WHAT ABOUT THE PEOPLE? POPULAR LEGITIMACY AND THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL THREATS

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RESUMO

Este texto aborda o papel dos actores não estatais no contexto das relações internacionais contemporâneas e bem assim o modo como este condiciona as decisões políticas, nomeadamente as respeitantes a questões de segurança. Analisa-se por isso a evolução da sensibilidade e da participação política directa, na Europa, em matérias da agenda internacional. Tomando em conta essa condicionante, aborda-se o cenário recente da relação das democracias, nos planos teórico e prático, com os desafios postos pelo terror, como ameaça securitária, no que respeita à manutenção concomitante da paz, da segurança e da liberdade.

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the issue of the role of non-state actors in the context of contemporary international relations, as well as the way it conditions political decisions, namely at the level of security. With a view to the evolution of political awareness and participation of the people in Europe on what concerns dominant topics of the international agenda, this paper aims to discuss the role of popular participation in the shaping of international politics. Furthermore, against a background of democratic theorisation, it aims to discuss how democracies can cope with terror without giving up both peace and freedom as their basilar standpoints.

1 Working paper presented to the CISS-ISA Conference (Buçaco, Portugal, 2007) as part of an on going research project on citizenship (OBERCID – Observatory on Citizenship) at CECLICO – Fernando Pessoa University. The project encompasses theoretical research along several axes – among which political participation – and empirical research on attitudes towards citizenship.
INTRODUCTION

By addressing the issue of popular legitimacy in the context of global threats, the topic this paper discusses is directly connected with the feasibility of democracy as a worldwide political solution, in terms both of its cultural and pragmatic adequacy.

For long non-state actors were not actors at all of conventional international relations and therefore international relations theory would not even consider them. Bounded to the domestic arenas, non-state actors would stick to national public spheres and would only remotely drive, if at all, international politics, by trusting sovereign powers into the hands of legitimate and allegedly skilful politicians, who would make the best (rational) decisions for the sake of the national interest of their home communities (Risse, 1995; Viotti and Kauppi, 1998). However, conventional representative democracy is increasingly being questioned on the grounds of its adequacy to the founding principle of popular legitimacy, as well as on the grounds of the results so far achieved (Avritzer and Santos, 2003; Held, 2006). Among others, the capacity for providing the citizens with reliable conditions of lasting security was one of the functions performed by the state that made it an accepted institution in the view of the people. In the long run, it endorsed part of the taken for grantedness of the institution. Yet, more recently, not only the idea of a nationally bounded community of citizens, as a community of law and rights, has been at stake, but it has also become pretty evident that, for the many, the state is far from being a capable provider of security for the citizens, without entering (the best) international arrangements. This is consistent with recent analyses on the evolution of post-Cold War security structures (Waever and Buzan, 2003). Thus, not only the aggregate interests of the people have been ‘de-bordering’ the national territories, by producing what is increasingly being called a transnational civil society, but also they have sometimes demarcated themselves from the standpoints of their national governments, on issues of international politics.

The European Union (EU), which has become a ‘gigantic’ international actor, seems nevertheless to be standing on ‘clay feet,’ security policies being concerned (Salmon, 2005). Not only its institutional capacity for producing coherent, cohesive policy measures at this level is limited, but also it meets in this domain the Achilles’ heel of the whole EU construction, which is the divorce between popular will and the bureaucratic structure upon which integration has been constructed (Kantner and Liberatore, 2006). Recent episodes concerning international interventions and geopolitics provided good evidence of disjuncture between the several governments of the EU member states, as well as a clear view of the divorce between state and society, on the issue of war. Such situation is inevitably paralysing for the well-being of any democracy. At the EU level, however, this may shape both a constraint and an opportunity: on the one hand, a need to overcome internal division between member states that may hinder the cohesion and continuation of the integration project,
on the other hand, an opportunity for meeting peoples’ expectations in terms of internal and external security, by acting as a consistent regional and global actor and thus re-enforcing itself as a polity. Its characterisation as a ‘normative power’ (Adler and Crawford, 2004) and in general the evolution of its international role as ‘crisis management actor’ (Howorth, 2007) may also be pointing in this direction.

