking in the former and the latter too became increasingly visible with the passing of the decades, as Atatürk’s legacy with non Turkic and non Muslim populations weakened.

The path to parliamentary democracy was a relatively smooth one, Atatürk's successor, İnönü, introduced a series of reforms in 1946. The reforms were in part a response to international pressure. In the wake of World War II, there was a choice available; look west or look east. On one hand lay the traditional foes of Turkey in the form of the Soviets, on the other the liberal west with attractive economic and political options. In order to align itself with the west, Turkey would enter NATO, sign the Geneva Convention on human rights and it would also be strongly encouraged to implement democracy at home. This pressure eventually led to the multi-party elections of 1950, ushering in the first era of a real democracy in Turkey (Mohapatra, 2008).

The Development Party (DP) was the liberal element of the *Curiyet Halk Partisi* or Republican People's Party (RPP) which in 1946 broke away and formed an opposition party. It was elected to government in 1950; it was elected again in 1953 and 1957 with a significant majority. It had not been successful in the first elections in 1946 owing to the 'open ballot-secret tally' policy that was followed at the time (Kosebalaban, 2011, p69). In socio-political terms, the DP chose to reverse some Kemalist policies that were seen as too secularist. This was in part to sustain the appeal of the party to the rural masses for which the Muslim identity was still seen as important. Testament to this was the fact that in 1950, 18 years after the changing of the call to prayer to Turkish, the law allowed for it to be in any language, in one day it was changed back to Arabic by all mosques (Kosebalaban, 2011, p70).

In economic terms, huge improvements were made and modernization projects were undertaken. There was steady growth, an average of 9% per year, a record that remains unbroken to this day, as Kosebalaban (2011) underlines. In terms of foreign policy it was allowed to push more west than east. The RPP was fiercely anti-soviet, an echo of the historical distrust between Russia and Turkey. As the main opposition party and the party was after all still strongly linked to the military powers-that-were, acting against RPP wishes was not the optimum choice. However while initially the economic restructuring and industrialization were funded in part by the Marshall plan, later on it began to cause debt for the government (Öktem, 2011). US aid did not materialize and further requests for loans were given limited responses. The economic situation was

worsening with increased budget deficit and inflation. Menderes sought to deal with the opposition he was facing from various sides, through authoritarian measures. The government was now making moves that were quite bold. At the same time there was a brief era of rapprochement with the Soviet administration which received heavy criticism from the RPP quarter. Before a scheduled meeting in July of 1960 between Menderes and Khrushchev, the military had already intervened in May.

It was announced in May of 1960 that the 'Turkish armed forces had taken control of the administration, the assembly was shut down and the constitution suspended' (Öktem, 2011, p45). The opposition party, Menderes' Democratic Party was outlawed, decimated by imprisonment and its leader along with two other important politicians (Minister for finance and Minister for foreign affairs) were executed. This first burst of democracy was forcibly and forcefully halted. Subsequently, Turkey, under the rule of the junta received US aid to alleviate some of its economic problems.

Though the military welcomed the Republican Peoples Party into office, it merely signified three weak coalitions that did not last, as they lacked real popular support. The removal of the DP allowed a facilitated victory for the RPP in 1961, but it would soon change. Meanwhile the İnönü government had the task of rewriting the constitution. According to Mohapatra (2008), the constitution was rewritten in such a way as to allow the bureaucracy a greater control without accountability to the electorate. Öktem (2011) argues that it was the 'most liberal that Turkey has seen to date', increasing individual liberties and freedom of association. And Kosebalaban (2011, p89) states that it was "arguably Turkey's most democratic constitution, even judged by modern standards".

This would also be the era in which the National Security Council was introduced, a legislated way for the military to be involved in government. It would seem that military power, as well as civilian freedoms and bureaucratic leeway, were increased at the expense of the elected representatives. The crucial point about the 1961 constitution, it would seem, was that it gave quite a lot of liberty to the people, in terms of freedom of association and of expression. Added to this were the economic reforms and modernization projects of the 1950s, allowing for a more mobilized and informed public sphere. As Kosebalaban (2011, p87) put it "the socio-economic and educational

transformation that took place in the 1950s empowered social forces". There was an international context of increasing left-right wing political polarization. There was significant anti-soviet sentiment in the cold war context, yet there was undeniably an important left wing revolutionary feeling across Europe and in parts of the US in the late 1960s. This was partly true of Turkey. A growing student population with left wing tendencies and a resistant and also increasing extremist element became evident in right wing nationalist camp. The constitution, having weakened the powers of elected representatives may have contributed to the movement of politics out of the parliament and on 'to the streets' (Öktem, 2011, p49). A series of protests began and before long the situation had got out of hand, martial law was declared in some provinces. The situation became increasingly violent, culminating with the kidnapping of four US soldiers. It was at this point that it was felt that the government was no longer in a position to control the increasing violence and in March of 1971 the armed forces intervened.

After the coup the constitution was curtailed, with 40 articles being changed to make it stricter. The junta rid itself of the left wing elements. It had been thought that the coup had been a left wing move; however the military was quick to quash any such beliefs. Following two incidents, first the capture and subsequent murder of the Israeli ambassador; and second the capture of three British and one Canadian hostage, the junta made sure that those responsible were tried and the student leader Deniz Gemis was executed. It marked the end of that particular era of violence in Turkish history.

Mohapatra argues that the coup had no lasting effect as it was not popularly supported. However, on the other hand given the large and significantly violent protests that had taken place prior to the coup and the restrictions that came after the coup, it is not unreasonable to argue that the coup was not planned in order to assume power but to put an immediate halt to the ongoing problems of public order and to make provisions for the situation not to be repeated.

The decade following the coup of 1971 was one of uncertainty and instability. It would seem that after years of a single party government, the extent of choice for the Turkish electorate made life more difficult rather than simple. Successive governments failed to

rule with any significant majority. There were little foreign policy concerns; it was a period of forced introspection³. While the situation internationally was one of heightened cold war, Turkey, did not enter into extensive international relations at this point. Though it was closely associated with the region and it weighed a huge part in the military-political balance. However in this inward looking period there were fewer external imminent threats, the borders were well secured. Turkey's strategic position afforded it a well managed, well funded border security.

The main concern throughout most of the 1970s was forming a stable government. Part of the problem of this period, as has been noted (Mohapatra, 2008), was that there was not broad support for any major parties. This meant that coalitions were formed with fringe parties and minor interest parties. This was a particular growth period for various elements at the extremities of the political spectrum. An attempt in at the end of the decade to introduce liberalizing economic reform was not well received and would become the pretext for the strictest military involvement in Turkish politics thus far.

The internal security situation in the late 1970s leading up to the 1980 military coup was one of repeated episodes of ethnic violence and political assassinations. The lead up in political terms was marked by an insistent instability. There was infighting between parties, an inability to form stable government, and also at times a refusal of some parties to form effective coalition. There were occasions, such as the RPP's win of 43% of the vote, in which parties would achieve significant victories only to face lack of confidence in parliament. The 1971 reforms had changed the system so as to allow for smaller parties to gain more seats in government, this had two main effects. Firstly it made the task of gaining sufficient seats in parliament to hold a clear majority more difficult, and secondly it gave the smaller parties more power. They often held the balance of power in their hands, meaning that they could be more exigent in their requests. It was an era in which Islamic parties such as Erbakan's National Salvation Party came to more prominence (Kosebalaban, 2011, p105). In addition, the US administration as part of its Cold War strategy against communism encouraged the idea of the Islamic Green belt around the Soviet Union. This landscape of much of this belt

³ The major exception to this was the invasion of Cyprus in 1974

would change however in the couple of years before the Coup of 1980. For one the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union happened, and perhaps evens more significantly the Iranian revolution of 1979. Two important buffer countries had moved out of the US sphere of influence. These two events put Turkey much more on the international geopolitical map and moved it higher on the international agenda.

The economic problems over the course of the decade had worsened as the years passed. The lack of political stability only served to aggravate the problems that ranged from inflation, to increasing debt and rising unemployment. There was aid available that would have gone a long way towards solving the economic troubles of Turkey. However the RPP government of 1979 was unhappy with the IMF conditions that were proposed and refused. Instead it looked for private credit, a move which was severely criticised by the opposition and led to the fall of Ecevit's government. When Demirel subsequently came to power and tried to implement the conditions there was widespread protest and resistance to the conditions. The Revolutionary Trade Workers Union prepared a series of strikes that began to overwhelm the already weak and unstable country. Violence in the east of the country was also growing. At this point Mohapatra tells us that it was with 'reluctance' that the military chose to step in.

1.4 The Özal years and beyond

The military made the decision to step into Turkish politics in September of 1980 in what was the toughest military intervention thus far. Almost the entire political system was shut down. The operating parties were outlawed and politicians were banned for a period of 10 years. The constitution of 1982 was passed with 91% approval, a fact that could indicate its immense popular support. The country had been going deeper in crisis in the latter years of the 1980s and the poll result would suggest a response of sheer relief from the Turkish people. However it is important to be mindful of another element. The polls were closely watched by the military and the ballot papers were contained in transparent envelopes, a fact which Öktem (2011) relates in order to demonstrate what he believes to have been a very tightly controlled result.

The constitution sought to reel in entirely all the freedoms that had been laid out by the 1961 constitution. The 1961 constitution was a liberal one, and the guardian state was not in approval. There is a question as to whether the military helped, along with other secret groups, to induce the disintegration of the liberal bases of the constitution. Or whether it merely watched by the sidelines until the time was ripe to bring the whole system back into place. Nonetheless restrictions were put on freedom of expression and of association. The constitution also extended the powers of the National Security Council, giving it more say in the day to day running of the country.

This particular coup is interesting as it can be seen from a variety of viewpoints;

1. As the military having been forced to step in as the country had become out of reasonable control;
2. As external forces pushing for it to happen and facilitating it for broader global strategy;
3. As a natural evolution of the situation given the internal political and economic circumstances.

Which one is true is impossible to say, what can be said is the tone that was taken by the military in carrying out the coup and the subsequent situation. And also the effect that it had on the political and economic horizon as events began to unfold during the 1980s.

There is an impression as given by Mohapatra that the coup of 1980 happened swiftly. It is not the only reference to speed that occurs when discussing this, Öktem also notes a particular abruptness however of a different nature. In his case it is the fact that the many assassinations and shot outs that had been persecuting Turkish society came to a halt almost overnight. Also, the military took a tough stance but appeared to have popular support, so it would seem that the previous decade of instability and of weak multiparty, coalition governments was judged to be an inadequate way to run the country. The population was not happy with that system and was only too happy to approve the one introduced by the president General Evren though it was much more restrictive than its predecessor. It would almost seem that in this case the people wanted less and not more. In the system where everyone was fairly represented, a feasible way to move forward in government had not been found. Perhaps it is also important to note that this was an era of increased violence and clashes with the Kurdish population and

so it is possible that the constitution of 1982 was accepted partly out of fear. This was perhaps the coup in which the military took the toughest line. Öktem underlines how the violence that followed the September coup in 1980 was harsher than had followed the other coups. The Kurds in particular were targeted as the violence that took place in the prisons in the Kurdish regions was focused against the Kurdish language and people⁴.

The elections that took place three years later were organized so as to give a semblance of democracy. However, what had been assumed would be the outcome, was not. To the surprise of the military it was the third candidate, mostly overlooked and not supported by the military that claimed 45% of the vote. The *Anavatan Partisi* or Motherland Party, with its liberal neo-Ottoman outlook surprisingly won the elections. It was led by Turgut Özal, who had solid economic experience in Demirel's government and during the military regime.

The economic measures that Ecevit had refused to even attempt to implement and that Demirel had tried and failed now went ahead. This was in part due to the lack of leftist opposition. The leftist camp had been removed from the equation and therefore did not pose a problem of resisting the new measures. This lack of left was important in the liberalisation of the economy. The post war decades had been highly protectionist of the few industries that were not state run and the rest was strictly controlled by the state. The rule of competition was not present in the economy at the time, and it was a huge task to modernise the economy sufficiently to be able to withstand the battering of international market forces.

The measures and successive economic policies followed by Özal were as nothing short of as Öktem (2011) put it 'herculean'. Kosebalaban has attributed some of the 'drastic liberalization' to Özal's previous experience in the World Bank. The import substitution model that had been used was replaced with an export lead growth and industrial one (Privatisation Administration of Turkey, 2010). The country went from triple to single figure inflation. The market was massively liberalized and if there had been someone to

⁴ There were a variety of brutal policies enforced at the time, regard things such as the use of the Kurdish language.

oppose it, there was no way for them to oppose-expression having been curtailed along with working politicians. In economic terms, Turkey was in a far better state after the intervention that it had been before. The Turkish economy had “opened up to wider competition from within” (Burak, 2011, p63). It was integrated in the global market in such a way that it was well prepared for the globalised world that would emerge post Cold War.

The fact that that Özal was partly Kurdish in origin allowed for interesting cultural balance, though the clear focus was still economy. There was also a liberalisation of the media, allowing for private television networks to broadcast (Burak, 2011). Changes to the constitution allowed the previously outlawed politicians to return into politics. And interestingly, in 1987 Özal made an unprecedented move by requesting for two generals to step down, subsequently nominating the new chief of staff. It showed the desire to remove some of the power that the military had regained with the 1980 coup (Kosebalaban, 2011, p119).

Foreign policy was also quite bold under Özal; he was attempting to prepare Turkey for the globalised world it would face in the post cold war era. He followed a variety of assertive foreign policies, especially with regard to the immediate geographical region. Interestingly, after the fall of the Soviet Union the central Asian Turkic states would become much more important in economic terms as the markets for Turkish exportation. These countries would also be open to influence in cultural and political terms, under the banner of pan Turkism, and open to international influence from larger countries in the region with respect to national political and governmental structures (Öktem, 2011, p70).

In 1991 Özal retired from active politics to become president, a role while mostly titular still held significance in foreign policy terms. After the death of Özal in 1993 Demirel stepped forward to become president, leaving somewhat of a political vacuum (Kosebalaban, 2011). The country was deficient of experienced politicians. The gap that was left by the departure of both Özal and Demirel from active party politics was filled principally by two candidates with significantly less experience. Firstly, Erdal İnönü, son of İsmet İnönü, led the Kemalist Social Democratic People’s Party and secondly,

Tansu Çiller headed the True Path party (Arslan, 2005, p137). This was an era of increased support for one of the only old school politicians left, Necmettin Erbakan and his *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party). The area in which Çiller was most active was the EU ambient. In 1995 the customs union came into effect and in 1996 the free trade area, though there was some internal scepticism about the benefits for Turkey out of these agreements and questions as to whether it truly benefits the Turkish economy (Bardakçı, 2010).

