Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10284/1423
Título: Is the European Central Bank a Case for Institutional Adaptation to the Challenges of Globalisation?
Outros títulos: implications for European Union’s Democratic Legitimacy
Autor: Vila Maior, Paulo
Palavras-chave: European integration
European Central Bank
Accountability
Legitimacy
Data: 2006
Citação: Lewis, Douglas (Ed.) - Global Governance and the Quest for Justice. London: Hart Publishing, 2006. ISBN 1-84113-408-2. p. 39-68.
Resumo: The paper focus on the constitutional implications derived from the specific nature of the European Central Bank (ECB) for the would-be polity formation in the European Union (EU). The emphasis is placed on the alleged absence of democratic legitimacy and the intertwined weak pattern of accountability the ECB shows. My argument tries to challenge the reasoning supporting this conventional criticism. Maybe the ECB is not so undemocratic; maybe the institutional arrangements for its accountability are not to be so harshly criticised. The denial of the conventional criticism relies on the specific nature of the supranational polity that is emerging, for which Economic and Monetary Union (and the ECB by large) plays a prominent role. The reasons for this alternative interpretation are twofold. One depicts the specific nature of the European integration process, and the inherent changes to the traditional vision of sovereignty, democracy and accountability. The other challenges the way member states themselves are currently unable to satisfy the requirements of democratic legitimacy and accountability for reasons related to a decay of parliamentary democracies and for the diminished ability nation states have to be the central agents of decision-making in a world of increased economic interdependence. Therefore the ECB may be in possession of sufficient democratic legitimacy (and thus the claims of limited accountability fall apart) if one assess its performance as being the guarantee for price stability as the main political-economic outcome the supranational bank can afford to the European citizens.
Descrição: Paper presented to the Global Governance and the Search for Justice Conference, Sheffield, 2003.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10284/1423
ISBN: 1-84113-408-2
Aparece nas colecções:FCHS (DCPC) - Capítulos de Livros em Editoras Internacionais



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