Terror became a keyword for international political analysis in the recent years and a major topic of world politics. Terror is a bad companion to democracy, as history has proved in the many cases it took over legal political order (Robin, 2005; Schmid, 2005). However, in the international environment, terror is not a by-product of anarchy, understood as ‘no state’s land’ lack of order. Terror, as we know it today, conveys deliberate political disorder in the national and international environments, rather than lack of order and cannot be explained in the framework of the traditional state system. Terror is in itself a given type of order, obeying its own logics and serving given interests. It is not erratic and not irrational. It questions democratic western order which for many years we have grown accustomed to considering ‘the best possible order’ for the world. Democracies, characterised as plural, open societies, do face a challenge here (Bauer and Raufer, 2003).

Yet, at the same time, claims for the democratisation of the world are fully in the agenda, coming both from idealistic views of cosmopolitan democracy and from more pragmatic programmes of structural adjustment or even preventive intervention. Either ways, non state actors are expected to play a role, be it as old or newly founded national civil societies, or as the transnational basis for cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Ottaway, 2005).

The subsequent text therefore addresses, in order, the following three topics: non-state actors; EU security policies and public opinion; terror, security and democracy.

NON-STATE ACTORS

Non-state actors and, in particular, civil society and its political role have become an increasingly debated topic in the academic field areas of politics and international relations, for the last couple of years (Risse, 1995). Though within politics, and espe-

\footnote{LSE’s Research Centre on Civil Society provides the following definition: “Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional as-}
cially democratic politics, organised civil society has had to be taken into account from its modern origins (actually the concept dates back there) it is nevertheless evident that recent trends of democracy, which have dictated a certain disenchantment with the representative pattern, have led to the reinforcement of alternative mechanisms, such as deliberative and, or participatory democracy (Avritzer and Santos, 2003; Held, 2006). Mediated participation is thus being increasingly challenged by complementary or even competitive mechanisms of much closer participation. Yet, if political communities are to be defined as national political communities, this will still be a matter of the domestic equilibrium between state and society, rather than an issue directly affecting the international level of politics.

For international relations however, the central question is that of the legitimacy of international politics decision-making procedures (O’Brien and Williams, 2004: 163). Legitimate national governments put forward claims for their legitimate mandate, according to the results of national elections and defy any of the so called civil society emergent agents in the international arena to put forward the same amount of supporters to their standpoints as theirs’ of electors. The argument is partially a good one, since national governments are endorsed with a legitimate mandate, according to electoral results, which also encompasses programmatic political guidelines for international politics. However, ever since World War II, a trend towards multilateralism has re-shaped the amount and nature of institutional transactions between national governments in the international environment and intergovernmental and even supranational organisations have emerged as taken for granted new actors of international relations. Though the scepticism of a strictly intergovernmentalist view on the evolution of multilateralism for the last fifty years or so might argue that, in terms of sovereignty, there is nothing specific to this new level of political decision and therefore that these institutions only work to the extent states are willing to make them work, their autonomy as ontologically consistent actors in international relations is increasingly evident. How would we, for instance, characterise global governance without considering World Trade Organisation or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or the United Nations or the European Union? Perhaps better put, can we breakdown every and each endeavour undertaken by these organisations into a specific calculation of the best common denominator for each and every state involved? Or still in other words: is it not the case that there is an effective sharing of sovereign political powers among the states, as they become increasingly involved in these organisations? (Karns and Mingst, 2004; O’Brien and Williams, 2004: 315-337) A positive answer to the last question thus implies getting back to the issue of legitimacy, as transferences of sovereignty are not minor functional changes, since they result in changes at the level of the polities’ constitutional order.

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ociations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.” [http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm (20/05/2007)]
That way put the issue raises two questions concerning the societal level:

i) It can be seen strictly as a matter of the relation between international organisations and the domestic societal sphere and thus of the mediation between the two. The latter can be conceived either as an exclusive task of the state, or as encompassing direct contact between the people and intergovernmental and, or, supranational instances. It then raises the question on whether the relation between the several levels of a multi-layered polity is only subsidiary or may encompass competitiveness between the layers (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Risse, 1995).

ii) It can be taken farther and thus lead to the interrogation on the criteria for the definition of the borders of political communities. Perhaps this is not yet so much the state of affairs, when it comes to intergovernmental organisations, but the question is becoming vital for the case of the EU, for example. A transnational civil society may be in the making, emerging out of shared common interests (eventually identities as well) that the national borders can no longer contain. Issue specific politics are substantially contributing to this de-bordering of the national community (Risse, 1995). International regimes such as the human rights regime – which is not simply an example among others, as it creates a statutory basis for questioning the unique role of the state in conferring citizenship and guaranteeing human rights – have substantially created cross borders societal continuities with, aside, or even against the national states (Risse, 1999). Still from this point of view, the fact that is not confined to a ‘docile’ civil society, only for the records of routine consultation procedures of international organisations, should be considered. This trend has shaped some of the largest political movements of present days political agendas and may raise the hypothesis of a new internationalism in the making (Pureza, 2001). The topic of a global civil society in the making has thus entered politics and international relations, be it attached to specific visions of a prospective cosmopolitan democracy, or more simply as a new framework category for the analysis of political actors.