Çiller came to power as Prime Minister in the context of mounting PKK activity in the east, partially resulting from the turbulence and increased activity subsequent to the Gulf war. This was added to by the Syrian policy of harbouring PKK rebels in exchange for political clout with Turkey. This meant that Çiller was forced to allow the military to take control of the situation. At the same time the military was pursuing an increasingly friendly policy towards Israel. This was partially out of the belief that democracy can and should work together. And can be attributed to the need to maintain the favour of the US as part of broader geopolitical considerations.

As the influence of the military continued to increase, there was a shift as Erbakan's Welfare party gained more popularity, employing a strongly Islamic discourse which was designed to include the Kurdish element of the electorate (Burak, 2011). As Erbakan took up office as Prime Minister his repeated Islamic discourse was not well received by the secularist generals, leading to what has been called the Turkish 'soft coup' (Kosebalban, 2011, p141). There was also some civil support of the military overthrowing the government in 1997 as Burak (2011) terms it 'the post modernist coup', as it was seen as too Islamist. The intervention sought to target the economic and social bases and political agents.

The military coup of 1980 can be viewed in many respects as the harshest to date. However there is an irony to the fact that economically the country benefitted hugely from the Özal's time in office. The liberalisation though mainly economic introduced important elements for civil society, as Burak (2011) has pointed out. The opening left in politics in the 1990s did not prove functionally beneficial to the country as the lack of charismatic leader meant a return to military decision making in matters of the state. It

also signalled the rise in Islamic nationalism, from the victory at the polls of Erbakan to the popularity of other pro Islamic political figures. This period in Turkish political history is one of significant importance, laying out the form of the current political bodies.

II. Dynamics of EU-Turkish Relations

2.1 History of relationship with EU

“The history of the Turkish people has been a journey towards the west starting in central Asia in the 4th century” (Özcan, 2012)

The above quote is a particularly interesting and appropriate summary of the relationship between Turkey and Europe, going back centuries. In a more concrete format the desire to orient itself west can be traced directly to the time of Kemal and his belief that the only way for Turkey to move forward was to follow in the footsteps of Europe (Erdogdu 2002; Öktem 2011). Its alliance with Britain and France in the Crimean war had afforded it inclusion in the concert of Europe and perhaps this was the moment of realisation that real inclusion in Europe was within grasp. As mentioned previously⁵ Turkey had fallen somewhat behind the modernisation that had taken place across Europe. For some this was the cause of the weakening and downfall of the Ottoman Empire, leaving it vulnerable to the imperialist wishes of Europe. Atatürk’s vision was to follow a European style of secularised modernity. The elites in Turkey enjoyed great European influence in the education system. This then filtered down into the mindset and outlook of many in the bureaucratic and political elites and importantly into the military which was the backbone of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey after the end of the single party rule. It was also not shy in asserting its beliefs as to how the country should be run and on an almost decadal basis enforced these beliefs militarily on the country by means of coups, interventions and military ‘encouragement’⁶.

The historical backdrop of the Turkish request to the European Economic Community is of particular importance when considering the whole process. The place of Turkey in the scheme of international relations has been marked throughout history by its geographical location and its need for defence against its neighbours. This was true of

⁵ Please refer to chapter 1 “Ottoman”

⁶ Erbakan resigned in 1997 after the military requested him to sign Treaties contrary to his normal political discourse.

the era surrounding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The alliance of Russia with its traditional allies of France and Britain, combined with an ideological approximation that had developed with Germany meant that Turkey would choose the losing side in the subsequent ‘world’ showdown (Öktem 2011 p33). The mistake was not repeated, and the post World War I period was one of isolation and introversion for the young state (Kosebalaban 2011, pp53-54). In the Second World War Turkey showed more reticence in aligning itself with one side. In the end it sided with the allies which proved in the long run a valuable choice. In 1949, subsequent to the Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was founded; Turkey then joined in 1952. This was hugely important to Turkey not least in terms of funding for its army (Kosebalaban, 2011). As has been pointed out, the Cold War was the perfect opportunity for Turkey to step up and step forward in foreign policy terms, as the friendly buffer zone between Europe and the USSR (Özcan, 2010).

The European Economic Community⁷ was founded by the signing of the Treaty of Rome by six European leaders at Campidoglio, Rome, 1957. A mere two years after its establishment Turkey applied for associate status to the same. This move showed the determination of the Turkish republic to orient itself firmly west. Not only this but the speed of Turkey’s request to join a union that had just come into being and consisted solely of a limited number of Western European countries is notable at the very least. The most part of Turkey in geographical terms is located in Asia; without dwelling excessively on the geographical definitions of Europe, we may still see what a leap of imagination the request might have been at the time. Yet, viewed in the geopolitical context of the time, it seemed to make perfect sense. During the cold war era when the position of Turkey in relation to Europe was examined, security and strategy far outweighed cultural concerns (Erdogdu 2002). Therefore it would appear that the acceptance of Turkey as an associate member in 1963 with the Ankara agreement was a logical response to the security needs of Europe and the west at the time.

The Ankara agreement gave a time frame for the various phases of accession. These would be the preparatory phase, the transitional period and eventually the attainment of

⁷ Henceforth referred to as the EU

full membership. Turkey has undergone many processes and changes in the 52 years since the initial request. So too has the European Union, yet none of these has led to Ankara's accession. In fact, it is the longest running application process. In the meantime the Union has grown from 6 founding members to a 27 strong Union. This includes a number of countries that did not even exist when the initial community was established.

The strategic importance of Turkey during the Cold War period is something that cannot be overstated. The desire of the west and of NATO to ensure good relations with this key nation was tantamount to the internal desire of the Turkish army to keep in line with the western oriented strategy of Atatürk (Kosebalaban, 2011). This ensured that the EU issue was kept firmly on the table even when the process was at somewhat of a standstill. Simultaneously, Turkey was going through a period of adjustment and at times internal upset which did not allow for the process to move forward in any real way⁸. The decades of transition to democracy were marked with intermittent periods of military coups, ethnic tensions, economic challenges and popular manifestations. The 1970s in particular was a turbulent era for Turkish national politics, and also with regard to the Kurdish struggle. As the 1961 constitution had opened up the political forum, and education had improved, the student population not only grew but also became more radicalised both to the left, to communism and soviet sympathies but also the right to nationalist and radical Islamic tendencies⁹. For these reasons the internal and pressing security concern outweighed the external political ones.

The situation underwent considerable change with the arrival of the 1980s. In 1983, just three years after one of the harshest military coups thus far experienced in Turkey, democratic elections were once again held. The third candidate, believed to be the outsider with little chance of winning, surprisingly took 45% of the vote (Öktem, 2011). This introduced a new era in Turkish politics and economic policy. The government took on a serious programme of tackling the reform of the Turkish economy (Burak,

⁸ Though it should be noted there was an additional protocol introduced in 1970 regarding the proposed Customs Union

⁹ See chapter 1

2011). It was during this period of renewed vigour for economic reform that the Özal government applied for full membership to the EU. Thanks to the reforms put in place during the Özal administration in Turkey, the economic advantages of allowing Turkey to join the EU became more apparent. The Turkish economy began to evolve into a potentially powerful one. The liberalisation that was implemented helped not only to open import substitute economy as well as to force the state supported industries to revolutionise and adapt to the new market conditions (Burak, 2011).

There was a significant shift in global dynamics in the aftermath of the Cold War. Turkey moved from being a top priority country to being one of continued interest but with nothing of the same commitment. In parallel to this, Islam and especially radical Islamic moved quickly up the list of preoccupations for the western world. During the Cold War a policy of encouraging the growth of Islam to counter the spread of Communism had been supported. This 'Islamic green belt policy' can be seen as having been quite effective in some areas¹⁰. So while at one level the importance of Turkey as the buffer zone country between the west and the communist east had disappeared, it seemed that a new sort of relevance was emerging in a context of growing Islamic sentiment.

The Europeanization project continued at a slow pace. The 1987 application was put off by internal European commitments but in 1995 a customs union was agreed up that came into effect in 1996. This opened up a large amount of trade between the EU and Turkey. The argument has been made that given the nature of this agreement and the benefits to both parties¹¹ that eventual membership would not be necessary, or at least some of the advantages normally associated with accession would have been already experienced by both parties (Kosebalaban, 2011). Though the application had been made in 1987 only following the 1999 Helsinki summit was approval given to the request for candidate status. It had taken a full 40 years from the initial interest to move to a position of candidate. Part of the delay had come from the internal difficulties in

¹⁰ Somewhat paradoxical considering the policy had been implemented by the west to counter Communism in the first place.

¹¹ Though admittedly the benefits took longer to filter into the Turkish economy as the initially a deficit was created through over importation

Turkey and in the latter years had come from the EU decision to prioritise other reforms that had been undertaken.

This now meant that in order to be approved for accession the Copenhagen criteria which included human rights, rule of law and the free market had to be put into practice (Hakki, 2006). Since the attainment of candidacy Turkey has worked hard at passing through parliament and implementing appropriate and sufficient reforms to allow the accession talks to move forward (Brljavac, 2011; Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009). There have a series of constitutional amendments covering areas such as human rights, the death penalty and also towards finding solutions to the Kurdish question (Özcan, 2011). This includes the opening up of regulations regarding civil society organisations, broadcasting and language restriction. In 2004 there was a change in legislation regarding the national Security Council in reducing the power of the military (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009). The EU in return monitors its progress with annual reports¹².

As Turkey moved out of the turbulent 1990s into the new millennium with the goal of joining the EU now closer at hand, the process suffered a serious setback in terms of perception and public opinion. Following the September 11th attacks and the ensuing war on terror, the Muslim world was instantly jolted back, in the eyes of many Europeans, to the often antagonistic status of the Ottomans. The tide had begun to turn on the rising issue of Islam (Cavanaugh, 2007). In addition to this, since the enlargement of 2004 there has been a marked decline in support for Turkey's entering the EU (Moxon-Browne&Ustun, 2009). The 2004 enlargement included one of the most problematic areas when considering the relationship between Europe and Turkey: the Republic of Cyprus. Not only this, but there were fears regarding the ever expanding size of the Union at one level, and simultaneously the cultural capacity to absorb at another; both of these concerns came from France (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009).

In October of 2005 accession negotiations began but the path has not proven entirely smooth. Since the council decision in 2008, eight of the thirty three chapters of the

¹² Reports are readily accessible on the Europa website.

accession process have not been opened¹³. These are chapters that relate to the issue of Cyprus and the additional protocol. And according to the EU until the problems have been resolved the chapters will not be opened (EU, 2012). The JDP government has made important progress nonetheless. In 2008 a new accession partnership was adopted, a review of the one adopted in 2006. The EU commends the progress that has been made so far but has expressed concerns that the pace of the reform has slowed significantly. With respect to human rights serious issues have been raised regarding legislation in the area and the criminal justice system (Human Rights Watch World Report, 2011).

As has been reported by the EU report the economic impact of Turkish accession would not be very large given the integration that already exists. This in some way gives credence to what has been pointed out about the scepticism regarding the Customs Unions (Bardakçı, 2010). The left claimed that the union would provide advantage to the EU without guaranteeing Turkey's entrance to the union. As Kosebalaban explains, the common market or "*ortak pazar*" would ensure Europe's access to a market "*pazar*" while the Turkish would merely be the partners or "*ortak*". Thus, the economic gain would exist without the responsibility (Kosebalaban 2011 p131).

The Gastarbeiter Question

Central to the debate on the accession to the EU has been the question of immigration. In a union where "Turks represent the largest third country nationals legally residing in the EU" (EU Report, 2007), it is not surprising. This movement dates back to the post World War II period. As Germany and other countries were experiencing a burst of growth following the war, it became increasingly apparent there was a need to fill the extra vacancies in the labour market. Many of these vacancies for manual labour were filled by guest workers or *gastarbeiter*, as they became known, with a great deal of them being sourced in Turkey. There was a facilitation of visas between the two countries and more than 100, 000 workers left Turkey annually between 1961 and 1974

¹³ The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.

(UN paper, 2009). This is an important element in the dynamics of how the relationship between Europe and Turkey evolved. As Germany is one of the most powerful members of the community and holds sway especially in economic terms, this has afforded Turkey a privileged position in the past, and a cultural approximation more recently. Germany and German-speaking countries in Europe have been the main gateways for Turkish migrants (Akman, 2011). However there was also a realisation by Germany during the 1973 recession, of the impact that Turkey's accession could have on migration (Erdogdu, 2002).

The post World War II era was marked by an exit from the economic strain that the war had taken on the continent of Europe. Fuelled by funds from the Marshall plan, the rebuilding of Europe began. Improvements to industry and education also took place. This meant in part that there was now a growing need for labour, coupled with a post war shortage of labour. Parallel to this the Turkish government had set forth a strategy of exporting the surplus of labour power as part of the five year plan 1962-1967 (UN paper, 2009). To remedy this many Europe countries signed agreements with neighbouring countries to facilitate visa processes in order to encourage guest workers to migrate to fill the gaps in the labour market. This was true of the many immigrants to France from former colonies, as well as the thousands of workers that went from Turkey to Germany as *gastarbeiter* under the bilateral labour recruitment agreement.