Mary Kaldor3 has written extensively on the subject. She characterises civil society as:

(...) civil society, according to my definition, is the process through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against or agree with each other and with the centres of political and economic authority. Through voluntary associations, movements, parties, unions, the individual is able to act publicly. (2003: 585)

She points out that the expression was not so much in use until Latin American (in the sixties) and East European (in the eighties) societies started ‘opposing totalitarianism’ under claims for ‘autonomy’, ‘self-organization’ and ‘withdrawal from the

3 Mary Kaldor’s long list of publications on global civil society issues is available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Spublications2.htm (20/05/2007).
state’ and that way creating ‘islands of civic engagement’. For the purpose, human
rights issues were particularly important, as they are backed by an international norma-
tive framework, which legitimises action against its infringement. Besides, after
1989, three dimensions of the process became visible: one taken up by new social
movements; another integrated in the ‘new policy agenda’ by governments and in-
ternational institutions; and finally, a ‘postmodern version’ of civil society embodied
by movements of a non individualistic basis (ethnic and/or religious based groups)
(Kaldor, 2003).

As for a global civil society⁴, Kaldor characterises it as follows:

(…) global civil society is a platform inhabited by activists (or post-Marxists), NGOs
and neoliberals, as well as national and religious groups, where they argue about,
campaign for (or against), negotiate about, or lobby for the arrangements that sha-
pe global developments. There is not one global civil society but many, affecting a
range of issues – human rights, environment and so on. It is not democratic (…) It is
also uneven and Northern-dominated. Nevertheless, the emergence of this pheno-
menon does offer a potential for individuals – a potential for emancipation. (Kaldor,

The definition above, far from presenting global civil society as a ‘political commu-
nity’ presents it as a much looser structure – a platform, i.e., a basis for free expression,
free exchange of information, advocacy of causes and negotiation of solutions. It
also acknowledges its Northern (the word Western could also be used) imprint and
the unevenness thus resulting. Despite those limits, Kaldor recognises it has a poten-
tial for creating conditions for individual emancipation, which can only be under-
stood as emancipation both from socially and politically obnoxious powers (Kaldor,
2003; 2003a).

Whether to include organised interests of a corporate nature within the definition
of civil society is a contested issue, as those can be interpreted either as part of the
power relations endorsing governments, or as an external (with relation to the latter)
civil standpoint, endowed with relative autonomy from the state and having a say
in the public arena. Santos (2001: 64), in his analysis of globalisation, distinguishes
between ‘global capitalist practices’ their protagonists being transnational corpora-
tions, and ‘transnational social and cultural practices’, in which he includes NGO’s,
social movements and other networks associated with transnational solidarism. In-
deed, much of the so called civil society – especially NGO’s – concentrates on issues
relating peace and stability, for humanitarian or other reasons. However, peace and
stability are also beneficial for the bulk of traders and producers, the warfare busi-

⁴ For more detailed information on global civil society see also the Global Civil Society Yearbooks [http://www.
lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchgcspub.htm (30.05. 2007)].
ness not being a universal solution for generating affluence among entrepreneurs. Besides, the vindication of war or the call to arms are not usually a claim put forward by civil society agents (though mass mobilisation for religious or nationalist warfare, which has happened in the Western world in the past, are exceptions to this).

In terms of political power, however, all these movements and organisations cannot parallel governmental instances, their means being mostly advocacy, civic mobilisation and pressure capacity, the provision of technical expertise, public opinion making and consultation. Yet, recent patterns of governance (at local, national, regional or global level) have reinforced the role of civil society representatives in policy making – both for the preparation and the implementation of policies – through the mechanisms of consultation and partnerships. Therefore, it seems that the political role of civil society agents is increasing, but this cannot be interpreted as the creation of an even and worldwide civic or political community. The whole process still bears a strong mark of fragmentation and ideologisation, the latter within the patterns of western democracy.