One of the effects that this migration would have in the subsequent years, but also decades, was a phenomenon of follow up migration. That is, in addition to the continuing migration in a south-north trajectory, there were also the cases where family reunification meant thousands more immigrated to countries like Germany and France. This had not been foreseen by the governments and in many cases the correct infrastructure was not in place to deal with the continuing immigration. There had been a belief that once a decline in the labour market set in, as projects ended, that those who had arrived would return to their respective homelands (Cocodia, 2007). However this was not the case. Many had settled, begun families and enjoyed a better quality of life. So rather than returning to the friends and family they missed in their home countries, instead they encouraged their loved ones to join them in the new life. Almost all of the current Turkish migration to Europe is of this type; family reunification (EU report on

Issues, 2004). This is a noted occurrence in issues regarding migratory flows (Heering et al., 2004). One of the relevant effects of this movement on the question of Turkish relations with Europe is the negative evaluation that had emerged as a result of the Turkish communities in Germany. One of the problems of this migration was that, as often happens; those who migrated in the 1950s and 1960s were those who came from the poorest parts of Turkey and with the least education. The economy was experiencing somewhat of an economic upturn resulting from the post war boom that was taking place and from the economic plans of the government. Improvements in the economy stemmed from the link that Turkey had with Germany and from international funding. The result of this was that there was sufficient employment in the larger urban areas and for those with a higher level of education. This meant that there was not a brain drain type emigration to Europe, but an emigration of those from more socially disadvantaged sections of society who then went to make up the unskilled work force overseas.

There was a notable the lack of preparation of the part of the Turkish government, in many cases the process was simply the receiving agency providing the worker with a visa and nothing more (i.e. no introductory language or cultural courses to this new environment). The overall long term effect of this has been a difficulty on the part of many immigrants in their ability to successfully integrate into the host society¹⁴. In general it has resulted in an often negative perception of immigrant communities which in turn has seriously damaged the public opinion with regard to the accession of Turkey to the EU.

As Erdogdu (2002) has put it “Turkey desired not to be left behind Greece” and this was one of the main motivation behind its initial request for associate status. It would seem that Turkey has always been a useful ally for Europe, a marriage of convenience as it were. During the cold war Turkish alliance was strategically very important, and not only this but the global players made sure that the alliance was well rewarded militarily for the Turks, knowing that military capability has been an important point for the

¹⁴ This has in turn had its effect on the uptake in radicalism as a reactionary movement to the hostility experienced in some areas.

country throughout history. During the 1990s the interest may have dwindled somewhat but it was sparked afresh and with great vigour in the post 9/11 global reshuffling.

It has been argued that the economic and political requirement to join the EU are not consistently applied and that in fact Turkey qualifies on some levels more than other countries has have already acceded (Erdogdu 2002). “For more than four decades, discretion, non-transparency, temporization, ambivalence and constructive ambiguity have been perpetual characteristics of EU-Turkey relations” (Serboş, 2008, p5). Given the length of the process, and its sporadic nature this statement is not a shocking evaluation of the nature of the relationship.

2.2 Areas of difficulty

There are a number of key areas in which Turkey encounters resistance with relation to EU accession. Perhaps the most visible and dominant is the Cyprus question, which stands out as the most prominent given that Cyprus is a member of the EU. Secondly, the question of the Kurdish population is also often cited as a major obstacle in the development of EU-Turkish relations. In international terms the Armenian diaspora and the question of the Armenian genocide and its recognition have both created problems for Turkey, especially in its relations with certain countries worldwide whose populations include a significant number of Armenians. The impact of each of these topics is central to the understanding the nature of EU-Turkish relationship and the progression of negotiations.

The diverse populations within the borders of Turkey have been viewed as problematic for successive governments on a variety of levels. Much of the tension can be traced back to the policies of the Kemalist era which sought to create a uniform and homogenous society. This resulted in harsh and restrictive policies towards the elements within the Turkish borders that were perceived as not acceptable. The Republic failed to even consider the possibility of integration of the multiple communities in Anatolia at the time. Assimilation was an option for a number, such as the Kurds, and for others exchange, neglect and decimation were the fate. These issues have continued to generate problematic situations over the decades.

The Armenians

In 1915 a number in the region of 600,000 and 1.5 million people lost their lives in what has become known as the Armenian genocide. It was during the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress and as part of the programme of creating a new Muslim territory (Öktem, 2011). The details of the deaths are subject to massive international debate and many contradicting accounts and stories surround it. A number of things are clear, that a large number of people died and that to this day it continues to create problems on an international level for Turkey.

The problems it presents are of two distinct kinds, firstly in terms of relations with Armenia but secondly and more significantly on the international stage, with the Armenian diaspora. The two are divergent in nature and it should be noted that there is some clash of interests between them. This is in relation to the acknowledgement of the genocide and the level of its importance. As Baser (2009) has pointed out, the Armenian population living in Armenia is concerned with resolving a number of issues with its neighbours and encouraging economic development whereas the Armenian population tends to prioritise the recognition of the genocide. It has been argued by clerics within the Turkish Armenian community that the issue of recognition of the genocide internationally has made the resolution of problems between the groups at home more difficult. Also membership of the EU has arisen as an issue that is received differently in the Armenian Diaspora community versus the Turkish Armenian community. With the latter supporting the move, stating that it would help to move forward the resolution of problems

Within the context of the EU, France is home to some 300,000 ethnic Armenians which lead to the recent legislation regarding the denial of the Armenian genocide. It is illegal to deny this genocide in France and also in Switzerland. France has also followed a policy of caution when it comes to the accession of Turkey to the EU (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009; Tocci, 2007). This can be attributed in part to internal concerns of integration. The country has, in the last number of decades, been witness to rising social problems in the question of integration of immigrants. France has a great deal with which to play with in terms of leverage and wields a degree of power in relation to

overall EU policy, thus pressure from the Armenian diaspora is well placed on French politicians.

There are three main elements in the modern dispute with Turkey, Turkish-Armenian relations; the opening of the borders between the two countries and resolving the Karabakh area issue. As it is illegal in France and Switzerland to deny the genocide, it is illegal to claim it happened in Turkey, as that would denigrate Turkishness (OKtem, 2011). Developing good relations with neighbours in the region is essential to the Armenian economy. One of the road blocks in the normalising of relations with Armenia is the conflict with Azerbaijan which of great importance to the Turkish regional policy. The EU has often stressed the needs to correctly address the situation and help find resolutions to the unresolved issues that persist.

The Kurds

“The Kurdish problem is one of the major barriers to Turkey’s accession to the EU” (Kuzu, 2010). Not only that but it is estimated that there are between 850,000 and 2 million Kurds dispersed in Europe (Baser, 2012). This is an issue of considerable importance to the European Union, to the Kurdish diaspora and of course to the Turkish government at home that still, in 2012, is embroiled in the endless court cases, cyclical violence and international disapproval.

To understand the Kurdish issue from the perspective of the Turkish government it is importance to bear in mind the roots of the nation that it modern Turkey. One of the key aspects of the country is the goal of maintaining it intact, unified and without separatists. The point has been made that one of the major advantages of Turkey joining the EU would be the resolution of the Kurdish question. Given the fact that if Turkey joined then any ideas of forming an independent Kurdistan or joining a Kurdish union with Kurdish Iraq would be out of the question (Council on Foreign Policy, 2006). However the resistance to the division of Kurds from Turks is not the complete picture,

The Kurds throughout most of the history of the Ottoman Empire had maintained an amicable relationship with ethnic Turks as they all formed part of the Muslim *millet*. Though the *millet* system grouped people according to religion, it was nonetheless quite

accommodating with regard to the many religions and ethnicities within its borders. As Şeker (2005, p64) says the Empire “fully recognized the multicultural characteristics of its society”. Later on, when this system was replaced and following the fall of the empire, the unification process of Turkey moved away from its religious segregation to a secular state. This worsened the Kurdish position as there was significant Kurdish resistance to the secular practices of the republic (Şeker, 2005). The republic focused on a restricted recipe for Turkish citizenship which sought to exclude other minorities. Until this point the Kurds had been an accepted and welcome part of the new system. The common threat of the Armenians in the east had ensured a certain amount of loyalty to the central Turkish government. The common Muslim identity had also maintained the link to the ethnic Turks, however when the caliphate was abolished in 1924 this broke a large part of the mutual understanding that had sealed the bond between the two ethnicities.

The rise of Turkish nationalism was an opposing force to the inclusion of the various multi ethnic groups in Turkey at the time. The Turkish national ideal sought to create a homogenous society of ethnically Turkish Sunni Muslims. In an era that popularized, eugenics and social Darwinist theories around the world, it was not surprising that the same fever of exclusion, superiority and ethnic prioritization took grip in Turkey. The implementation of the mono ethnic policies was in keeping with the feeling of Europe at the time; there was “a strong nationalist fervour in the 1920s and 1930s” (Şeker, 2005, p64). Certain groups were considered fit for assimilation and the others were expelled (Öktem, 2011, p33).

The Kurds were severely restricted by the regime of Ataturk, as part of the plan to create a homogenous nation state. First it was done by way of benign neglect, and subsequently by proactive legislation to curb the use and promotion of the language and culture (Öktem, 2011). It also included the banning of political clubs or associations with ethnic ties and the imposition of Turkish as the language of education went a long way towards restricting the survival and promotion of a number of groups but most predominantly the Kurds. Benign neglect has been noted as being a way to reach equality (within liberal egalitarianism) but in this case it was not equality but assimilation was expected (Kuzu, 2011). Instead, the outcome was revolts by the

Kurdish people which in turn resulted in further restrictions. In this way the dialogue between the ruling forces and the Kurdish population in eastern Anatolia grew increasingly one of prolonged and retributive violence.

Öktem describes how in 1925 in south eastern Turkey, the Kurds rebelled under the leadership of Sheikh Said. They were harshly suppressed by air bombardment and their leader Sheikh Said was executed. This was just the beginning of the seemingly endless cycle of violence that has played out in the region. One of the tactics used to weaken the Kurdish resistance was to disperse the Kurdish population among Turks. Predominantly Kurdish areas were also repopulated with Turks to help this dispersal. It was used as a way to offset any movement that could formulate, so local leaders were moved to different areas (Kamrava, 2005). Heper (2007) posits the theory that in order to ensure Kurdish loyalty to the state rather than to the local chieftain, the laws of 1934 were enacted. The state was the entity to be adhered to and legislation should reflect that. He goes on to outline that part of the oppression came with a fear of the central powers of the religious fanaticism of this group of Muslims and so certain religious practices were outlawed. The 1934 the Enactment law legislated for cultural and linguistic assimilation with no room for maintaining distinct identity. It was secular, modern and western; it was part of the Turkification of the non Turks (Şeker, 2005, p66).

Over the next number of decades, the Kurdish movement grew. In the 1970s as Turkey became restless on many levels and political participation increased, so too did the involvement in the Kurdish cause. Like other political activism at the time, it also became violent. During the 1980s and 1990s the violence continued to grow in the Kurdish provinces. The central government had “neither the power nor will to stem the tide of violence” (Öktem, 2011, p74). One of the turning points came after a prominent political activist had been killed by counter terrorism units. Police opened fire on the funeral crowd and a number of civilian were killed. It was one of the many incidents that peppered the 1990s, attack and reprisal from both sides were the defining characteristics of the relationship between the Kurds and the state. In 1999 a ceasefire was agreed but there was again renewed violence in 2005 and 2006.

The Justice and Development Party carried out important reforms in many areas affecting non Muslims and Kurds such as broadcasting, freedom of speech and language courses (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009). However as Human Rights Watch recently reported the Erdogan “government has not prioritized human rights reforms since 2005”. There has also been an escalation in violence between the PKK and state forces. Still outside of the individual incidents and the ebb and flow of news relating to various acts of aggression by either party, the fact still remains that while the government has made some progress towards the many human rights abuses and punctures in civil liberties yet the judiciary has failed to keep pace. There are countless cases of charges and convictions against individuals without sufficient evidence. There are serious deficits in Turkey’s criminal justice system (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Though the Kurdish problem is more of an internal one, it is nonetheless quite important in terms Turkey’s international image and its human rights record.

2.3 The Cyprus Issue

“The island has been considered vital for the country [Turkey] since Cyprus is only 70 km from the Turkish coast and is the biggest island to its East, controlling access to ports in the region.” (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009)

Cyprus is an issue of significant importance when considering the relationship between the EU and Turkey. The question has been indicated time and again by the EU as one of the main blockages to the accession of Turkey (Hakki, 2006; EU, 2007:2010). As it stands 8 of the chapters in the accession negotiations that have been close relate directly to the divided island. The issue has moved in and out of the limelight over the course of the last number of decades and the hopes for resolution have been dashed repeatedly. Since the opening of accession talks with Turkey in 2005 it would seem more important than ever that the issue be resolved.

Historically it has been placed high on the agenda of various Turkish governments-for example the Ecevit RPP government of 1974 when it gave orders for the invasion of the northern part of the island. Ecevit believed that this manoeuvre would be significant enough to the Turkish people that based on his improved public standing a majority

government would be within his reach (Kosebalaban). This was not the case but it nonetheless proves the perceived importance of the island to even internal Turkish politics. The disagreements that emerged regarding the issue also led the Greek government to threaten to veto the entire EU enlargement process (Yiangou 2002). Incidents like this underline the relative importance of the issue to the parties concerned, especially in terms of those with more clout in international political terms. Where Turkey will often tactically use its membership of NATO, Greece will use its membership of the EU-bringing not only the two countries to loggerheads but at times causing conflict between the two organisations. This is most evident when regarding the European Security and Defence Policy. The EU plans to request the use of NATO weapons and technology for the common defence force was blocked by Turkey out of fear that it would be used on Turkish soil (Christou 2002). These examples however relevant fail to fully portray the entirety of this complex situation. For this a more detailed summary is needed.

To gain a broader understanding of the conflict it is necessary to briefly outline the events that have taken place since the initial guerrilla struggle that began to take shape in the 1950s. The island was under British control and there was a Greek Cypriot guerrilla movement to obtain the island's independence. There is some implication that the British, wishing to retain control of the island and viewing the Greek element as the more difficult supported the strengthening of the Turkish element to pit them against the Greek Cypriots in a more cynical review (Tocci and Kovziridze, 2004), or to ally with the Turkish Cypriots in an alternative reading of the situation. As the situation became more tense talks were undertaken to secure the independence of the island. Following the talks in Zurich and then in London the island achieved its independence from Britain in 1960. The Greek prime minister and Menderes of the Democratic Party signed the treaty in London.

“The London/Zurich agreements appointed Turkey, Greece and the UK as the guarantors for Cyprus and they should be consulted in any development regarding the islands' political status.” (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009)

The treaty laid out specific conditions for the new Republic of Cyprus which excluded any possibility neither of *enosis* – joining of the island with Greece – nor of *taksim* – joining with Turkey. The political structure was divided based on a ratio of 7:3, to reflect the Greek Cypriot majority. The posts of president and vice president would be shared between Greek and Turkish candidates respectively. There was dissatisfaction among Greek Cypriots who felt the ratios were unfair, in particular in terms of policing where it was 6:4, especially given the fact that the Turkish Cypriot population was only 18% (Tocci and Kovziridze, 2004).