THE EUROPEAN UNION, SECURITY POLICIES AND PUBLIC OPINION

Issue politics embody a substantial part of civil society approaches to the international scene. Security is one of those issues, certainly a relevant one. In the words of Karl Deutsch (1957), integrated communities are peaceful ‘security communities’\(^5\). This idea points to one of the main tasks a polity is expected to accomplish, that of providing security for its citizens, which means both internal and external protection. In the European Union, security issues are becoming a growing subject of interest, not only for the politicians but also for the common citizen. Though it could be argued that the European Union was born from a common market project, it is also known that, from the outset, the project was aimed at becoming something else – an integrated polity – although in a gradual, step by step manner. Thus, the definition of a common foreign security policy has been, from the commencement, a distant objective in the future and the path meanwhile covered provides good evidence of that. However, being a core area of conventional state sovereignty the states hesitate in recognising it as a clear area of common interest, that resulting in limited institutional means (Nicoll and Salmon, 2001; Salmon, 2005).

My hypothesis is that, in spite of its relative underdevelopment (if, for instance, compared with economic integration) this might be an area in which citizens might be

\(^5\) Deutsch’s idea is very much at the core of the ongoing debate on the EU as a ‘normative power’ (see e.g. Adler and Crawford, 2004).
willing to accept a more proactive and cohesive role of the EU. For further analysing 
the problem, two questions must be asked: First, how are European Union's institu-
tions dealing with security issues (both externally and internally)? Second, how do 
European citizens face the problem? Furthermore, it should be taken into account 
that the recent years have registered some critical junctures, security issues being 
considered, namely the Balkans' crises, the impacts of the 9/11/2001, the war in Iraq\textsuperscript{6} 
and the terrorist attacks in Spain in 2004 and in London, in 2005. Terrorism in Europe 
and other parts of the world illustrates the fact that internal and external security are 
closely tied, especially at a time of systematic migration and open borders.

As the aim of this paper is not to thoroughly analyse security policies in the fram-
ework of the European Union, the following is only a brief sketch of those of its 
characteristics that directly relate the problem being debated. An analysis of the Eu-
ropean Council's document \textit{A Secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy} (2003) allows a certain number of conclusions and a brief reflection. There is a 
clear notion that internal and external issues concerning security are connected be-
cause of open borders and global interdependence. There is also a clear concern that 
the 'internal' (i.e. EU's) territory be equally safe and peaceful along its entire exten-
sion. Security is presented as a pre-condition for development, addressing the cases 
of other world regions undermined by cycles of poverty, disease and war. Awareness 
of the EU as a global actor, also at the security level, is stated. The role of the US as a 
'dominant military actor' is acknowledged but it is also affirmed: "However, no single 
country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own" (European Council, 
2003: 1). Key threats are identified as being: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.

Action to be undertaken encompasses sharing the responsibility for global security 
i.e.: addressing the threats, namely by seeking conflict prevention through the use of 
military, humanitarian and economic instruments; having neighbourhood concerns 
– it is stated that “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East 
of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean” (European Council, 
2003: 1); promoting multilateralism, international order, international law and the 
role of the UN; continuing transatlantic cooperation; spreading good governance, 
trade and international assistance; creating effective mechanisms for crisis manage-
ment; and increasing coordination of member states capacities.

The picture thus sketched is one of a global political actor breaking through in order 
to become an effective presence in the international scenario, knowing as it does 
that its economic interests and human networks are not confined to its geographi-

\textsuperscript{6} 9/11 posed a major challenge to global security, but Iraq's war, in the context of US's reaction to global se-
curity issues, brought war to the close East of Europe and enforced dissent among EU member states, while 
reinforcing a regional (both territorial and civilisational) referential to terrorism, on the borders of Europe.
cal borders and also that internal security can only be achieved at the price of some amount of external stabilisation. Specifically addressing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Posen (2006) argues that, from a structural realist perspective, it can be interpreted as a strategy of ‘balance of power’ i.e., EU is balancing US’s power as a response to unipolarity. The author further states: “I argue that the EU is preparing itself to manage autonomously security problems on Europe’s periphery and to have a voice in the settlement of more distant secure issues, should they prove of interest.” (2006: 150). Waever and Buzan provide an interpretation of EU’s security role as the shaping of a regional structure of security, a third way, between neorealist theses on unipolarism and globalist views on world security (Waever and Buzan, 2003).

The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2005) follows the same strategic guidelines, basing the action to be undertaken on four major principles: to prevent people turning to terrorism by addressing its root causes; to protect people and infrastructures; to pursue terrorists and to respond to crises. These imply not only a reactive but also a preventive coordinated strategy against terrorism, tackling ‘root’ causes, many of them having their origin outside EU borders and requiring external security policies’ measures, as addressed above. It is also stated that:

working to resolve conflicts and promote good governance and democracy will be essential elements of the Strategy, as part of the dialogue and alliance between cultures, faiths and civilisations, in order to address the motivational and structural factors underpinning radicalisation (…) the vast majority of Europeans, irrespective of belief, do not accept extremist ideologies. (Council of the European Union, 2005: 7)

This is important because:

“(…) the propagation of a particular extremist worldview brings individuals to consider and justify violence. In the context of the most recent wave of terror, for example, the core of the issue is propaganda which distorts conflicts around the world as a supposed proof of a clash between the West and Islam. To address these issues, we need to ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism by engaging with civil society and faith groups that reject the ideas put forward by terrorists and extremists that incite violence. (…) We must also ensure that our own policies do not exacerbate division. Developing a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues will support this.” (Council of the European Union, 2005: 7-8)

The emphasis on ‘intercultural dialogue’ and on the use of a ‘non-emotive lexicon’ is part of the notion that security is not a strictly military affair, that it is a matter profoundly rooted in societal practices and ideological frameworks. Therefore civil society is the primary place where to start counteracting extremism and associa-
ted violence. Though ‘top-down’ in its political nature, this appeal to civil society synergies partly corroborates my departing hypothesis that security might become a
good field for bridging EU’s political action with the popular level.

After the project of creating a common market as an open area for flows of merchandise, services, capital and people, emerged a common Europe, in which movements across borders have been welcomed. A European ‘public opinion’ may still be a contested concept, but the intensification of flows and increased communication between the places is opening up its space. From the beginning, the project has been elite driven, thus lacking the popular background any polity will have to find as a pre-condition for stabilisation. Existing institutional procedures within the Union still bear the mark of the so called ‘democratic deficit’7. I would argue that this is not so important for current decision making, as long as the quality of the decisions taken meets the functional requirements of the complex regional economic and political bloc EU evolved into, but may become a problem when facing critical junctures that require acknowledgment and identification with the European Union as a community, based on common interests, the defence of which may, at times, imply renouncing to other partial interests. In a sense, this is the dividing line between technical and major political decision, the latter belonging to the people, according to the democratic paradigm.

The European community, however, has never been too good in creating tides of popular mobilisation across borders, leaving the affair mostly to states and domestic relations. But it were certainly not the states that mobilised public opinion against their internal political decisions, at the time of the war in Iraq8. It was impressive that such a movement burst in several countries and it was all the more relevant that the people (at least those that integrated public demonstrations) were clearly standing against external security policy decisions of their home governments (Isernia and Everts, 2006). The dramatic climax of this were the events of March 2004, in Spain. They were a sharp demonstration of the ultimate bottom up nature of democratic

7 EU’s on line glossary provides the following definition for ‘democratic deficit’: “The democratic deficit is a concept invoked principally in the argument that the European Union and its various bodies suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen because their method of operating is so complex. The view is that the Community institutional set-up is dominated by an institution combining legislative and government powers (the Council of the European Union) and an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy (the European Commission). (…)”[http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm (20/05/2007)]

8 Flash Eurobarometer 151, a special survey conducted in 2003, provides evidence of people’s standpoints on the crisis of Iraq: “The first results of this survey reveal that EU citizens: prefer that the United Nations and the provisional government manage the rebuilding of Iraq/are highly in favour of offering humanitarian aid to Iraq/want their country to participate in financing the rebuilding of Iraq/want the US to beat the brunt of financing the rebuilding of Iraq/ (…) think that military intervention in Iraq was not justified/want more EU involvement in the Middle East Peace process/still feel the threat of terrorism”. (European Commission, 2003: 3).
legitimacy. Yet, in terms of the analysis of democratic procedures, it is very disturbing that the electoral outcome of the process was remotely controlled by a terrorist act.