There followed an era of political and paramilitary tension. Greek Cypriots had proposed amendments which were rejected by the Turkish. And at the same time paramilitary violence by the EOKA-B increased which was supported by the Greek junta (Kosebalaban 2012 p106). The junta finally staged a coup in 1974. This resulted in the endangerment of the residents of the island. Given that the northern half of the island was mainly populated by Turkish Cypriots the Turkish government under the leadership of Ecevit chose to step in to protect the Turkish Cypriots. The parallel argument of course remains that the move was strategic in nature rather than humanitarian (Suvarierol 2003).

Following the fall of the military junta in Greece, Cypriot President Makarios returned to the island. The new government in Greece also declared its intention to apply for membership the European Community. The combination of these elements shifted international support to the Greek Cypriot side¹⁵. Given that the threat to the Turkish Cypriots had been removed, it would have seemed that there was no longer a need for the army to remain however the Turkish occupation continued and in 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared. The international community was wholly disapproving of the military moves on the island in 1974, with the UN demanding for an immediate end to the “foreign military intervention” in the republic of Cyprus.

The decades that followed the Turkish invasion of the island were speckled with a recurrent series of failed talks, which for one reason or another and due to the roles

¹⁵ Reflected in the reports from the Security Council at the time.

played by both parties were not successful. In the meantime Greece joined the EU in 1981. Turkey submitted its application formally in 1987 however the EU put off further accession until after 1993. In 1990 the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership to the EU. This was initially accepted on the basis of a resolution to the question. However after refusal on the part of the Turkish Cypriot element to enter talks, the EU published Agenda 2000 accepting Cyprus for the following round of enlargement despite the continuing conflict. Accession negotiations then began in 1998. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots strongly protested this, as EU *had* accepted candidacy of the whole island (Yiangou 2002).

The Accession negotiations put a serious spanner in the works and Cypriot leader Denktash refused further talks after a round of talks in New York. These talks were followed by further proximity talks but still to no avail. One of the reasons for the breakdown of these particular talks had been the lack of recognition for Denktash as a head of government. The Secretary General also reported after the proximity talks that “I was never able to convince Mr. Denktash that the realities of the Cyprus problem were not only the realities on the ground but the realities of international law and international politics” (UN Report, 2003). The impression given by the report is that moving away from ideological questions proved difficult as did the effort to emphasise that there were certain international legal norms that had to be respected. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Turkey states that the Turkish side always supported the efforts carried out under the good offices mission of the United Nations Secretary-General towards finding a just and viable settlement to the Cyprus issue¹⁶.

While it would have seemed that accession would be an incentive or a resolution of the problem, it proved to be more troublesome in reality (Yiangou 2002). At the 1999 Helsinki summit, Turkey was accepted for candidate status and unification of Cyprus was no longer a prerequisite for accession. The EU confirmation of Turkey’s eligibility to join, was made “in the hope that this would aid the drive to finding a solution to the Cyprus issue” (Christou 2002). But the talks continued without a compromise being found. Time and again it would appear that a solution had been found only for

¹⁶ Formthe Ministry for Foreign Affairs wesite, date unavailable

negotiations to break down at the last minute. However, when the Annan plan was put forward, there was still some hope that it might succeed. The plan was the most comprehensive plan towards resolving the conflict to date. The intention was to reunify the island. One particular aspect which had been a source of problems was sovereignty, this plan proposed to share sovereignty. In 2004 there was a referendum in which 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted yes but 75% of Greek Cypriots voted no (Öktem, 2011, p138). At this point, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus had been guaranteed; this had a significant and detrimental effect on the willingness of the Greek Cypriot leaders to find a solution (Tocci and Kovziridze, 2004).

There are a number of areas of division between the two communities that are worth highlighting. As Tocci and Kovziridze (2004) show there are three main points to be considered. The first is the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. This is a point that is echoed by Yiangou (2002) who underlines the advantage that the Republic of Cyprus holds in terms of “international legitimacy and access”. The social and cultural division is second. 2004 was an important moment towards bridging the socio-cultural gaps that exist. The border between the two parts of the island was opened and the passing of buffer zone was important; in the first year and a half alone 4 million crossing without incident (UN report, 2004). Economic disparity is another of the main roadblocks to the resolution of the issues, as there is a fear among the northerners that the more economically prosperous south will dominate.

One thing is important, the role of both ‘motherland’ countries play a crucial role in the eventual resolution of the issue. Give the fact that Greece is a member of the European Union, and this is one of the chief issues that stands in the way of Turkish accession, it would seem that the Greeks have less motivation to resolve the issue, as the resolution or lack thereof does not forego anything. It could be argued that the Turkish Cypriot element has more of an incentive. If this were the case it would create a diplomatic disparity and an unequal relationship which can be antagonistic and exacerbate the difficulties that already exist in the process.

It had seemed that the EU was interested in resolving the issues. However as it was removed as a prerequisite to membership, it appeared to have dropped lower on the list

of priorities. The question of Cyprus has been quite important in the relationship of Turkey with the EU. As a territory that is disputed with a member state, it has proved to be a blocking point on the path to accession for Turkey. The invasion of Northern Cyprus by Turkish forces in 1974 can be recognized as one of the most difficult times in the recent history of the Island. Since then there have been advances in working towards a resolution of the problem but there have also been significant setbacks. The European Union on many occasions has signalled that the Cyprus question is one of the largest questions blocking accession. And as a member state Greece has also been instrumental in its attempt to achieve its desired outcome.

The resolution of issue has been a major stumbling block. Given that the political, economic and human rights dimensions continued to be reviewed and reformed with a respectable degree of fluidity. However in the case of Cyprus, the 8 relevant chapters will remain closed until the protocol has been implemented. It remains to be seen if this step will be taken. Also the legal basis for the Turkish Cypriot position was disputed by Greek Cypriot side and rejected by EU (UN report, 2003). These positions could be viewed in quite a negative light in Turkey, an unfair appraisal of the situation by the international community. This could go some way to explaining the inflexible attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leader with regard to moving the process forward.

One of the key characteristics on the Cyprus question, and highly relevant when considering Turkey's position in relation to the EU is the geostrategic importance of Cyprus. It can easily be summarised as this "Cyprus is seen as the exit point for oil and natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean," (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009). Though its political affiliations have varied greatly over the decades, its geographical location has not, nor has its strategic importance. Perhaps for this reason, the Turkish element has been slow to relinquish any influence it holds over the island. However with the recent death of prominent Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, it still remains to be seen how the situation will unfold from here.

III. Energy: Geo-strategic Relevance

3.1 Overview

Turkey's relationship to Europe and importance on the world stage has been evolving in dramatic way in the last number of decades. A series of important and interlinked events caused this shift. The fall of USSR allowed two principal things to change from the Turkish perspective. Firstly, it introduced a new era of independence for Turkey's neighbours. This would create an entirely new area of interest and foreign policy to Turkey's east. Secondly, it removed the Soviet threat from the international policy table, thereby readjusting completely the paradigm of US-Turkish relations. In one respect, it diminished the interest on the part of the US towards Turkey but at another level it loosened the ties and to some extent allowed more freedom in pursuing its foreign policy goals.

Europe also began to view this neighbour with a new perspective, as the emergence of a new energy landscape began to form. To the east, north and south of Turkey lie countries that harbour "70% of the world's oil and gas reserves" (Barysch, 2007), in the only other direction to the west, lies the EU. With the longest running application to the union, one must wonder why it has taken so long? But with the relatively new region scheme, and its implications, it is only fair to question whether and how Turkey uses the main asset that it has to its advantage.. The question now faces us: Is Turkey the emboldened geopolitical power that its policies imply it would like to be? It very well may be. If Turkey becomes a hub, not only in terms of energy but in a larger way as a regional player and eventually potentially even player on the world stage of global geopolitics. In order to understand what is being asked, three principal aspects need to be examined: the geographical, the political and the structural.

The relative importance of energy and power generation has increased rapidly over the last century. Previous to the industrial revolution, energy was produced primarily for warmth and domestic chores. Nowadays the principal uses for fuels are power, heating and industry. During the industrial era, carbon fuels were raised to newer, greater importance (ExxoMobil, 2010). As coal decreased in importance, oil and gas grew. As

technology advanced, nuclear and renewable energy also emerged (International Energy Agency, 2011). Many countries continue to try to fully and efficiently harness the natural non fossil resources to advance the prospects of renewable energy. At the same time nuclear energy continues to prove itself risky in terms of the potential for disaster, highlighted by disasters such as Chernobyl 1986 and more recently in Japan, as well as the ambiguity on the part of certain countries as to the goals of their nuclear programmes. In this context the business of oil and gas remains a central element to the power generation sector.

The renewable energy sector is constantly growing and innovating, in response to demand. There are a number of significant renewable energy plants around the world. Yet fossil fuels have been the dominant source of energy since the industrial revolution and the electrification of the world. They currently account for 80% of the world's energy (IEA, 2011). Though coal was initially quite important the disappearing coal deposits have meant that the main focus now is on petroleum and gas. In many cases the control of petroleum – the most used in producing energy worldwide – lies with state run companies.

Turkey has a covetable geographic location; this seems obvious at first glance. It lies between north and south, between east and west. It has land access to Europe, to the Middle East, central Asia and beyond. It controls some of the most important straits, it has access to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and it is well connected to the Caspian Sea as well. Geographically speaking, it is a veritable crossroads, yet not only in terms of geography. Through its long and rich history, it has accumulated links to the many countries that surround it: from the cultural and linguistic ties to the Turkic nations; to the historical and political ties to the countries of the former Ottoman Empire and lastly to the broadest and most complex, its ties to the Muslim world. It has a soft power potential that is enviable to say the least. Its location has brought it to the attention of the world powers in the past; we need only cast our minds back to the Cold War to understand the key role that Turkey played with relation to the USSR and to the western powers. During this period it was courted by the US interest in the region, which ties in with NATO interest and ultimately the European Union. Nowadays there remains a strong interest in the areas but for a whole new set of reasons. A great number

of these are intricately linked with the ongoing Europeanisation process and the process of accession to the European Union, which can be seen as two different processes, though so similar as to appear to be one.

3.2 Neighbouring Region

As the European Union report on Turkey's energy supply so unequivocally points out "Turkey is geographically located in close proximity to 71.8% of the world's proven gas and 72.7% of oil reserves, in particular those in the Middle East and the Caspian basin." (Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2008) It is a natural land bridge between east and west. In addition to this, Forbes estimated that, among the top four oil fields of the future in terms of production, three will be located in Iraq (Forbes, 2010). The Caspian region is home to an impressive quantity of natural resources. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Iran are the countries who are vying over its rich deposits. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that full development of Kazakhstan's major oilfields could make it one of the world's top 5 oil producers within the next decade (EIA, 2010). In Azerbaijan the Shah Deniz project in Azerbaijan is an important gas field that could have a profound influence on the economic development of the country (Offshore Technology, 2011). Turkmenistan is also an important supplier of both oil and gas (Rousseau, 2011). There can be no doubt as to the ample resources on Turkey's doorstep.

Like many of the regions, the Caspian is not without its own difficulties. One of the issues that surrounds the exploration and development of the Caspian is the issue of whether it is considered a lake or a sea, as these two carry different interpretations in international law. There has been an ongoing dispute over the two decades concerning the definition of the Caspian Sea as a sea (Gokay, 2001). It is the largest landlocked body of water. Its demarcation as a sea has a number of implications with regards to fishing rights and transportation, this is not to mention the implication it would have with regards to the energy reserves found there. The concerns are threefold. In terms of fishing rights it relates to the production of caviar; about 80% of the world's caviar originates from there and consistent over-fishing through the years have seriously threatened the survival of sturgeon, from whom roe is obtained (CASPECO, 2011).

In transportational terms, the Volga is of strategic importance, and would be subject to different treatment were the Caspian to be considered a sea rather than a lake. A treaty had existed between Iran and Russia; however, since the formation of the newer Caspian states, there has not been adherence by the aforementioned to the treaty, as it does not provide for these nations. There have been attempts to resolve the situation through suggestions by the countries concerned. Yet, many of these suggestions favour the countries that have proposed them, and for this reason have not been workable. There have been multi-lateral agreements with relation to environmental concerns, but these have failed to fully address the exploration of the area's natural resources.

Given the range of countries here not only in terms of economic or political clout but also in terms of influence and relations to their neighbours, this makes of an interesting interplay. Newly independent states Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan emerging from the former USSR have major energy reserves to be exploited. Given that these countries are a series of recently liberated states with difficult and at times fragile internal politics, the point has been made that this is an opportunity to forge important bonds in the region, and bolster peace and stability in central Asia and the Caucasus through commerce (Aras and Foster, 1998). "The affordable and uninterrupted supply of energy sources is of fundamental importance for any country's sustainable economic development" (Babali, 2009). Not only this but those in possession of the supply are in a position to foster improved relations with countries in the west. According to Kamrava (p135) [since 1973] oil has become a highly effective economic and diplomatic weapon. It is in the interest of these nations to use this weapon not only for increasing their own growth and stability, but also, through interdependence, to gain international support and interest in sustaining those tools of development.

President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan underlined, when interviewed, that he believed that, in order to stabilise his country at least – if not others in the region – then the economy must take priority and politics take the backseat. The worry in the region is that, all too often, the concept of democracy is closely associated in the minds of the people with that of poverty, an association that has been made in the past following the break-up of the former USSR (Euronews, 2010). Now observations about the situation

in Afghanistan are being made whether it will be same there. This perspective underlines the opportunities the right number of dollar or lira signs can expect to encounter, perhaps somewhat irrespective of who is providing the funding¹⁷. If this is not the case then one thing is sure that future alliances are not clear-cut and will depend on a variety of factors.