Ever since, the interest of the Europeans for issues of internal and external security has intensified and is convergent across countries, according to opinion polls data. Furthermore, it appears to back the strategic guidelines adopted by the Union for such policies (namely prevention, by adopting good neighbourhood and external aid policies; judiciary cooperation and the enhancement of cross border information systems; anti-discrimination measures). This is therefore fresh terrain for political mobilisation and it is also an issue on which many citizens have shown their dissatisfaction with national political orientation. This is not to say that the Union, as a political layer, should be competing fiercely with the states; but, clearly, this is an issue area in which the citizens have internalised a notion of common interest and apparently see the advantages of sharing sovereignty to the benefit of all. The difference between some states’ standpoints and their citizens’ lies probably in the fact that whereas the latter care for their immediate personal and collective security, regardless of fracturing conjuncture and geopolitical strategies, the first sometimes seem to go the opposite way. Counterfactually, the question might be put on what the situation would have been like, back in 2003, if the level of integration for foreign security policy matters had been the same as for foreign commercial policy. Yet, there is also a case for a cautious approach to issues of external security policy, given its sensitiveness, in terms of the balance of power and even of their identitarian impacts, which might in the long run lead to dangerous oppositions, in the framework of globalisation.

The question is all the more pungent as it has been argued that foreign security policy bears the mark of a ‘double democratic deficit’ (Kantner and Liberatore, 2006: 377): from the point of view of the deepening of integration, Maastricht’s second pillar was at the same time an achievement and a disappointment. Its mostly intergovernmental sequence implies that the institutions of a communitarian inspiration, as the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice, do not truly have a say there. Thus, institutional initiative for a reinforcement of joint action on external security issues has to be taken at the core institution of the intergovernmental procedures – the European Council, which risks schizophrenia, entangled between the appeals of an emergent European civil society for common security and an ancestral and dividing notion of the several disparate national best interests.

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9 The bulk of the information comes from: Standard Eurobarometer, ns. 56 to 66 (2002-2007); Special Eurobarometer issues on relevant themes for the present debate, namely on: globalisation (n. 151) aid (n.184), organised cross-border crime and corruption (n. 245), the future of Europe (n. 251), enlargement (n. 255), neighbourhood policy (n. 259), discrimination (n. 263), fight against organised crime (n. 264), humanitarian aid (n. 268), nuclear safety (n. 271); Flash Eurobarometer, 151, “Iraq and Peace in the World” (2003).
The third topic to be addressed is that on the nature of terror and its relation to democracy. This also implies addressing security policies, in the framework of democratic states. Schmid (2005), in discussing “Terrorism as Psychological Warfare”, establishes a close connection between terror and public opinion trends. He quotes Weinberg and Pedahzur who state: “Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role” (2005: 140). Also Boaz Ganor has defined it as:

(…) terrorism is a form of psychological warfare against the public morale, whereby terrorist organizations through indiscriminate attacks, attempt to change the political agenda of the targeted population (…) By convincing the target population that terrorist attacks can be stopped only by appeasement of the terrorist organizations, the terrorist hope to win concessions to their demands. The greatest danger presented by terrorism is thus not necessarily the direct physical damage that it inflicts, but the impact on the way policy makers feel, think and respond (cit. by Schmid, 2005: 143)

Both definitions stress the fact that terror is a means at the service of a political end and that it targets both politicians and public opinion, in order to directly or indirectly manipulate decision making procedures. Therefore, one of the tactics to act against a state or political power is to demonstrate its incapacity for protecting the citizens and thus alienating them from the state by breaking down trust and consent, which, in the case of democracies, are fundamental for the good functioning of the political institutions. In this context, media broadcasted news are a major support for the actions of terrorists. “We give the media what they need: newsworthy events. They cover us, explain our causes and this, unknowingly, legitimates us (…)”, once declared a terrorist (cit. by Schmid, 2005: 141).