Turkish relations with its neighbours

The opportunity to create stronger ties to these emergent states whose natural resources have proven to be of crucial importance has not gone unnoticed by the Turkish. Turkey and Georgia already enjoy a close and strong economic and political relationship. A free trade agreement signed in 2007 consolidate this and there are hopes that this will extend to Azerbaijan to help establish a free trade area between the three (Hurriyet news, 2012). There had been an effort initially to create a model similar to the Benelux one. The agreement may eventually extend to Armenia also (Babali, 2009). One of the hindrances to this is the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. Though Ankara is keen to improve relations with Armenian, its consideration for Azerbaijan precedes this goal.

Maintaining good relations with its eastern neighbours is clearly very important to Turkey; this is evident from its zero problems policy. And it has been careful to follow through, using, in many cases, economics as a way to build relations. The Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) for example currently has two ongoing projects in the offshore Azerbaijani oil sector: the Shah Deniz field and the Azeri-chirag-guneshli oil project. There is also a joint venture company between TPAO and Kazakhstan's KazMunaiGas (TPAO, 2012). Bearing in mind, as Aras and Foster (1998) aptly put it, "the benefits to take advantage of the mutual development opportunities that cooperation can create". As Babali (2010) notes however, there is still much work to be done for these Caspian nations to develop and stabilise, economically and politically. He states "further consolidation and development of their political sovereignty, economic

¹⁷ It is interesting to observe, for example, that according to the Azerbaijan International magazine, an independent publication concerning Azerbaijanis around the world, a great many of its projects have been funded and sponsored by the major oil and gas companies, specifically Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, and Statoil.

diversity and integration with the wider world through globally acceptable standards of business and rules of accountability is necessary”.

“The Turkish region of the Black Sea is still largely unexplored, presenting high risk but equally high potential return: Turkey is a country surrounded but important oil producing basins and crossed by major pipelines to supplying Europe” (Rigzone, 2006).

The Black Sea is currently highly considered by some: “The region is considered as one of the world's last oil frontiers”¹⁸. Brazil’s Petrobras and TPAO signed an agreement in 2009, in conjunction with ExxonMobil, (Offshore, 2009), which was renewed in 2010, to work together for exploration and production in the Black Sea. The cooperation of these two developing economies is certainly a source of interest, if not concern for the EU. The two also worked together to broker a deal with Iran, though it later fell through.

TPAO has also been working with in Iraq. Though given the Kurdish control of parts of the oil rich areas in Iraq and the strained relationship the Turkish have had in recent decade with the Kurdish community, one wonders whether this has blocked business cooperation in this area. The companies that are involved in the Iraqi oil fields include South Korea, Kuwaiti, Turkish and Malaysian and Russia’s Gazprom on gas projects. Arabian Oil and Gas (2011) reports that working in Iraqi Kurdistan has been facilitated by the relaxation of regulations by the authorities, Kurdistan is, by comparison to the other regions, largely safe. This is quite interesting considering the relationship Turkish Kurdistan has with its central government and the relative level of safety there.

According to MIT there are still 16,200 Trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of recoverable gas, 150 times current annual global gas consumption (MIT, 2010). This makes net gas suppliers an important asset on any country’s list of economic partners. And as Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have each considerable gas resources. Azerbaijan has large gas reserves at 30 trillion cubic feet (EIA, 2012), Turkmenistan exports 24 billion cubic metres (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2011) and Kazakhstan is also a net

¹⁸ <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90858/90863/7003689.html> 29.03.2012

exporter. This makes developing a good relationship with these countries of the utmost significance to any nation's energy portfolio. As has been mentioned, the key focus for these states is developing a stable economy. This is precisely what Turkey has been aiming to do through economic cooperation.

“Competition for control of natural gas pipelines and pipeline routes is intense in key regions” (MIT, 2010). Though Turkey may have the potential to do many things in its role as toll man of the crossroads of power, it would be more than unwise not to overlook the other significant and still powerful players on the scene. Russia, as the former leader of the soviet republics find itself in an interesting position. These malleable nations have spent decades bending to the will of their ‘older brother of the region as Yazdani (2006) puts it. Yet increasingly they are beginning to show themselves eager to break away from the Russian sphere of influence. Russia on the other hand has shown itself more than reluctant to release these countries from its sphere of influence towards a more tangible independence, or to allow others to infringe on this influence that, it would seem, it assumes as a right (Yazdani, 2006). Russia is a key energy supplier to the west, but it seeks to exert excessive influence over its neighbouring countries. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, Turkey's main supplier of oil has been, since 2009, Russia, followed by Iran, who previously held the position as top supplier (EIA, 2011). In addition, 60% of Turkey's gas comes from Russia's Gazprom. Thus it becomes clear that Turkey needs to both maintain good relations with Russia and at the same time find ways of reducing its dependence on her supplies (Barysch, 2007). This becomes an even more intricate task when viewed in light of the Caspian nations' desires to form new economic ties, Turkey's desire to create similar links and Russia's deep seated opposition to such moves.

Iran possesses an undeniably large amount of natural gas; while Russia holds 24% of the world's proven gas reserves. Iran according to BP (2010) holds 15.8% of the world's reserves of gas. The Pars field alone accounts for 19% of the world's supply, the South Pars field is located in Iran, the North field in Qatar. (Qatar is the 3rd ranking country with proven as reserves). Iran is also a direct geographical route to the west, a bargaining chip that it has already tried to use, but to little avail. Iran's interest in the regional energy supplies is of particular concern, in view of the fact that it is the only

OPEC country that borders central Asia and the Caspian (Yazdani, 2006). One of the reasons cited for pursuing alternative routes was its internal instability; this is apparent from various incidents of civil unrest in recent years. But perhaps more importantly, the US still maintains that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and that it seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction. There is a belief that Iran is cultivating nuclear weapons, though the government has assured the international community that its nuclear programme is a power generation project, an assurance which fell on deaf ears. This has resulted in sanctions for the country, despite the vehement denial that the nuclear projects are for building nuclear weaponry. The Iranian response to the warning of further sanctions was a threat to close the access of the Straits of Hormuz. And given the fact that “One in every five barrels of oil must pass through the straits of Hormuz” (BBC, 2012) a showdown in this particular stretch of water is not in the interest of the global energy market. Iran maintains that it has “every right to block the straits of Hormuz” (Business Insider, 2012). This incident sparked a dramatic rise in the price of oil around the world and perhaps served as a sharp reminder of the relevance of Iran to global energy security.

One of the reasons that Iran does not appear as a viable option to supply energy is because to export central Asian oil through a competitor country does not seem like a logical option, it would place far too much power in the hands of what has oft been cited as an unstable government. It is a country with far too much vested interest in controlling the flow of energy resources originating from the region. Despite the fact that it is a well-equipped country, in logistical terms and a well-positioned one in geographical terms, the Iranian offer of transporting energy has not been welcomed. Iran would gain too much control over the economies of the aforementioned countries and over the supply of oil to third parties (Yazdani, 2006). Both Iran and Russia have in the past, as they often still do, pursued erratic and volatile external policies, making them inopportune choices when it comes to securing power supply. To allow a principal resource supply country to control supplies from other neighbouring, competitor countries makes little if any sense therefore to allow either Iran or Russia to control the supply of the nearby Caspian energy would surely spell disaster.

3.3 EU's energy needs

The European Union as it is known commonly know grew out of an economic community born in the heart of industrial Europe. The great industrial engines of Europe emerged during the industrial revolution, with much of the activity based around the coal mines of Western Europe. These countries would go on to form the European Steel and Coal Community, an economic cooperation organisation. Though initially it was formed as an economic association, with various phases of political readjustment in the neighbouring countries-the fall of fascist dictators and the fall of the USSR the enlargement of the Union began to take on a much more political facet. Its horizons have changed so much so that the last major round of accessions can be almost entirely viewed with a political lens¹⁹.

This European Union is an entity with a significant population and energy requirements that are constantly expanding. Many other developing nations around the world have rapidly growing energy needs, the EU is all too aware of the risk posed by developing nations to its own energy needs (EU, 2012). This puts pressure to secure supply on a union which is currently struggling economically²⁰. The Union has also set goals of sustainable development for underdeveloped nations, which could cause some grey areas in a competitive global market for energy. "While relations with producing and transit countries are important, relations with large energy-consuming nations and particularly emerging and developing countries are of growing significance... sustainable development must be at the core of both energy and development policy" (EU Energy Strategy, 2010).

The European Union has suffered in the past as a result of not securing its energy supply, both in 2006 with the Ukraine energy crisis and also this past winter, with the reoccurrence of a similar situation if somewhat diminished. Russia is linked to Europe by Ukraine which is the principal transporter or Russian gas to Europe (Shapovalova,

¹⁹ While the economic motivation has arguably been shelved, it is still ready for use when necessary but not always the chosen course of action.

²⁰ In light of the buying power of growing economies like China this further increases the challenge

2010). The EU has become more aware of the insecurity of its energy supply and its current dependence on Russian gas is a source of concern. The policies followed by president-elect and current prime minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, have varied over the years and can be seen as testament to his record of volatility (Ramírez, 2009). This is one of the factors that has driven the EU to actively investigate other energy supply possibilities and pursue their development.

There are other hurdles to be overcome on the path to energy security for Europe. “Despite accounting for one fifth of the world’s energy use, the EU continues to have less influence on international energy markets than its economic weight would suggest” one of the problems is the agreement and setting of common goals by member states. It is clear that in a community of 27 defining clear and common objective is a constant problem, especially when individual member states hold differing nation relationships with certain neighbouring countries²¹. The strategy of the EU sets out to reduce dependency and diversify. Diversification of fuels, sources of supply and transit routes are all essential for security of supply (EU, 2010). The EU aims to do this through partnerships with suppliers and transit countries. As a country holding the position that it does, Turkey’s partnership is of the utmost importance. And it is clear that the accession process of Turkey falls into this category. And the further the process goes the more secure Europe’s energy supply will be.

3.4 Turkey’s relevance

“Turkey is the silk route of the 21st century” (Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2008)

In 1959 Turkey applied for associate status which eventually came into effect in 1964. Since then, the EC/EU has been considering the various stepping stones that are required for full accession. In the meantime Turkey's importance to the E.U. has evolved, growing for strategic reasons during the Cold War (Erdogdu, 2002), and once

²¹ For example, the eastern Europe countries that share borders with Ukraine and Russia, Greece and Cyprus in their relationship with Turkey, Italy as a Mediterranean marina for refugees.

again in this current era according to the emerging energy needs of Europe. Turkey's cooperation and friendship is essential to Europe's goal of diversifying energy supply. The EU's extensive energy needs are not satisfactorily met by Russian gas – though there is reliance on Norway for a good portion of supply²². Questions regarding the inconsistent nature of the Russian leader have left EU leaders growing increasingly concerned with the security of their energy supply. Turkey, as a candidate member of the EU, sits in an already interesting place politically.

In addition to this, it holds another particularly interesting position geographically. Turkey is a key part of the axis that runs from central Asia to the EU. And Central Asia is a region home to a plethora of locations abundant with fossil fuels. The combination of these elements, it would seem, make it the ideal contender to ensure a secure energy supply to Europe, thereby securing a place in Europe. There is no doubt in the minds of the European powers-that-be that Turkey is the obvious choice for transporting energy from the Caspian basin to Europe. Iran and Russia, the other possibilities have been ruled out. Though this may be purely a utilitarian relationship between the EU and Turkey it is nonetheless an important one for both sides.

Turkey as an energy hub

Turkey has a number of things that make it ideal as an energy hub. It is located within a veritable arms reach of a great deal of natural resources. It has cultural, historical and to some extent linguistic ties to these countries. These countries are young states, unsure of their role in the geopolitical scene and ripe for moulding by whosoever should seize the opportunity first. The president of Kazakhstan has clearly indicated that before political reform and transparency he, and his government, place economic development. Turkey has set its sights on becoming a hub for the region, not just a transit country to pass through. To be a hub would signify important revenue through transit fees but also a security for their own domestic energy supply, perhaps out of a fear of dependency on Russia.

²² Interesting to note that it is a Norwegian company that has majority stakes in the project to develop the Shah Deniz field, Azerbaijan's largest oil reserve.

There are a range of pipelines that run from east to west, along different paths. These pipelines have been competing over the Caspian resources to supply the pipes. The first is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which runs from Baku in Azerbaijan to Tbilisi, Georgia and on to Ceyhan on the coast of Turkey, transporting Azerbaijani crude oil to the Mediterranean. It was heavily supported by the U.S. as an alternative for transporting Caspian oil without going through Russia. In parallel with this is the South Caucasus, Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) pipeline for transporting natural gas. These pipelines are important to the area not only as a step to move away from Russian supply but also reduce the large volume of traffic that passes through the Turkish straits.

Environmental concerns play a role in the decision making regarding the traffic flows through the straits every day. Given this movement, there is a good probability that an environmental disaster could happen sooner or later. The effect on the local ecological system would be tremendous; this is particularly pertinent given the incident in the Gulf of Mexico. However the incident in the Gulf of Mexico also served to highlight the potential for severe financial loss. Oil is a financial risky business. The environmental cases taken by the Brazilian government demonstrate this “Chevron now spends more time and money on lawyers than it does drilling for oil” (Forbes, 2012). Though it would be ideal to assume that these environmental questions are borne out of genuine concern for the protection of the environment, in more realistic terms the impact of such oil spills would be massive losses incurred by the companies and ultimately down the line by the consumer. This is what has brought the issue to the fore.

This is where the Nabucco pipeline project is one of great multi-level strategic importance. It will help strengthen EU-Turkey relations at one level, and on another loosen Turkish ties with Russia. These two elements would seem to be congruous policies. It would also be a further move towards reinforcing Turkey's role as an energy hub for Europe. The project proposes to link up with the existing BTC and transport energy through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and into Austria (Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH [NIC], 2010). The initiative has the backing of the European Union, individual governments and private enterprise. Although there have been questions raised as to whether there will be enough gas to flow through the pipeline (Hurriyet, 2008), it's mere creation and the relative threat to other suppliers, namely

Russia and Gazprom, could be enough to offset the €5 billion investment (Barysch 2007)²³.

The relative importance of the Nabucco pipeline project to the EU was highlighted in a speech given by EU commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn at the European Policy Centre; he noted the need to overcome the outstanding problems in order to move forward with the project. It should be seen as an asset instead of an issue, the EU wants to see a “stable, prosperous and democratic Turkey by its side” (EU, 2009). It is interesting to note the choice of words not only in terms of the traits but also the key phrase *by its side*, certainly an amicable turn of phrase but yet one that does not inspire the utmost confidence with regards to Europe's intentions of proceeding with Turkey's accession.

The Nabucco project however faces real competition from the Gazprom South Stream pipeline. The recent agreement between Turkey and Russia regarding construction that would run through Turkish waters in the Black Sea would indicate that the project will go ahead. The project is aimed for conclusion by 2015, two years before the proposed completion of the Nabucco project (NIC, 2010). Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recently thanked the government of Turkey for giving permission to OAO Gazprom to build the South Stream gas pipeline in Turkish waters of the Black Sea. According to Gazprom, Turkey granted "all the necessary and unconditional permissions" to allow the construction and operation of the South Stream project via Turkey's exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. Turkey's authorization was the final hurdle to the pipeline's construction. Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei Miller described it as "the most serious proof" that the project will be completed by 2015 (Oil and Gas Journal, 2012).

In order for a country to be considered for accession it has to have the infrastructure to uphold the institutions and principles of the EU, open market, democracy and human rights. One of the elements of such an infrastructure is the energy market. Were the Turkish to introduce the framework of the EU market, it would be one more step towards accession on one hand and also would help the liberalisation of and investment

²³ The estimates have since gone to €8 and to a further €10 Billion

in the sector on the other. Though Turkey's strategic location should be a valuable playing card in the accession talks, it has at times served to complicate EU-Turkish relations, a question of commerce and engineering that became over politicised and clouded matters. The Republic of Turkey has a privatisation administration and is privatising many areas, one of which is energy. However the EU is concerned that Turkey has been falling behind on its schedule to liberalise the energy market (EU Progress Report, 2007, p31). The 2011 Progress Report on Turkey states “Developments on security of supply, the gas sector and energy efficiency also require further efforts.”

The privatisation and liberalisation of the market in order to make it viable for foreign investment is key to Turkey's accession driven overhaul. Many state entities are now being privatised but are dawdling in fully implementing privatisation. New legislation was introduced in 2001 and has been coming into effect over the last number of years. Yet also in some cases it is slow to filter down to each level, especially in the case of the BOTAS *de facto* monopoly on imports in the natural gas sector, it has been very reluctant to let go of the mechanism that allows it to control the gas market. This has restricted the competitiveness of market suppliers (IEA, 2011).

When we consider the game of energy supply, there are of three principal stages; upstream which is exploration and production. This is where the resource is explored. Then there is midstream referring to transport and finally downstream, the refinement and [re]sale. Within the upstream stage there is yet another clarification to be made, it is important to underline the difference between exploration and development versus production activities, as the first two do not guarantee the third. In addition, exploration costs can be quite high proving it an uncertain venture at times. In realistic terms while upstream is an essential part of the process, it is an expensive operation and does not always reap the relative benefits. The mid and downstream activities are far more profitable and whoever controls these phases are truly the ones profiting. This means that countries who transport oil and gas stand to profit substantially but more importantly the resale of energy is the key. Perhaps for this reason, Turkey has set its sights on not only being a route of transit but also a hub and point of resale. While the liberalisation and restructuring of the market have progressed to a certain degree, the

processes have slowed significantly.

There are two points worth noting here, on one hand even if the EU manage to secure supply through agreements, if Turkey doesn't give in on the issue of Cyprus there is no guarantee that they will be allowed to join the Union, but the necessary changes in legislation will already be in place at that point to help secure energy supply. An alternative reading of this would be that if Turkey's accession does not go ahead²⁴, the necessary liberalisation of the energy market will still be in place thus potentially allowing Turkey to use that valuable market position to its own advantage.

A number of factors have driven the direction of Turkey's internal and therefore external energy policy. These two concepts are closely linked because the internal market is both supplied and supplies different external markets. Turkey has shown an awareness of the needs of its eastern neighbours. It appears to have succeeded in coaxing them into economic agreement over their resources. It is also keenly aware of its western neighbours, and whilst it has made some progress and moves towards implemented the necessary changes to continue along the path of accession, it does not appear to be doing so with great impetus. It shifted its focus from being entirely on the EU to facilitate relationships with a broader range of neighbours, including Russia and, at times, Iran also. But it is constructing a certain amount of balance between the liberties it gives to one set of neighbours versus another. This is no easy task, and it is by no stretch of imagination one that does not run significant risks.

Between the developed western democracies of fortress Europe and the intricate and unstable Middle East it knocks politely on one neighbour's door, attempting to align itself to the house rules; whilst at the same trying to fulfil its role as a mediator between its other neighbours and the larger international players. Its historical connection to both east and west afford it a privileged position when it comes to international relations yet it does always fully draw on these soft power capabilities. Now in this era of modernity, as industrialisation spreads as rapidly as the global population grows, feeding and

²⁴ The notion that the support for EU membership is decreasing has been approached (Centre for European Reform, 2011)

securing the world's energy needs has become top of the agenda. Issues like global warming and international terrorism are at the forefront of discussion by governments and policy makers in OECD countries around the world. With Turkey's relationship to the Islamic nations and the oil and gas producing nations, its place at the table is undeniably important.

This country has kept its sights firmly set on the west, (but also its ear to the ground on the east). Between Turkey's wish to become a real part of Europe and the EU's keen if not pressing, wish to secure its energy supply for the future, therein lies a fascinating series of interactions that produce this complex weave that is the fabric of current power generation geopolitics. Turkey is poised and ready for the obstacles that accession may continue to throw up and economically speaking Brussels will in the near future have little to complain about. Whether Turkey can continue to evolve along its current diplomatic lines and to a satisfactory cultural level so as to be accepted by the EU remains unclear but its ability to compete on geopolitical and economic level with the multistate union is far from something to be overlooked.

IV. Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy

4.1 Identity

Atatürk ushered in a new era in the Ottoman heartland and with it a new set of rules, customs and modes that would affect every area of society. This new era, meant to totally reform and remodel the remnant of the Ottoman Empire into a modern, western and secular Turkey would in fact reformat the society to such an extent as to completely confound its people. This confusion manifested itself often in the ensuing decades in the form of intense protest and conflict in the socio-political sphere in the 1960s, political indecision and instability in the 1970s that refused to abate. It would also help mould the military into what is known as the “guardian state” (Öktem, 2011). This guardian state, wholly believing in the ideology of its founding father, would attempt and succeed time and again to bring society, politics and foreign policy back into line with what was believed to be the appropriate line of action. The continuing hold over government and society would hinder these areas from developing and create crisis of identity that only recently has begun to diminish in light of the loosening of the grip of the military.

The removal of institutions that had been part of the fabric of Turkish society in the Ottoman era caused a rupture between the Turkish people and their perceived identity. The removal of the Caliphate broke the link that had held the *Umma*²⁵ together. Now the Muslims of Turkey were not united in the same way to the rest of the Muslim world as they had been for centuries. Religion plays an important role in rural and working class societies, and while Turkey had an important urban middle class, the Muslim peasant masses made up the vast majority of the country.

Linguistic changes were one area of reform whereby the alphabet was changed from Arabic script to Latin script, though the effect was lessened given the level of literacy at the time. Rather than changing the character of the Turks, it sought to create it, to make

²⁵ Umma is the Muslim world or community, an Islamic concept that joins Muslims together.

the leap from Ottoman Turkish, written in what was seen to be an archaic script²⁶ to modern Turkish written in the western style. His project was well executed and as Öktem (p28) puts it “the republic’s children were raised to become illiterate with regard to their Ottoman past”. A move that was surely met with a variety of reactions at the time, though most would not have foreseen how successful it would be. Nor would they have imagined that it would so cleverly cut the link between the people of Modern Turkey from their Ottoman heritage and past. The changes went further still, banishing words and phrases of borrowed origin, attempting to polish the language and rid it of any pre-republic, Ottoman stains.

Kemal also commissioned the rewriting of history. His adoptive daughter, who studied in Switzerland, wrote a revised version of history to educate the masses (Öktem, 2011). Yet another move to strip the country of any of the things that had been true and present for their parents or grandparents generation, thereby replacing the natural educational paradigm that existed in many non literate areas of oral tradition and passing of knowledge from mother to daughter or father to son. These changes would create a divide between the generations and fray the fabric of society so that it was no longer able to withstand the challenges associated with the birth and development of a new nation.

Though the Kurds had lived side by side with the Turks for centuries they were now being put under pressure to assimilate into ‘Turkish’ society as part of the Turkification process (Heper, 2007). The option of living in peace without being forced to adopt the ways of their neighbours was not given. The harsh policies towards the Kurds alienated and enraged this sector of the population to such an extent that they country at times, was divided in two absolutely different places with different languages, functioning and rules of law. Essentially, in his aims to create one Turkey Kemal actually succeeding in creating two.

²⁶ And one too closely associated with the Arabs, a people who had just recently abandoned the Ottoman Empire.

The question of nation and nationality is an interesting one and worth noting briefly some points on it. There are a number of theories surrounding the topic of nationhood that are relevant for approaching the topic of the birth of the Turkish republic. As the reformulation of this redefined geographical unit that had been the Ottoman Empire and would now be called Turkey was a project of nation building.

Let's look at Smith's primordialist ideas of nation as being based on 'ancient' *ethnies* with shared history, ancestry and homeland, versus Gellner's idea of nation as being based on new political and economic conditions (op. Cit. Wan, 2009). This is particularly interesting when viewing the case of Turkey, as the structuring and moulding of the 'nation' was done by elite and by a largely politicised class. Furthermore it did not rely on previously well established historical and cultural links, but used new legislation to create the boundaries of this society.

"The 'great debate' in nationalism studies is between so-called 'primordialists' and 'modernists.' Put simply, primordialists argue that the nation derives directly from *a priori* ethnic groups and is based on kinship ties and ancient heritage. For their part, modernists insist that the nation is an entirely novel form of identity and political organization, which owes nothing to ethnic heritage and everything to the modern dynamics of industrial capitalism" (Wan, 2009). Thus, in light of the total disregard for common culture and identity that had been accumulated in Ottoman heartland, Kemal clearly broke from this to follow a 'modernist' theory of nationhood.

The whole series of other changes that came into effect would extend the impact of the process across many different areas of society. Eventually the links to the past would be broken, as Kemal had wished, and though his theory was to introduce a new identity to the modern Turkey. The decades since his death have only served to prove that the republic has constantly struggled with the question of its own identity. And even more so the institution of the army has repeatedly enforced this identity gap, each time that it seemed the adolescent nation would take a step into independent adulthood, the appropriately titled guardian state would quickly reprimand it and put it back in what was perceived to be its correct Kemalist place

The foundation of the Republic of Turkey was steeped in a military struggle. The creation of the new nation was overseen by the victor of the war, and the perceived power that he gained from battle was one of the cornerstones of the Kemalist ideology. Few countries experience the cult of the leader that lasts as long a time as this character has for Turkey. His face is impressively ubiquitous in state affairs and the vestiges of his influence are far reaching.

The importance of the military is outlined for us by Moxon-Browne and Ustun (2009) “Besides Turkish Armed Forces being one of the most trusted institutions in the country, their influence is considerable on the public.” Though their sway in politics has lessened significantly their influence in the eyes and minds of the Turkish still remains strong, and without a doubt this affects their ability to redirect public opinion as needed. Arslan (2005), however, states that the influence of the military has been constantly declining, the percentage of military officers in the political elite having gone from 20% to 2%.

Identity plays a large role in internal and national politics. It decides the direction of political parties and the identity of the electorate. The perception of what the voter wants and will identify with is key when developing political strategy. The perceived identity of a political party and its representatives are key for the electorate when they decide for whom they will vote.

In external terms the identity of a nation affects its relationship with other nations around it. This is true of the Turkic speaking world, as there is a perceived common identity, though historically and politically many nations were part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Arab world shares a great deal of common history, heritage and contemporary religious culture with Turkey yet there has constantly been a reticence with regard to approximation in political and international relations questions.

4.2 Turkish Foreign Policy through the decades

The Kemalist era had followed quite an isolationist policy so when the country moved from single party to multiparty rule there was a shift towards a more outward looking policy. The 1950s saw Menderes followed quite a broad and pluralist policy with a

liberal western orientation. He pursued an assertive and active foreign policy. It was bold yet he had the political space to do that, as he enjoyed a considerable majority in parliament and healthy public support. The Baghdad pact was signed, which included Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Britain. The moves to encourage the US to join proved fruitless, given the nature of the organisation, and the potential interpretation by the Israeli state. Turkey often followed a pragmatic approach, but at the same time a proactive one. It sought to create ties with the Arab world, though mostly unsuccessfully. It was often blocked by Egypt's resistance to its pro American stance. This was the case when it invited Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to join the pact. Nasser's nationalist stance was against this. Israel was keen to prevent the spread of communism but also the spread of pan-Arabism. It sought the help of the US in foreign bonds with the nations that did not fall into either category: Turkey and Iran to the north and Ethiopia to the south. The relationship with Israel has varied over the decades but the proximity of the US to both sides has usually resulted in favourable relations.

Following the 1960 military coup Demirel followed in similar footsteps as Menderes but far more reticent. This is not surprisingly, given the outcome whereby he predecessor struck out with a challenging and assertive foreign policy. It was in this era that Turkey signed the Ankara agreement with the EU, in keeping with the Kemalist ideology of constantly moving west. The Ankara agreement was signed in the context of shaping national policies and defending national interests. In the era when the US was funding many projects in Europe and Turkey was of significant importance to both Europe and the US in the fight against communism, this could be viewed as Europe doing what it needed to at the time to serve its own needs.

The 1970s foreign policy was limited to say the least. This was mostly due to the rising tide of violence that was spreading across the country. The major exception to this was the invasion of Northern Cyprus. This creating quite a strain on Greco-Turkish relations, which had been relatively smooth at the beginning of the Republic. Despite clashes that had taken place between the Greeks and Turkish in the fight for independence, in the early republican era an amicable status for both countries was formed

The relationship between the military and Özal in the 1980s proved to be interesting evolution of the interaction between the political and military actors in the Turkey. Though for a large part Özal's economic reform did not clash with the army's vision for the country. The international relations pursued by the Motherland party leader were bold and even could be considered visionary, but they stayed on a western oriented and liberal path. "In short, Özal wanted to transform Turkey from being an isolated, bureaucratic and military republic into an open democracy" (Burak, 2011)

He played the regional role very well, and formed close ties with many neighbours, basing much of it on economic ties which not only benefited the Turkish economy but also was a simpler path, leaving aside the political considerations. Given the political nature of many of the neighbouring countries at the time, this was important. He was also careful to maintain good relations with the US as this was key for the army, and key for the subversive forces at work through the era of the deep state. The application to the EU was submitted in this period, though its acceptance was put off due to internal engagements in Europe. The Cyprus was also still very much relevant, as the declaration of the independence of the Northern part of the island had only been declared four years previously in 1983.