On the other side, governmental institutions may also be tempted to manipulate public opinion, in order to back up their anti-terrorist strategies. A common fear may be as much an effective argument for mobilisation as a good common cause. Furthermore, it allows the construction of a divisive discourse distinguishing the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ wars, as Jackson (2005) has demonstrated. Whether this will be used strictly for the combat of enrooted terrorist cells or will spill over to other internal and external policy strategies is ultimately a matter of the ethics of those who govern… and obviously of the amount of institutionalised control mechanisms a democracy is able to maintain, even when going through a time of security crisis that will usually allow for some amount of exceptionalism. From this point of view, Jackson analyses the recent US discourse on the war on terrorism as being indebted to a conventional view of the international sphere: “a zero-sum attitude towards international action, a tendency to militarize foreign policy responses, a fear of internal subversion, and a sense of enlargement towards ‘the other’.” (2005: 164).
Kaldor, in addressing the same topic in the context of globalisation, affirms: “Both terror and war on terror are profoundly inimical to global civil society. Terror can be regarded as a direct attack on global civil society, a way of creating fear and insecurity that are the opposite of civil society.” (2003: 591). The author is thus addressing one of the major threats implied in the spread of terrorism as a political weapon. The idea of a global civil society relies on some amount of peaceful relations and on openness between and across states, or in other words, on the spreading of the underlying conditions for a democratic society. Fear and fierce closing security measures undermine the communication ties that ought to be there for a global civil society to be at work. Thus, she puts US’s recent policy options for the fight on terrorism on the same ‘destructive’ side, globalisation being concerned. She further states, in addressing US’s anti-terrorist policy:

But I do not think Bush can reverse the process of globalization. The consequences of trying to do so will be a still more uneven, anarchic, wild globalization. If you like, it will be a situation in which the ‘outside’ of international relations, at least in a realist conception, comes ‘inside’; in which we can no longer insulate civil society from what goes on outside. The distinction between war and domestic peace made by classical theorists of civil society no longer holds. Global civil society offers the promise of bringing the ‘inside’ outside. The war on terror offers the opposite. The polarizing effect of war is likely to increase rather than reduce terrorist attacks. (Kaldor, 2003: 591)

That is to say that conventional notions of self and other insiders and outsiders, friends and enemies undermine universal notions of humankind that ‘good’ globalisation would otherwise promote. Furthermore, a conventional framework for the analysis of war, as something going on between the states, rather than inside of them, does not match the pattern of terrorism, which ‘invades’ the states’ territories and leads a rather unconventional type of war, right inside of them.

The question therefore is whether democracies can combat terrorism while preserving their inner structural foundations and persisting in standing for democratic procedures as good governance practices, in the framework of globalisation (Danchev and Macmillan, 2004). Democracies as open plural societies are obviously fragile, when facing terrorism, but their chance of surviving relies on their capacity for providing internal (and external) security without undermining democratic procedures. Kantner and Liberatore state “In democratic societies, public debate, public fears and public panic might easily escalate and open a window of opportunity for illiberal

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\[\text{10 The Council of the European Union stated, in 2005, in the document The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy: “Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. It poses a serious threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and the rights and freedoms of our citizens, especially through the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people.” (Council of the European Union, 2005: 6).}\]
politicians or force more or less liberal politicians to adopt illiberal measures." (2006: 369). The authors thus imply that internal anti-democratic temptations may find a reason in allegedly necessary anti-terrorist measures. Freeman also presents a good picture of the emergent difficulties:

The problem with restricting civil liberties to fight terrorism is that this strategy is fundamentally anathema to the constitutive norms of democracy. Democracy is based on the principles of electoral equality, the rule of law, and the idea that the government is limited in its power vis-à-vis individual citizens. (2006: 233)

However, he has compared different performances of different democracies, going through a period of crisis and has concluded that some do well, while others go into serious difficulties of maintaining basic democratic standards, especially on what concerns individual liberties and basic rights. Freeman (2006) points out three major institutional safeguards for the survival of democracy and civil liberties: legislative, judiciary and media control over political action. Here again the author’s discourse meets the role of non-state actors, namely civil society agents which, by being aware, by fostering public debate and by seeking and promoting the diffusion of reliable information may hinder authoritarian temptations.

These ideas are partially replicated in the report by the study group on Europe’s security capabilities, in 2004, as a reflection on the aforementioned European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003). A Human Security Doctrine for Europe (Study Group, 2004) thus presents a view on EU’s security as being closely connected both with external aid and developmental action, based on the concept of integration and therefore not stressing the difference between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Quite on the contrary, it presents arguments which favour the taking outside of some of the inside:

The European Union pioneered the technique of integration at the level of society, based on interdependence and adherence to common standards, as a way of promoting peace. The same approach should be adopted in external relations. Elements of this approach are contained in association agreements, trade and other forms of co-operation. It should be extended to the rule of law and public security. And if necessary, it must be guaranteed by the use of military capabilities. (Study Group, 2004: 12)