The first Gulf War is of particular interest as the first standoff between a president (Özal) and an army chief of staff. The military had always had the final word in matter of foreign policy. The military also had a specific direction and set of objectives. If at times a government stepped outside of this set of rules, the armed forces were only too willing to step in to reaffirm Turkey's foreign policy in line with the correct alliances and Kemalist pro-western ideology. This theory was seriously jolted when Özal decided to go up against the Army Chief of Staff in a decision regarding the involvement of Turkey in the Gulf war (Öktem, 2011, p82). The policy that had been consistently applied was one of non involvement in Arab affairs but Özal pushed for the support if the US military effort. Ultimately the Chief of Staff was forced to resign, marking a important defeat by civilian politics of the army stance. Overall the support of the US, though eventually limited, was ill fated move. The resulting influx of Kurdish refugees to Turkey did not bode well for the suspected formation of Kurdistan. Economically it affected Turkish Iraqi pipelines and also the continuation of an unstable neighbour on

its eastern border which ran contrary to the policy on maintaining peace on Turkey's borders. This pleased neither the political nor the military elements in the country.

The of years of military interventions where the army constantly tried to revert the orientation of politics to what it deemed to be suitable and in line with its own entrenched post Kemalist ideology had left its legacy on Turkish politics. However this was disrupted to some extent in the 1980s by Özal. Though Özal did not attempt to overrule the military he did succeed in achieving his goals on occasion, which at times ran contrary to the aims of the army. This combined with the fact that he was the first civilian elected as President tells us that some sort of change was afoot. The military continued to interfere with the workings of internal politics through the 1990s but the ties had already begun to weaken.

In the post Cold War global restructuring a new game strategy was needed. Though the military was, as always, keen to revert to the default that it had been using for decades now, this would not be possible or at least it would have been useless (Kosebalaban, 2011, p122). A whole new world was opening up and the approach would have to be rethought. Especially give the fact that Turkey's privileged position as buffer zone between the Soviets and the west was no longer viable. It seemed that Turkey's greatest asset was being lost, but in fact it was just being remodelled. This did not become apparent immediately. However there was an awareness that a massive geographical and political reshaping that was taking place in almost every direction around Turkey.

The Balkans and the Caspian in particular were of interest. The first a former Ottoman territory was an option for a potentially very useful alliance. Turkey, after all, always looks west before east. Yet, in the years to come it would become increasingly obvious, as it has by now, that east would be the direction of critical strategic importance. Özal proactively sought links; the central Asian states became an objective not just of trade but of foreign relations. He sought to positively put Turkey in the middle, at the centre, at the fulcrum of whatever would happen in these new states. As it turned out, it was a very wise move on his part. These Turkic nations had with a new lease of life. They were out from under the Soviet thumb and looking for a new direction (Gül, 2008)). The

question at the time was would they go east or west? In fact it seems now that it was the third option, to stay local.

One of Turkey's most important, arguably the most, in the region is Azerbaijan. Turkey was the first country to recognise Azerbaijan's independence in 1991 and since then has consistently worked on nurturing relations with its Caucasian neighbour (Turkish Weekly, 2008). Give then ever increasing power of Azerbaijan, this has been a wise move on the part of Ankara.

The 1990s were a turbulent and challenging era for Turkey. Though much progression had been made in economic terms in the 1980s, this was largely due to the charismatic and involving political personality that was Özal. The weaker coalitions that took office subsequently were unable to maintain control of the Kurdish situation in the east for example. Çiller willingly handed over management of the issue to the military (Heper, 2007). There was some development in the EU process, with the introduction of the Customs Union, though as has been outlined this met with significant opposition from some corners.

The military was in a position to reassert its position in this decade, through a combination of the fragility of government and intensification of violence in the east. It would not be until the emergence of the AKP that a new era in foreign policy would be observed, but as this new wave of foreign policy has build momentum, it would seem that it was worth the wait.

4.3 Alterations Since the AKP

It is interesting to note that the party that was the first democratically elected in the post Kemalist era would be, in a way, a forerunner of the current Justice and Development party²⁷.

²⁷ Though many parties were abolished by the courts and then reformed under different title and not necessarily with the same members, part of the path of the members of the first Democratic Party would lead to the AKP.

The shift that has happened since the arrival of AKP government is significant and also visible. The foreign policy pursued in the last number of years has accumulated quite a momentum and undoubtedly a proactive stance. Brljavac (2011) raises some questions about the soft power capabilities of Turkey and how Turkey has been exploring these in the Balkans in recent years under the AKP government. Given the significant cultural and historical ties that Turkey holds with many countries in the region it is not surprising that this link should be made. The multicultural fabric of the Ottoman Empire is a historical link that could have been used over the years to a greater extent. The AKP government has taken a different tack with regards foreign policy and is pursuing a more multi lateral approach, recognizing its advantage in having cultural bonds with many of its neighbouring countries. And while realising in parallel its capability to create closer ties with others further afield.

In 2004 the EU reported that the foreign policy considerations of Turkey pertained more to its nearby region, rather than global considerations. It is fair to assume at this point that the game has been opened up by Turkey in foreign policy terms. Turkey is now developing ties to countries outside its immediate geographical vicinity. More than this, it now has economic ties to places as far afield as Brazil through the Black Sea agreement. Unlike the failed attempt by Sultan Abdülhamid to form an alliance with Japan (Kosebalaban, p38), it would seem that the AKP government really is succeeding in gaining allies from around the world.

A meeting recently took place between the foreign ministers of Turkey and Morocco. It was the first time in 25 years that a visit had been paid to Turkey by the foreign minister, owing to the relative stability of the relationship between the two countries according to minister Davotglu (Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2012). Though the motive given for this was the lack of necessity previously, it is nonetheless noteworthy that Turkey, who showed little interest in Morocco in the past, now demonstrates once again its proactive diplomatic attitude. There are plans to increase the volume of trade between the two nations by up to \$3 billion.

Human Rights Watch (2012) reports that the focus of Turkey in 2011 was more on regional policy. This is interesting and may underline that Turkey no longer focuses as much of its concentration on the EU as it did in the past. It appears that now it is

interested in the nearby regional situation. The AKP focused more on building a dynamic regional foreign policy.

There is an idea the Turkish military would always fold to the requests of the US (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006). In 2003 there was a surprise vote from Turkish parliament against the entry of US troops via Turkey to Iraq. The Iraq question is one of great importance to Turkey, especially with regard to the Kurdish issue. Turkey's omnipresent zero problems policy arises again here, ensuring peace at its borders is of the utmost importance and nowhere is this more true than its border with countries that have significant Kurdish populations²⁸. In every direction, Turkey has been show its ability to assertive, independent and yet cooperative at the same time.

As the EU report (2004) mentions the terms of the relationship between Turkey and the US have changed. Where before it was an area of geostrategic and military importance, it is now seen more as a stabilising force in the region. The US interest in reinforcing the European orientation of Turkey represents to a certain extent a factor in the course that the EU-Turkish relations take (Serboş, 2008, p6). And the US is certainly trying to encourage the EU to push the process forward, partly out of the assertion that it is necessary to counter fundamental Islamism but also as Turkey is still the "strongest and most reliable US ally in the Middle East" (Anrtevski et al, 2011).

Yiangou (2002) raises a point regarding the true nature of the Turkish application to the EU as to whether the relationship is one of mere rhetoric or whether there is a real intention to join. The Turkish government has maintained its stance on this issue; most especially given the progression to accession talks since 2005. As was recently reiterated by the Turkish ambassador to Portugal at a conference entitled "*Rising Turkey: Democracy, Economy, Foreign Policy and Relations with EU in the Last Decade*", the Turkish official position has always been and remains with its sights firmly and unflinchingly on EU membership²⁹.

It would seem that a great deal of the support for the ruling AKP party can be attributed to its mass appeal. The Muslim nation had its Islamic character forcibly removed in its

²⁸ As any upset there would potentially cause and influx of refugees into the eastern Kurdish province in Turkey which in turn could add strength to the PKK movement, as well as increase Kurdish solidarity- which is of concern to Turkey as it has always feared a Kurdish independent nation.

²⁹ Paraphrasal of response given by Ambassador.

founding. A fact that was constantly reaffirmed by its military is now in this era of improved democracy, through political reform that is part of the Europeanisation process. And this increased freedom of choice has led it back to Islamic outlook. A shift has also been seen on an internal level with regard to the western powers that it would seem have helped the further democratisation efforts. Turkish Public opinion in 2005 was strongly anti EU anti US, demanding an independent Turkey (Moxon-Browne and Ustun, 2009).

Nowadays in the context of the post 9/11 world there is an increased polarisation of the Islamic world versus the non Islamic world and combined with the heightened negativity towards Muslims, it has played into the hand of Islamist parties, such as the AKP. Turkey, a fiercely secular Muslim nation that has experienced the decadal military reassertion of its secularism is now undergoing an era of ever increasing Muslim sentiment. Has this overbearing secularism been replaced with Islamism? Previous to fall of the Empire the Ottomanist reformers had tried to find solutions to the myriad of problems threatening it. They had tried to find ways to incorporate the Muslim perspective into a modern discourse (Boztemur, 2005). This Islamic nationalist perspective did not succeed at the time but to a certain extent we can see a link to the modern AKP from the Islamic nationalists of the end of the Ottoman era.

This government has taken on a political and diplomatic juggling act of many different fronts, though seemingly innocent in order to keep peace with the neighbours through its zero problems policy. But if we take a closer look at what it has managed to pile on its semi-European, pro-western, quasi-middle eastern, pro-Turkic and pan Islamic plate, it seems that the precarious balancing act may just prove too much.

The identity of Turkey has always been deeply entrenched in two main things. The First is the secular basis of the nation and the second is the role of the military in keeping politics and society in check. In the last two decades these two elements have been called into question. The secular identity that was synthetically imposed, it now seems, never truly became an organic part of the core of Turkey. As soon as the hold of the military began to slip, the Islamic aspect of the country began to re-emerge. The

question is whether this aspect is merely a reaction to the religious repression that marked the last century of Turkish history.

Conclusion

This dissertation has attempted to investigate Turkish identity and foreign policy in view of the pertinence of EU accession and the EU's need to guarantee a secure energy supply for the future. The question of identity is essential when approaching this topic. Turkish national identity is a complex issue, and in some respects an oxymoron, for nation implies a shared common culture and heritage which could be disproved on two counts. Firstly the attitude of the republic towards the Kurds makes the definition of nation difficult and secondly the erasure of a large part of the common culture and heritage that tied the Anatolian heartland together makes it near impossible. Thus the question of identity remains a confusing topic internally speaking.

Though Turkey has been involved to a significant extent in the western world for the last half a century, the majority of this involvement was at the behest of the western powers in light of Cold War necessities. The US policy towards Turkey cleverly indulged the Turkish military's desire to enhance its national security and expand its weaponry, in exchange NATO and the US benefited from strategically placed army bases at the threshold of the Soviet Union. The EU accession process can surely stand testament to a self serving attitude, a process of candidacy and accession that has been ongoing for the last 55 years is at the very least highly questionable and at most borders on ridiculous.

Turkey has pursued an active involvement in (re)creating, developing and maintaining its ties to its neighbouring countries by the Caspian Sea. It has relied on cultural and linguistic links in some cases and a proactive economic policy in all. The importance of the region began to shape in the post Cold War regional re-organisation. This importance has intensified with the passage of the years, as has the attitude from Ankara towards it. Other regional interests such as the Black Sea area, and Iraqi Kurdistan are firmly planted on Turkey's economic horizon, though admittedly the latter is of a complex and less amicable nature than the former. The highly sought after natural resources of Turkey's backyard have not gone unnoticed by Ankara's policy makers and each year brings fresh news of the ever extensive collaboration that Turkey is pursuing not only in the neighbouring region but further afield as well.

Though the identity of Turkey has been called into question here there can be no doubt as to the direction this growing economic power is taking, whether or not it is still suffering from a crisis of identity, as it seemed to have been for the last number of decades, it is nonetheless following not only an active but a decidedly proactive diplomatic and economic set of policies in engaging with its neighbours and other global players. It is not the first time that it has engaged such economic policies but diplomatic efforts with such fervour have not been experienced by this key nation since Ottoman times. As to the question of whether Turkey is an emboldened geopolitical power or not, we need only glance at energy intersections that are spread across its land and its impressive international portfolio for the answer.

Bibliography

Ahmed, A. (2002). *Discovering Islam - Making Sense Of Muslim History And Society*. Revised edition. London: Routledge.

Antevski, M. *et alii* (2011). Regional and international aspects of energy security. *Medjunarodni Problemi*, 63, pp. 260-275.

Aras, B. *et alii* (1998). Research Paper No.43: *Turkey and the Azerbaijani Oil Controversies: Looking for a Light at the End of the Pipeline*. Athens: Research Institute for International and European Studies.

Arslan, A. (2005). The evaluation of parliamentary democracy in Turkey and Turkish political elites, *Historia Actual Online*, [online]. Available at: <<http://www.historia-actual.org/Publicaciones/index.php/haol/article/viewFile/332/320>> [Accessed November 2011]

Azarkan, E. (2009). The Relations between Central Asian States and United States, China and Russian within the Framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 8 (3).

Azerbaijan International (2012). *Azerbaijan International magazine*. [online] (updated 2 April 2012) Available at: <<http://www.azer.com/>> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Babali, T. (2009). Eurasian Politics: Turkish Perspective. In: Harvard University, *Post-Communist Politics and Economics Workshop*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA 26 October 2009.

Bader, M. (2008). Fluid Party Politics and the Challenge for Democracy Assistance in Georgia. *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 2 (2).

Bardakçı, M. (2010). Turkish parties' positions towards the EU: Between Europhilia and Europhobia. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 10 (4), pp. 26-41.

Barysch, K. (2007). Turkey's role in European energy security. *Centre for European Reform Essays*. London: Centre for European Reform.

Barysch, K. (2011). Is Turkey our partner now?, *Centre for European Reform*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2011/turkey->

[our-partner-now](#)> [Accessed 18 December 2011]

Baser, B. (2012). The Kurdish diaspora in Europe: identity formation and political activism. In: The Institute for Migration Studies, *Relationships between Diasporas and Their 'Homelands' and Their Impact on the State, National Identities, and Peace & Conflict*. Beirut, Lebanon 2-4 February 2012.

BBC (2012). EU Iran sanctions: Ministers adopt Iran oil imports ban, *BBC News*, [online]. Available at: <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16674660>> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

BBC (2012). Country Profile Georgia, *BBC News*, [online]. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102477.stm> [Accessed 12 February 2012]

Boztemur, R. (2005). *Nationalism and Religion in the Formation of Modern State in Turkey and Egypt until World War I*. [online] Journal for the Studies of Religion and Ideology. Available at: <<http://jsri.ro/ojs/index.php/jsri/article/view/277/276>> [Accessed November 2011]

Brljavac, B. (2011). Turkey Entering the European Union through the Balkan Doors: In the Style of a Great Power?, *Middle East Studies Online Journal*, 6 (3). [Online] Available at: <<http://www.middle-east-studies.net/?p=22602>> [Accessed 15 January 2012]

CASPECO (2011). *Caspian Environment Programme*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.caspianenvironment.org/newsite/index.htm>> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Christou, G. (2002). The European Union and Cyprus: The Power of Attraction as a Solution to the Cyprus Issue. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 2.

Cohen, D. (2006). Questions About the World's Biggest Natural Gas Field, *The Oil Drum*, [online]. Available at: <<http://www.theoil Drum.com/story/2006/6/8/155013/7696>> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

Council on Foreign Policy (2006). *Cook: Pope's Visit Finds Turkey Preoccupied with European, Kurdish, Cypriot Issues*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.cfr.org/turkey/cook-popes-visit-finds-turkey-preoccupied-european-kurdish-cypriot-issues/p12059>> [Accessed 29 March 2012]

Diez, T. (2002). Why the EU Can Nonetheless Be Good for Cyprus. *Journal on*

Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 2.

Energy Information Administration (2011). *Country Analysis Briefs – Kazakhstan*. [online] (updated November 2010) Available at:
<<http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf>> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

Energy Information Administration (2011). *Country Analysis Briefs – Turkey*. [online] (updated February 2011) Available at:
<<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=TU>> [Accessed 28 July 2011]

Energy Information Administration (2012). *Country Analysis Briefs - Azerbaijan*. [online] (updated January 2012) Available at:
<<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=AJ>> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

Erdogdu, E. (2002). Turkey and Europe: undivided but not united. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 6 (2), pp. 40-51.

EU Council decision 2008/157/EC. *Accession Partnership 2008* [Online] Available at:
<<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:051:0004:01:EN:HTML>> [Accessed date 26 March 2012]

EU Commissioner for Energy (2012). An integrated electricity market by 2014: How to make this political goal a Reality?. In: Eurelectric, *Electricity Markets at the Crossroads: Which Market Design for the Future?*. Brussels, Belgium 19 January 2012. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/oettinger/headlines/speeches/2012/01/doc/20120119.pdf> [Accessed 25 January 2012]

EU Commissioner for Enlargement (2009). *Turkey as an energy hub for Europe: prospects and challenges*. In: European Policy Centre, Brussels, Belgium 4 March 2009. [online] Available at:
<<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/89&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>> [Accessed 15 June 2011]

EU Energy (2011). *2020 A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy*. [online] Available at:
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2011_energy2020_en.pdf> [Accessed 20 March 2012]

Euronews (2010). *Nazarbayev: “economy first, then politics”*. [online] Available at:
<<http://www.euronews.com/2010/01/15/nazarbayev-economy-first-then-politics/>> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

European Commission (2012). *Candidate Countries: Turkey*. [online] Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/index_en.htm> [Accessed 18 June 2011]

European Commission COM (2004) 656 final. *Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective*.

European Commission COM (2007) 663 final. Turkey 2007 Progress Report, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008*.

European Commission COM (2010) 660. Turkey 2010 Progress Report, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011*. [online] Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf> [Accessed 1 October 2011]

European Commission COM (2011) 666 final. Conclusions on Turkey, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012*.

ExxonMobil (2009). *The Outlook for Energy: A View to 2030*. [pdf] Available at: <http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/news_pub_eo_2010.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2011]

Feyzullayev, A. (2011). About retardation of a physicochemical processes in overpressured sediments, South-Caspian basin, Azerbaijan. *Natural Science*, 3 (5), pp. 359-364.

Gokay, B. (2001). *The Politics of the Caspian Oil*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Gül, M. (2008). Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations after 1989. *Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 7 (2 and 3).

Hakki, M.M. (2006). Turkey into the European Union Past Challenges and Future Prospects. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 6 (1), pp. 51-79.

Helman, C. (2010). The World's Biggest Oil Reserves, *Forbes*, [online]. Available at: <<http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/21/biggest-oil-fields-business-energy-oil-fields.html>> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

Heper, M. (2007). *The State and Kurds in Turkey - The Question of Assimilation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Humans Rights Watch (2012). *World Report: Turkey*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-turkey>> [Accessed 10 November 2011]

Hurriyet Daily News (2012). *Minister wants free trade with Georgia, Azerbaijan*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/minister-wants-free-trade-with-georgia-azerbaijan-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=13964&NewsCatID=344>> [Accessed 22 February 2012]

International Energy Agency (2005). *Energy Policies of IEA Countries - Turkey 2005 Review*. [pdf] Available at: <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/energy-policies-of-iea-countries-turkey-2005_9789264109285-en> [Accessed 20 July 2011]

Iraq Business News (2011). Siba and Mansuriyah Gas Deals Signed, *Iraq Business News*. [online]. Available at: <<http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/06/05/siba-and-mansuriyah-gas-deals-signed/>> [Accessed 1 March 2012]

Osgood, P. (2011). Country Focus: Iraq's New Dawn, *Arabian Oil and Gas*. [online]. Available at: <<http://www.arabianoilandgas.com/article-9339-country-focus-iraqs-new-dawn/4/>> [Accessed 1 March 2012]

Johnson, R. (2012). Following New EU Sanctions, Iran Says Closing The Strait Of Hormuz Is Now Its Legal Right, *Business Insider*, [online]. Available at: <http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-01-23/news/30654472_1_iran-claims-fars-underwater-threat> [Accessed 19 March 2012]

Kamrava, M. (2005). *The Modern Middle East - a Political History Since the First World War*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Kuşku, E. (2008). The Shadow of Past Rivalry: Limits of Post-1999 Dynamism in Greco-Turkish Relations. *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 2 (3), pp. 156-165.

Kuzu, D. (2010). A Self-Governing Group or Equal Citizens? Kurds, Turkey and the European Union. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 9 (1).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (2008). *Turkey's Energy Strategy*.

[pdf] Available at:

<[http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Strategy%20\(Ocak%202009\).pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Strategy%20(Ocak%202009).pdf)> [Accessed 10 November 2011]

MIT Energy Initiative (2010). *The Future of Natural Gas: an interdisciplinary MIT study, Interim Report 2010.*

Mohapatra, A. (2008). *Democratization in the Arab World : Relevance of the Turkish Model*, Sage Publications, [online]. Available at:

<<http://isq.sagepub.com/content/45/4/271>> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Moxon-Browne, E. (2009). Turkey and the European Union: Divergent Discourses?. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 9 (3), pp.34-52.

Nabucco. (2012) *Nabucco Gas Pipeline*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route>> [Accessed 12 January 2012]

Natural Resources Defence Council (2011). *Say No to Tar Sands Pipeline: Proposed Keystone XL Project Would Deliver Dirty Fuel at a High Cost*. [pdf] Available at: <<http://www.nrdc.org/land/files/TarSandsPipeline4pgr.pdf>> [Accessed 12 January 2012]

New World Encyclopedia (2007). *Caspian Sea*. [online] Available at: <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Caspian_Sea> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Offshore, (2009) Petrobras, TPAO sign Black Sea rig accord, *Offshore Magazine*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2009/05/petrobrastpao-sign-black-sea-rig-accord.html>> [Accessed 01 March 2012]

Offshore Technology (2011). *Shah Deniz, Azerbaijan*. [online] Available at: <http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/shah_deniz/> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

Oktem, K. (2011). *Turkey since 1999: Angry Nation*. London: Zed Books.

Özcan, S. (2010). Historical evolution of the Europeanization process of Turkey. *Portuguese Journal of International Affairs*, Spring-Summer 2010, pp. 33-40.

People's Daily Online (2010). Petrobras, Turkish TPAO to enhance oil exploration research in Black Sea, *People's Daily Online*. [online] Available at: <<http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90858/90863/7003689.html>> [Accessed 29

March 2012]

Privatization Administration - Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (2005? probable year). *Privatization of Turkey's Electricity - Distribution Industry*. [online] Available at: <http://www.oib.gov.tr/tedas/teaser_english.pdf> [Accessed 10 November 2011]

Privatization Administration - Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (2010). *Privatization Endeavor in Turkey*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.oib.gov.tr/yayinlar/publications.htm>> [Accessed 10 November 2011]

Ramírez, P. (2009). El desenvolvimiento de las relaciones de la Federación Rusa con la Unión Europea entre los años 2007 y 2009. Sus aciertos y desaciertos. *CONfines*, 5 (10), pp. 25-37.

Rapoza, K. (2012). In Brazil, Chevron's Lone Gunman Shoots Again, *Forbes*, [online]. Available at: <<http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/04/05/in-brazil-chevrons-lone-gunman-shoots-again>> [Accessed 05 April 2012]

Rigzone. (2006) Petrobras Wins Deepwater Exploration Blocks in the Black Sea, *E&P News*. [online] <http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=29739> [Accessed 15 February 2012]

Romaniuk, S. N *et alii* (2010). In *Omnia Paratus: Of War, Conflict, and International Law in the Contemporary World System*. *Journal of Politics and Law*, 3 (2).

Rousseau, R. (2011). Competing Geopolitical Interests of China, Russia and the United States in Central Asia and the Caspian Region. *Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 14 (3).

Sardar, Z. (1984). *The touch of Midas - Science, values and environment in Islam and the West*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Şeker, N. (2005). *Identity formation and the political power in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic*. [online] *Historia Actual Online* (September 2005). Available at: <<http://www.historia-actual.org/Publicaciones/index.php/haol/article/viewPDFInterstitial/118/107>> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Serbos, S. (2008). Between the Functional and the Essential: European Perceptions & Domestic Choices in the Framework of Contemporary EU-Turkish Relations. *Research Journal of International Studies*, 7, pp. 4-18.

Shapovalova, N. (2010). The Battle for Ukraine's energy allegiance. *Policy Brief - FRIDE*, 55.

SOCAR (2011? probable year). *Oil History in Azerbaijan*. [online] Available at: <<http://new.socar.az/socar/en/company/about-socar/oil-history-in-azerbaijan>> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Society of Petroleum Engineers (2007). *Petroleum Resources Management System*. [pdf] Available at: <http://www.spe.org/industry/docs/Petroleum_Resources_Management_System_2007.pdf> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Strateji Araştırmalar Mərkəzi (2010). Azerbaijan Focus, *Journal of International Affairs*, [online]. Available at: <<http://sam.gov.az/en/publications/journals/azerbaijanfocus/>> [Accessed 25 July 2011]

Suvarierol, S. (2003). *The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union*.

Tocci, N. et alii (2004). Cyprus. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 1 (2).

Tocci, N. (2007). *The Closed Armenia-Turkey Border: economic and social effects, including those on the people; and implications for the Overall Situation in the region*. Brussels: European Parliament.

Turkish Petroleum Corporation (2012). *TPAO Worldwide*. [online] Available at: <http://www.tpa.gov.tr/tp2/sub_en/sub_content.aspx?id=78> [Accessed 16 March 2012]

Tunali, O. (1995). Turkey's energy insecurity, *World Watch*. Available at: <<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Turkey's+energy+insecurity.-a017312940>> [Accessed 12 January 2012]

UN Security Council (1974). *Resolution 354 of July 20*. [online] Available at: <<http://daccess-dds->

ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/73/IMG/NR028973.pdf?OpenElement>

[Accessed 15 November 2011]

UN Security Council (2003). *Report of the Secretary General of his mission of good offices in Cyprus*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.un.org/docs/sc/sgrep03.html>>

[Accessed 29 March 2012]

UN Security Council (2004). *Report of the Secretary General of his mission of good offices in Cyprus*. [online] Available at: <[http://daccess-dds-](http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/361/53/PDF/N0436153.pdf?OpenElement)

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/361/53/PDF/N0436153.pdf?OpenElement>

[Accessed 29 March 2012]

UNDP (2009). *International Migration and Human Development in Turkey*. [pdf]

Available at:

<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/papers/HDRP_2009_52.pdf> [Accessed

29 March 2012]

Wan, E. *et alii* (2009). A review of the literature on "ethnicity" and "national identity" and related missiological studies, *Global Missiology*, [online]. Available at:

<<http://ojs.globalmissiology.org/index.php/english/article/viewFile/194/542>> [Accessed

10 March 2012]

Watkins, E (2012). Russia to Build South Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Via Turkey, *Oil and Gas Journal*, [online]. Available at: <[http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-](http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-1a/general-interest/russia-to-build-south.html)

[110/issue-1a/general-interest/russia-to-build-south.html](http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-1a/general-interest/russia-to-build-south.html)> [Accessed 26 January 2012]

Yazdani, E. (2006). Competition over the Caspian oil routes: Oilers and Gamers perspective. *Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 5 (1 and 2).

Yinanç, B. (2012). Turkey got more than it wanted on Nabucco, *Hurriyet Daily News*,

[online]. Available at: <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/finance/12048093.asp>>

[Accessed 15 March 2010]

Yiangou, G. S. (2002). The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and

Opportunities for the New European Regional Order. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and*

Minority Issues in Europe, 2.