It is also stated that these interventions ought to be based upon a set of principles, which are: primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments and appropriate use of force.
A project for the establishment of a ‘Human Security Response Force’ for crisis intervention, composed of both military and civilians, a part of which would be volunteers, is presented in the same document:

(…) while the force should have a professional core, it should also have a voluntary element to contribute to the human security task forces. This ‘Human Security Voluntary Service’ should comprise two elements: mid-career or post-career professionals with skills to offer; and school-leavers and students who would be used for less challenging mission. (…) NGOs could be registered as part of the Human Security Volunteer Service, along with individuals. The Service could provide a framework for contracts with NGOs (…) For private corporations, there could be a registration procedure and tenders for certain non-military tasks, such as logistics or communications, but they should not form an integral part of the force. (Study Group, 2004: 23-24)

The issue of democracy and democratic accountability is also addressed, given EU’s double democratic deficit impending on security issues. Increased public access to relevant documents and the reinforcement of national Parliaments’ control over measures and documents on security are the measures presented. Furthermore, for guaranteeing democratic accountability in the missions, it is advocated that there should be: bottom up accountability, understood as the result of consultation to and debate with the local populations, about the goals and methods of the missions; a legal framework governing the missions publicly available; and finally, clear complaint procedures against mission personnel (Study Group, 2004: 20-26).

The picture of a ‘Human Security Doctrine’ thus resulting is much closer to the pattern that has been developed ever since World War II, namely within the framework of the UN, than the abovementioned dichotomised views on self and other. It stands for democratic values and procedures and it is based on the belief that the human rights regime is of universal value and can be applied as such. Thus, the use of force should be conditional to the respect of those values. Furthermore, it involves civilian action as part of security interventions. Yet, it remains to be proved whether such a security model is feasible, and, if so, how efficacious it can be for coping with core security issues. Last but not the least, the claimed universalism of the values underlying the ‘doctrine’ – no matter how ‘good’ they may look, before ‘Western’ eyes – is also highly arguable.

Nevertheless, the European Union as regional security framework in the making and in spite of its relative fragility, may in the long run become a good political locus for these views on security of a normative inspiration. Such doctrine seems to fit better civil society standpoints on the issue of war than conventional realist views of politics, war and violence.
CONCLUSION

How inspirational can democracy be for diminishing the ‘power’ of terror? Democracy is deeply rooted in the concept of liberty. However, security implies at times a certain amount of surveillance that may hinder individual liberties. How to cope both together, without living under a permanent regime of exceptionalism, which enables attempts of authoritarianism, is the difficult equation the democracies of the present have to solve. Democratic states are reacting in different manners to the threats of terrorism and it is undeniable that the problem, matched with the tendency to unipolarity, in the world system, reinforced internal dividing lines along geopolitical interests, namely in the EU. And yet, though without a consistent common framework to make it effective, Europe has been putting forward claims for a security policy that was shaped according to a notion of present days’ security issues that is, by far, more adapted to the framework of transnationalism and globalisation than any conventional state to state fight, in the search for hidden enemies. External stabilisation as a guarantee of human rights and a condition for internal security, spread of the democratic values and the maintenance of internal order within the boundaries of democratic legality are essential components of this strategy. Yet, this means tackling the structural causes of conflict rather than reacting to threats.

How can non-state actors contribute to the definition and the implementation of security policies? The answer will not, for the time being, be the same for every part of the world, but western democracies have long established civil societies that have grown accustomed to exerting a legitimate and free capacity of thinking and of expressing either agreement or disagreement. If individuals become aware of their civic rights and do not give in, in front of allegedly exceptional crisis management powers; if citizens’ awareness on the goals of terrorists is raised, rather than fear stimulated; if citizens’ standpoints are taken into account in the shaping and the making of policies, it will avoid their alienation from states or other governmental organisations’ policies. Furthermore, citizens are going across borders ever more frequently and this creates in the long run a good pre-condition for interpenetration, interculturalism and human integration. In the words of Kaldor, this means taking the inside outside, that is to say, deconstructing dividing lines that have once shaped differences as if they were essential features of an irremediably divided mankind.

The two abovementioned perspectives stand on a same normative pillar which is based upon the Kantian conception of peace as a universal value, thus competing with the idea that war is inextricably at the core of politics.
REFERENCES


